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CONSPIRACY THINKING AND OFFICIAL RHETORIC IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA

by

CHARA KAY VAN HORN

Under the Direction of James Darsey

ABSTRACT
The assassination of President John F. Kennedy in 1963 and the terrorist attacks of 9/11 are two
events that scarred America and its people. In the aftermath of the assassination and the terrorist
attacks, the American public was forced to sift through competing messages existing in the
public sphere in order to make meaning out of the events. Although the American government,
within a few days of both events, released who was ultimately responsible (Lee Harvey Oswald
assassinated President Kennedy and Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda were responsible for 9/11),
the people were still left with coming to terms for why such violence occurred.

In order to provide a frame from which the American people could view and understand
the assassination and the terrorist attacks, two blue ribbon commissions were formed: the Warren
Commission, which investigated the assassination of President Kennedy, and the 9/11
Commission, which investigated the terrorist attacks. Despite the reports‘ purposes, significant
segments of the population questioned both Commissions‘ conclusions. In both instances,
conspiratorial understandings of the events grew after the publication of the reports so that, in the
case of the Warren Commission, most of the American public believe Oswald did not act alone
and, in the case of the 9/11 Commission, there is growing belief that the government‘s failure to
predict and prevent the terrorist attacks was the result of a governmental conspiracy. This
dissertation seeks to understand why, in our current times, official discourses are unable to
prevail over conspiracy theories.
This study proposes to illustrate the power of conspiracy discourse by examining it
through the lens of official discourses that were designed, in part, to head-off conspiracy beliefs
before they gained momentum within the American public. Such an inquiry will provide three
main benefits: it will contribute to a more exacting understanding of the rhetorical power of
conspiracy arguments in our times; it will provide insight into the relationship between official
and conspiracy discourses (especially as they now exist); and, such a study has implications for
determining the current direction of political life.
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Indeterminacy
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1
CHAPTER 1
FRACTIOUS FICTIONS: CONSPIRACY THEORY AND ITS
EVOLUTIONARY EFFECT ON OFFICIAL DISCOURSE

"It is, I think, an indisputable fact that Americans are, as Americans, the most
self-conscious people in the world, and the most addicted to the belief that the
other nations of the earth are in a conspiracy to under value them.”
—Henry James

Worldwide and Historical Appeal of Conspiracy Thinking
Conspiracies, or ―the agreement of two or more persons to do an illegal act, or to do a lawful act
by unlawful means,‖ have recurred throughout world history and have shaped and influenced
political thought and action.1 Catiline‘s attempt to overthrow the Roman government in 63 BCE
was chronicled by Cicero and served to influence Roman politics and historical thought. The
Roman Catholic Church, during the Middle Ages, was involved in the Crusades and the Spanish
Inquisition, which, as some scholars posit, marked the beginning of a millennium-long
conspiracy to root out Jews and Muslims in the name of Christianity.2 In addition to the
bloodshed inspired by Christianity, the selling of indulgences and corrupt policies—which were,
to some degree, designed to expand the power and influence of the Roman Catholic Church
throughout Europe—were a driving force behind the Protestant Reformation. During the early
years of the reign of Queen Elizabeth I of England (1570-1586), agents of the Church were
implicated in at least four assassination attempts against the queen.3 There are even those who
argue that the advent of Christianity was itself a conspiracy.4 With several significant historical
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events being the result of conspiracies, it should come as no surprise that theories about
conspiracies have also informed worldwide political thought and action.
Conspiracy theories, or ―the theor[ies] that an event or phenomenon occurs as a result of
a conspiracy between interested parties,‖ specifically as it pertains to ―belief[s] that some covert
but influential agency (typically political in motivation and oppressive in intent) is responsible
for an unexplained event,‖ have similarly influenced political thought and action.5 Fears about a
secretive group, the Bavarian Illuminati, surfaced in Europe during the late eighteenth century
and posited that the group was out to control the world.6 Similarly, in the late nineteenth century,
a pamphlet titled the Protocols of the Elders of Zion circulated throughout Europe and detailed a
secret plot being enacted by Jews to take over the world.7 More modern conspiracy theories are
as varied as Adolph Hitler‘s belief that Jews were the cause of Germany‘s moral decay and the
widely held belief, rebutted most recently in an official inquest nearly eleven years after her
tragic accident, that the death of Princess Diana was the result of a secret and concerted plot.
Though not a peculiarly American phenomenon, the United States has proved a
hospitable climate for a wide array of conspiracy theories. American historian Bernard Bailyn
argues that conspiracy beliefs inspired the events leading up to the American Revolution.8
Following the Revolution, the American people engaged in a series of movements denouncing
certain groups because of beliefs that these groups were attempting to take control of the new
country. Jedidiah Morse sounded the alarm that the Bavarian Illuminati were attempting to
infiltrate and control the new nation. Following closely on this fear was the kidnapping and
murder of a Freemason who was set to expose the secret inner workings of the Masonic Order.9
Religious movements with secretive underpinnings were particularly susceptible to alarmist
claims. Anti-Mormon and anti-Catholic sentiments were especially virulent during the first half
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of the nineteenth century, and a profound suspicion of secret religious sects continues to exist in
the American populace.10 The slave power conspiracy expressed beliefs that powerful
slaveholders were trying to subvert and gain control over the North and emerging states.11 By the
twentieth century, suspicions with deep nineteenth-century roots about the Federal Reserve
System were forwarded by such groups as the Grangers, and the fear of communist infiltration
prompted the first Red Scare at the close of World War I. The 1940s featured fears that an alien
other was invading the country in the form of an alleged UFO crash in Roswell, New Mexico.12
The 1950s saw the rise of Senator Joseph McCarthy and claims, made by him and by others, that
communists were again among us.13 Other conspiracy theories include beliefs that the
fluoridation of water is a mind-control plot implemented by the government and that the United
Nations is attempting to implement a New World Order.14 Although hardly an exhaustive list,
these examples reveal conspiracy thinking to be a perennial feature of American history,
occasionally significant enough to spur political reaction.
Cultural conditions in the time since World War II have proved to be a particularly ripe
breeding ground for the propagation and dissemination of conspiracy theories. In the time since
World War II, conspiracy theories have changed from pervasive fears that a cabal of alien others
were attempting to infiltrate and subvert American culture and ideals to, as Peter Knight states,
―a not entirely unfounded suspicion that the normal order of things itself amounts to a
conspiracy.‖15 The mutation of conspiracy fears from a single identifiable enemy to a more
amorphous and harder to define enemy now has conspiracy theories cast as ―a reasonable
assumption‖ on the part of a large segment of the American population instead of a ―fringe
belief‖ that is sometimes able to garner popular support and action.16 Technological advances in
communication, in particular, are credited with turning the conspiracy theory tide. The almost
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unfettered access the American people have to fanzines such as ―Paranoia,‖ which actively
promote a conspiratorial understanding of current cultural, social, economic, and political
conditions; media that capitalize on and popularize conspiracy beliefs with television shows and
films such as the X-Files and Oliver Stone‘s JFK; and the millions of Web pages devoted to
forwarding beliefs, either in support or denial, of conspiracy claims build off one another,
reinforcing a conspiratorial interpretation of events in the world.17
This ―culture of conspiracy‖ casts a default suspicion toward institutions of power so that
when these institutions ―authorize‖ discourses to explain a situation or event, they are lodged,
sometimes in direct opposition, against the information and various interpretations of the event,
whether factual or not, existing within the public sphere.18 Auditors are faced with an
overwhelming amount of information from which to choose in order to form their beliefs, and
this choice frequently rests on the question of whom to believe, the conspiratorial or the official;
this is a peculiarly contemporary phenomenon.
Despite their current widespread popularity and belief, conspiracy theories and the
rhetoric that accompanies them have received only modest attention from historians and even
less from rhetoricians. What we do understand about conspiracy theories has been deeply
influenced by psychological perspectives, which identify a political maladjustment in peoples—
usually located on the political, social, and economic fringes—who use conspiracy claims as a
means to gain notoriety or to force some sort of political action.19 For instance, filmmaker Oliver
Stone‘s release of JFK, and the hype that surrounded it, spurred the National Archives to release
hundreds of thousands of pages of previously sealed assassination records, and the work of
Stanton Friedman, and others like him, has prompted the U.S. Air Force to reinvestigate the
alleged UFO crash in Roswell at least twice.20 Rhetoricians confronting conspiracy theories have
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generally engaged in criticism designed to evaluate the theories by mapping the generic,
argumentative, and narrative dimensions of such arguments.21 What is common to both historical
and rhetorical scholarship is the tendency to examine conspiracy theories as aberrant,
misinformed, and overly simplistic, although there is a more recent recognition that belief in
conspiracy is neither as marginal as once imagined, nor as misguided and paranoid as once
presumed.22
Currently, conspiracy beliefs are a pervasive and powerful mode of thinking and many,
from the most marginal to the most powerful, people in the country fall victim, at times, to
conspiracy theory‘s seductive nature. Generally, identifying an argument as a conspiracy theory
serves as a means of dismissal, setting the ―theory‖ apart from the more reasoned, more
believable explanations offered by social, economic, and political leaders. There is now
recognition that a closer affinity than we have previously acknowledged exists between official
and/or political discourses and their conspiratorial counterparts; in fact, the current relationship
that exists is more dialogic than once believed.
Politicians have always had to respond to conspiracy claims when conspiracists were able
to forward a prima facie case. When such a case is presented it creates a rhetorical exigence23
that forces officials to address the claims, sometimes by passing legislation such as the Alien and
Sedition Acts and, in other times, by focusing political campaigns on conspiracy fears. The
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was created specifically to combat the fear of a communist
invasion following World War I.24 In instances where politicians forwarded their own claims of
conspiracy, as evidenced in discourses such as the Lincoln-Douglas Debates, politicians framed
fears of conspiracy in ways that dismissed the more ―irrational‖ beliefs as faulty while
simultaneously forwarding an argument that laid out a more ―reasonable‖ take on the issue at
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hand.25 Prior to World War II, once politicians took hold of the issue, or some sort of official
action was taken to address conspiracy fears, generally the fears faded back to the periphery until
a different alarm featuring a different enemy was sounded.26 Now, however, conspiracy theories
exist in a persistent battle between their version of reality and ―official‖ or ―authorized‖
discourses.
In our time, the ability of politicians and/or official discourses to maintain argumentative
presumption when challenged by conspiracy narratives is severely diminished. The general
skepticism leveled against economic, social, and political institutions and their discourses is,
according to Knight, ―inseparable from the culture of postmodernism … [and] is very much in
tune with a postmodern distrust of final narrative solutions.‖27 After all, Americans in large
numbers ―know,‖ contrary to claims set forth by the Warren Commission Report, that Lee
Harvey Oswald did not act alone in the assassination of President Kennedy, and although we
―know‖ Osama bin Laden was the master plotter behind the terrorist attacks of 9/11, a growing
portion of the population believes that there are significant questions about the attacks that
remain unanswered, despite the explanations propounded by the 9/11 Commission Report. The
uncertainty cast upon these two documents—the former embroiled in controversy for over forty
years, and the latter the subject of increasingly more widespread doubt—indicates that regardless
of the more ―reasonable‖ explanations for occurrences offered by officials, those officials have
been unable to forward arguments that quell conspiratorial beliefs about these events despite the
―definitive‖ and ―final‖ nature of the texts and despite being given almost limitless resources.
Certainly the sheer force of the authority of the government is insufficient to carry the burden of
proof.
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What this suggests is that conspiracy theories have enormous power in our contemporary
world. Conspiracy theories about significant historical, social, and cultural events often enter the
public sphere prior to the release of an ―official‖ response or interpretation. Official discourses,
at least in recent years, have been unable to diminish beliefs that conspiracies were behind the
events; indeed, in cases such as President Kennedy‘s assassination and the terrorist attacks of
9/11, conspiratorial interpretations of events, although present before publication, continued to
grow after the publication of the discourses. Central to this dissertation is understanding how
conspiracy theories manifest their power by shaping official discourses in the conspiracy image,
an image that allows conspiracy theories to grow after the release of official discourses.
Official discourse, like all discourse, is called forth by rhetorical exigencies.28 Based on
the situation, those who fashion official discourses are faced with the unenviable task of
compiling and sifting through overwhelming amounts of evidence, including the depositions and
testimony of witnesses from the most pedestrian of citizens to the most powerful leaders in the
country. This is no easy task; not only must the official discourse provide a complete account of
the events, it is also expected to ease the public‘s fears and to provide a list of suggested
comprehensive policy changes to keep such a tragic event from happening again. Moreover, the
discourse must provide a story that competes with counter claims and charges surrounding the
event, all of which are in circulation in the public sphere before the official discourse is formed.
If, as I argue, official discourse is designed, in part, to dismiss, contradict, and head off
conspiracy theories, then the inability for official discourse to prevail over conspiracy theories is
hampered by the enormous agenda-setting capabilities exhibited by conspiracy theories.
In essence, conspiracy theories force official discourse into a dialogue wherein official
discourse not only is incapable of prevailing over conspiracy beliefs, but in countering
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conspiracy claims takes on some of the generic characteristics of conspiracy arguments. If
conspiracy beliefs are powerful enough to force official discourse into a dialogue and are then
capable of calling into question the veracity and believability of official discourse, then there are
broad political implications that may be better understood by examining the nexus between
official and conspiratorial discourses under our contemporary cultural, social, and economic
conditions.

Categorizing Conspiracy, Conspiracy Theory, and Conspiracists
Different valences of conspiracy research have emerged within the last few years, providing the
public with a cornucopia of different synonyms for conspiracies, conspiracy theories, and
conspiracists. None of these studies share a definition of conspiracy. Conspiracy comes from the
Latin conspire, meaning to breathe together.29 According to the Oxford English Dictionary
(OED), the word ―conspiracy‖ found its way into the English language in 1386 when Chaucer
wrote of the conspiracy between Brutus and Cassius against Julius Caesar.30 Conspiracy theory,
however, did not find expression as a term until 1909 in The American History Review.31
The popular use of ―conspiracy theory‖ as a term, however, would not be realized until
1952 when it was used by Karl Popper to designate ―an explanation of a social phenomenon
[that] consists in the discovery of the men or groups who are interested in the occurrence of‖
conspiracies.32 More interesting, however, is the fact that the term ―conspiracy theory‖ was not
added to the OED until July 1997 when a supplemental issue of the dictionary was released.33 As
Alasdair Spark writes, recognition by the OED is a signal of the growing importance of
conspiracy theories in the popular imagination, especially as they exist in the United States.34
Even though the history of the term chronicles a growing recognition of the importance
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conspiracy theories play in contemporary society, for the sake of clarity and expediency, it is
necessary to define other key terms that relate to conspiracies and conspiracy theories.
Following the definitions of Jack Bratich and Michael Pfau, ―conspiracism,‖ ―conspiracy
beliefs,‖ and ―conspiracy fears‖ are the beliefs that conspiracies are ―a driving force in history.‖35
―Conspiracists‖ and ―conspiracy theorists‖ are those who believe in and conjure conspiracy
theories.36 ―Conspirators‖ are those who are implicated in the conspiracy plot. ―Conspiracy
discourse‖ is an umbrella term that encapsulates the sum of persuasive texts and the
―intertextual, ideological, political, and social context[s] within which these texts are produced
and consumed.‖37 ―Conspiracy narratives‖ and ―conspiracy rhetoric‖ are the narrative/rhetorical
accounts that posit that two or more people, for their own nefarious benefit, seek to control the
way an event occurs to the detriment of others.38 ―Conspiracy arguments‖ are narrower in focus
and pertain ―to the logical or rational operations and techniques‖ used to forward conspiracists‘
arguments.
In understanding the effects conspiracy theories have on official discourse, it is necessary
that all of these terms be employed and interrogated. Official discourse is a part and product of
the larger discursive arena into which it is born. This arena involves conspirators, conspiracists,
conspiracy theories, conspiracy discourse, and conspiracy arguments, all of which play a part in
shaping official discourse. In order to arrive at a thoughtful conclusion about the role conspiracy
theories play in the shaping of official discourse, it is necessary to be aware of, and sensitive to,
the above terms and their interrelationship.
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Historical Treatment of Conspiracy Arguments
Although conspiracy thinking and beliefs permeate world and American history, not much
scholarly ink was spilled in pursuit of its study until the height of the Cold War, followed by an
explosion of interest in the 1990s and into the new millennium. For instance, a basic search on
―conspiracy theory‖ in the ProQuest database lists only eleven theses or dissertations written
prior to 1990. Since 1990, however, over fifty theses and dissertations have directly dealt with
the topic of conspiracy theory.39 In their studies, historical and cultural scholars have typically
used a psychological approach to analyze conspiracy beliefs, characterizing conspiratorial belief,
itself, as a political disease. Virtually all of the existing scholarship aims at discrediting
conspiracy theories, either by pointing out the inherent problems associated with a conspiracy
culture, or by debunking the individual theories conspiracists introduce into the public sphere.40
Even those scholars who take a more sympathetic approach, sometimes recognizing that there
are very good reasons to believe in conspiracies, largely view conspiracy theories as
problematic.41
No work has been more influential in discrediting conspiracy beliefs than Richard
Hofstadter‘s ―The Paranoid Style in American Politics.‖42 Hofstadter wrote his invective against
conspiracy theories in the aftermath of World War II when existentialist and psychological
approaches to making meaning were not only en vogue in the scholarly community, but also in
more popular venues such as newspapers and magazines.43 The discovery of the horrors
uncovered after the war that were promoted by extremist ideologies prompted a general hostility
in the intellectual community directed against any form of extremist thought. The extremist
views widely followed by significant segments of the population, forwarded by Joseph
McCarthy in the 1950s and Barry Goldwater, Robert Welch and the John Birch Society in the

11
1960s, signaled alarms for the susceptibility of even a more pragmatic culture in the United
States to fall victim to increasingly extremist and emotional views.44 With a general hostility
directed against extremist views of politics, Hofstadter identified what he termed as ―an old and
recurrent mode of expression in our public life which has frequently been linked with
movements of suspicious discontent and whose content remains much the same even when it is
adopted by men [sic] of distinctly different purposes.‖45 Hofstadter labeled the totalizing and
apocalyptic expressions to which he was referring as ―the paranoid style,‖ being careful to note
that, although it was not a clinical pathology, such utterances were indicative of a political
malaise existing in a minority of political movements.
The belief that the paranoid style was a political fringe phenomenon was expanded to
encompass more than the radical right, which was Hofstadter‘s primary concern. Scholars such
as David Brion Davis, writing within a few years of Hofstadter, noted that virtually all countersubversive movements, whether from the political right or left, contained elements of
Hofstadter‘s paranoid style.46 Today, over forty years later, Hofstadter‘s delineation of a
―paranoid style‖ continues to be influential in scholarly and popular media. As Bratich observed,
―Most serious contemporary analysts of conspiracy theories (on various points on the political
spectrum) cite Hofstadter. In so doing, they use conspiracy theories as paradigmatic of the
‗paranoid style.‘‖47 Current conceptions of those suffering from the delusions of conspiracy now
range from the politically disaffected (e.g., African Americans) to the most powerful leaders in
the country.48 There continues to be a default assumption cast against conspiracy theories that
automatically presumes them to be a type of ―paranoid‖ pathology, sometimes blurring the line
between the political and clinical pathologies.49
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Those who view belief in conspiracy theories as a clinical delusion call to mind crackpots
who cling to conspiratorial beliefs because of their mental incapacity for determining real from
fictive causal events. Daniel Pipes compares belief in conspiracy to a ―titillation,‖ or a ―modish
… taste for puzzles and puzzlement.‖50 Regardless of a ―modish‖ taste for conspiracy, Pipes
emphasizes that belief in conspiracy is dangerous because it has the capability of becoming the
way one ―views life itself,‖ where one no longer can distinguish between fact and fiction. Robert
Robins and Jerrold Post posit that when political leaders suffer from the paranoid style it can lead
to hatred and result in a remarkable amount of bloodshed.51 Conspiracy beliefs, for these
scholars, are misguided, seductive, and dangerous and operate from a premise that there is a
―proper‖ or ―rational‖ way to view history and current situations, as opposed to an ―improper‖ or
―irrational‖ view.
Hofstadter, in particular, employed a ―consensus‖ approach to historiographic study.
Consensus historiography stemmed from the belief that the United States exhibited a rich and
unique history marked by an ideological consensus among its people. It was generally believed
that the American people were, on the whole, aspiring to middle-class values and beliefs. Those
who argued against or challenged consensus beliefs were attempting to disrupt the remarkable
continuity of the American experience.52 Thus, those who forwarded discourse that reflected the
paranoid style were malcontents, disenfranchised by the consensus view. As the study of history
changed to reflect a growing recognition that the telling of history is ideological, marginalizing,
and silencing of disparate voices in the polity, the metanarratives of history became problematic.
Far too frequently those voices that were not part of the prevailing view of history and politics
were left unexplored and unrecorded. Murray Edelman has pointed out that psychological frames
have the effect of turning social problems into individual problems, and explanations based on
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psychological pathology have the capacity to turn social problems into issues of individual
maladjustment.53 Historians began to posit that belief in conspiracy cannot solely be explained
by a paranoid premise.
With the increasing recognition that a multiplicity of disparate voices has either been
ignored or marginalized within the public sphere, that social problems are sometimes systemic
and structural and cannot always be dismissed as individual psychopathology, scholars have
recognized that conspiracy theories are not limited to the totalizing and apocalyptic frame set out
by Hofstadter. There is a general recognition in the historical and cultural communities that the
status of conspiracy theory in contemporary American society has fundamentally changed since
Hofstadter first published his ―paranoid‖ essay. Robert Goldberg states, ―This period departs
from the past in the regularity of the drumbeat, the multiplicity of messages and carriers, the
number of believers, and the depth of immersion of popular culture in conspiracy thinking.‖54
Conspiracy theories, rather than being marginal beliefs held by a minority of people, are now a
fundamental way a significant number of Americans view ―how the world works.‖55 The prima
facie belief in conspiracy gives rise to a whole host of types of conspiracy arguments. Various
types of conspiracy theories exist within the public sphere, some simply attributing causal
reasons to significant events, while others direct attention to a cabal of ne‘er-do-wells who are
attempting to destroy a way of life.56 While those who followed Hofstadter focused on the latter
type of conspiracy, most now focus on the former, recognizing that these types of conspiracy
theories serve different purposes within the polis.
Historians and cultural scholars have approached this new take on conspiracy theories by
using various interpretive frames by which to analyze conspiracy beliefs. Largely, scholars still
rely on psychological explanations arguing that different peoples use conspiracy theories for
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different functions. For example, marginal populations use conspiracy theories as a binding force
with which to battle racism, sexism, and oppression.57 Others are likely to use conspiracy
theories as a means to gain autonomy and power as intermediaries between the people (e.g.,
labor unions) and large institutions of power.58 Conspiracy theories represent a battle between
competing ideological factions and give people a means by which to infuse their lives with
meaning and significance.59 Instead of automatically seeing pathology when looking on
embittered people fighting against large systems of control, scholars are now inclined to
recognize what George Marcus terms ―paranoia within reason.‖60
Popular belief in conspiracy no longer requires an alien ―other‖ attempting to infiltrate
and subvert the masses; the enemy to be combated is our own system of power.61 While belief
that an alien ―other‖ is attempting to infiltrate and overtake the American government still exists
and has been most recently exploited by fringe members of the Tea Party, a belief that the
establishment itself is conspiring against the American people comes at the hands of uncovered
instances of corporate and governmental malfeasance (e.g., Watergate, COINTELPRO, IranContra, and Enron). Significant portions of the public now cast a cynical eye toward officials and
their ―authorized‖ versions of events. Knight explains, ―In the eyes of many Americans, the only
safe bet is that there might well be a conspiracy, for all the public at large know or are likely to
ever know. The burden of proof is now reversed, such that the authorities must strenuously
provide conclusive evidence that there has been no initial conspiracy or subsequent cover-up.‖62
Officials and their discourses must now not only ―prove‖ what happened in significant events,
but also must prove that the resulting event was not part of a larger conspiracy.
The questioning of official accounts of events through the medium of conspiracy theory
signifies that conspiracy and official discourse exist within a dialogic relationship. Of particular

15
importance to this study is Bratich‘s observation that conspiracy theories are ―a zone where
politics and reason meet.‖63 Not only do conspiracy theories cast suspicion and doubt onto
institutions of power and the discourses they provide, but these same institutions view conspiracy
theories as dangerous. Bratich argues that current political rationality views conspiracy theories
as the enemies, the threats against democracy that need to be battled.64 Conspiracy theories exist
in a battle of one-upmanship with official discourse, and, as it currently stands, are threatening to
become the way most of the population thinks about historical events.65
Although the historical and cultural studies of conspiracy theories still largely operate
from a psychological standpoint, there is a growing recognition that conspiracy theories stand in
direct opposition to their official counterparts. Conspiracies, rather than occasionally infecting
political thought and action, are now more about a growing suspicion directed at institutions of
power and are seen, by these same institutions, as an enemy that needs to be combated. If
conspiracy theories are an enemy, then it stands to reason that official discourses that are
designed to quell conspiracy beliefs should attempt to attack and root them out within the corpus
of their texts. Rhetorical scholars, in particular, are concerned with, and uniquely situated to
uncovering the suasory strength of conspiracy rhetoric and its interaction with official discourse.

Complicating the Context and Genesis of Conspiracy Argument
Rhetorical examinations of conspiracies have largely reflected the trajectory set out by
historians. The study of conspiracy within the rhetorical community has taken two primary paths:
determining the rhetorical characteristics that make conspiracy theories particularly persuasive
and evaluating individual conspiracy theories in an effort to expose their inherent argumentative
problems. Although the rhetorical community has largely used its skills to delegitimize
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conspiracy theories and beliefs, there is, as in the historical community, recognition that
conspiracy theories cannot be solely identified as pathological. Conspiracy theories are now a
staple of American politics and are forwarded by marginal and mainstream political actors
alike.66
Initial forays by rhetoricians into the dark world of conspiracy built upon Hofstadter‘s
characterization of paranoid discourse. Hofstadter argued that conspiracy discourse was marked
by a ―distorted style‖ contained within an ―apocalyptic and absolutist framework.‖67 The
narrative of the conspiracy theory, according to Hofstadter, contained: 1) ―a vast and sinister
conspiracy, a gigantic and yet subtle machinery of influence set in motion to undermine and
destroy a way of life‖; 2) ―the special significance that attaches to the figure of the renegade
from the enemy cause‖; and 3) ―that quality of pedantry‖ in which conspiracists imitate the form,
substance, and style of scholarly and legal arguments.68 Through this emulation, conspiracists
attempt to create ethos. Conspiracy theories, according to Hofstadter, begin with ―certain moral
commitments‖ and ―judgments‖ that can be defended.69 Conspiracists, when marshalling their
evidence to make their cases for conspiracy, are subject to ―leaps in logic‖ when tying together
seemingly unrelated events, people, and practices into these theories.70 Following Hofstadter‘s
lead, Earl Creps determined that conspiracy theories comprised a unique rhetorical genre
―composed of a deductive/causal substantive form, a massively documented/dramatic style, and
a ‗stressful‘ situation‖ that are bound together through the location of an evil force trying to
subvert American ideals.71 The location of evil allowed for a single, identifiable enemy to be
combated, resulting in polarizing the audience between ―Us,‖ upholders of traditional American
values and beliefs, and ―Them,‖ those who would destroy America and its way of life.72 In
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essence, Creps was articulating the signature elements of the narratives conspiracists weave in
telling their tales of deceit and corruption.
Conspiracy theories begin with the anomalies of an event or events: the unanswered
questions, the peculiarities of agents, the conflicting accounts among authorities. Conspiracists
point to the anomalous information and argue that such anomalies are a ―sign‖ that ―something‖
corrupt is occurring.73 These ―signs‖ then get woven into a dramatic and polarizing narrative
form. Narrative is, as Fran Mason asserts, ―the main form of legitimating knowledge in
conspiracy theory.‖74 The basic plot of the conspiracy narrative posits that someone or something
is threatening to destroy a community or way of life. The audience is warned of this impending
doom by a farsighted leader who amasses colossal amounts of evidence into a ―singular plot‖
that draws from ―the traditional logic of conventional popular narratives‖ (most notably the
mystery), and ascribes causality and agency of the potential destruction to some malignant
outside agent.75 Indeed, ―the primary burden of the conspiracy theorist,‖ according to James
Darsey, ―is to provide credible purpose as the preeminent element of motive‖ to the agent‘s
perceived desires.76 Conspiracy narratives gain their persuasive appeal by melding the purpose
guiding the agent (evil) with a dramatic form, what Burke calls a syllogistic progression. Burke
states, ―We call it syllogistic because, given certain things, certain things must follow.‖77 When
the audience reaches the inevitable conclusion of the conspiracy, it faces the recognition that the
only way the community can be saved is by purging itself of either the agent or the agency.
Conspiracy theories are plausible because of their ability to tap into the traditional values
and beliefs of their audiences, and they are able to stay popular within the public sphere over
long periods of time because of their ability to adapt to, and reflect, temporal and cultural
conditions.78 Conspiracy narratives allow for no ambiguities, no discrepancies, no coincidences;
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everything within the conspiracy narrative has a purpose.79 Indeed, the stories woven by
conspiracists maintain an internal coherence so masterful, that, according to Darsey, traditional
modes of evaluation, although helpful, are not accessible enough for the lay person to use to
evaluate conspiracy claims. Rather, a more helpful and public way to evaluate conspiracy
theories rests on a question of motive because, as Walter Fisher argued, even a lay public has the
access and acuity to determine if the motives of the villain make sense.80 While narrative may be
the vessel through which conspiracy theories gain their legitimization, equally important are the
argumentative techniques used within conspiracy narratives.
Perhaps the single most seductive element of the conspiracy argument is what David
Zarefsky terms as its self-sealing nature.81 Successful conspiracy arguments, according to
Zarefsky, ―shift the burden of proof onto opponents while minimizing its own burdens.‖82
Frequently, shifting the burden of proof onto those countering conspiracy claims includes using
argument from absence. When a conspiracy charge is made, and a respondent counters by
asserting that there is no conspiracy, then the response actually becomes proof that there is a
conspiracy. Even if there is no response, the absence of a response becomes evidence that a vast
and sinister conspiracy is brewing. As Brian Keeley notes, ―conspiracy arguments are the only
theories for which evidence against them is actually constructed as evidence in favor of them.‖83
Darsey affirms:
Under normal circumstances, appearance demands presumption. One who claims that
things are not as they appear to be assumes the burden of proof; a strong prima facie case
is required before appearances need be seriously interrogated. Conspiracy argument
exploits and reverses this normative presumption, making the lack of evidence into
evidence transmogrifying surfaces from their pedestrian status as the most visible
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outward manifestation of reality into veils and masks.84
Thus, the ability of conspiracy theories to use the absence of evidence as evidence allows for
virtually anything to be subsumed into the conspiracy narrative.
The rhetorical hallmarks of conspiracy theories provide insight into the power such
theories wield. However, rhetorical scholars have generally focused on, and analyzed, a singular
conspiracy theory located within the public sphere in order to uncover the argumentative and
narrative strategies conspiracists use in persuading their audiences. Such studies have tended to
uncover the situational and contextual elements that make conspiracy theories more believable
and then map out their inherent logical and narrative problems. I am more interested in the
intersection that exists between conspiracy arguments and official discourse and what this
intersection has to offer to our insight. Darsey alludes to an examination of this nexus when he
calls for a restoration of public science.85 The secrecy under which institutional agencies operate
is often ascribed to a malign purpose. Sissela Bok argues secrecy, by its very nature, breeds
distrust: it is an intentional concealment that ―sets apart the secret from the non-secret, and of
keepers of a secret from those excluded.‖86 In our increasingly secret world (be it related to
political, scientific, or trade realms), there is a tendency to believe the worst rather than the best
about what these ―secretive‖ agencies are doing.
When a significant event happens, such as the terrorist attacks of 9/11, and a claim that is
not immediately discreditable or compelling is made about the causes and culprits behind the
event, there is a moment of suspension where auditors fall in between comprehension and
incomprehension, the awful and the awe-full, what Darsey, borrowing from Tzvetan Todorov,
describes as the fantastic. It is this space between meaning and meaninglessness that conspiracy
theories fill, ascribing agency, purpose, and direction to otherwise senseless acts and effects.87
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When an ―official‖ explanation is forthcoming, it is already entering into a sphere of competition
with conspiracy theories. When counter-narratives fill the voids left by an absence of official
discourse, a kind of rhetorical back-peddling occurs on the part of officials. In other words,
officials have to prove within the corpus of their discourse that there is no conspiracy rather than
simply proving what happened, and the standards for proof are altered by the presence of
conspiracy narratives. The legitimacy of conspiracy theories is expanded when the discourse
offered fails to tell a story that ―fits‖ the facts and is exacerbated when credible witnesses offer
conflicting evidence and substantiate causal agency. In the absence of a compelling case on the
part of officials, people find themselves choosing between stories that provide purpose and
motive and other accounts that leave them open to interpretation and that seemingly defy
belief.88
Why are conspiracy theories so able to force the hand of officials? Part of the answer lies
with the loss of central authority and the indeterminacy of information that are, at least in part, a
result of the conditions of postmodernity.

Loss of Authority, Indeterminacy, and the Conditions of Conspiracy
Scholars overwhelmingly posit that the proliferation of conspiracy theories in our time is a result
of the loss of central authority and the rise of indeterminacy, both of which are a part of the
postmodern condition. Postmodernity is a highly contested term, entailing a host of theoretical
positions and criticisms. Generally, the term has been used to signal a period of time, although
Barry Smart offers that it is more useful to think of it as a recognition that the promises of
modernity—certainty, stability, security—―will remain unfulfilled.‖89 If the term is contested, so,
too, is the issue of its precise genesis. There is a general consensus that postmodernity emerged
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in the post-World War II world, and reached maturity, including finding its name, in the 1970s.90
Regardless of the exact time of its emergence, the nascent characteristics of postmodernity were
noticeable in the general turbulence that marked the 1950s and even more so the 1960s.
If postmodernity is a recognition of historical time, then postmodernism is the vehicle
through which this recognition is made manifest. ―Postmodernism‖ has been employed to signify
a ―style or genre‖ representing notions of fracture, ―fragmentation, indeterminacy, and plurality‖
that combated the narrow, restrictive views of modernity.91 Modernity, characterized as
―positivistic, technocentric, and rationalistic,‖ according to David Harvey, ―has been identified
with the belief in linear progress, absolute truths, the rational planning of ideal social orders, and
the standardization of knowledge and production.‖92 Political, social, and economic norms were
based on universal and totalizing ideals that set the standard to which people were to aspire.93
Those disenfranchised from the norms of political, social, and economic orders joined in a
mutual struggle to attain access to the universal ideals in the public sphere. In contradistinction,
postmodernity, is prefaced on the search for more individual meaning. Smart wrote, ―The
questioning of universals, of grounds, of foundations, and values, and the corollary, a recognition
of cultural pluralism and fragmentation, of diversity and difference are widely acknowledged to
be prominent features of the complex contemporary conditions we encounter.‖94 What has
changed from modernity to postmodernity are not the ideas of universal concepts, such as
equality, justice, and freedom, but, according to Simon Malpas, ―their ‗ontological status‘: their
certainty, the means by which they are defined, justified, and defended.‖95 Universal standards
take on new and disparate meanings among disparate peoples. A cacophony of voices enters into
an endless struggle to determine their own ideals rather than having meanings defined for them
by authorities.
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The universalizing and totalizing metanarratives of history and politics are now
recognized for their silencing and oppressive natures; the response is a proliferation of voices
and methodological positions essentially decimating a unified frame from which to interpret
meaning.96 Meaning is now constructed based on the intertextual nature of information and
communication; beginning from what we already know (or think we know) and the constant
addition of information from ever more texts to meaning, diminishing the authority of singular
texts in favor of the continual construction of meanings by individuals.97 This multiplicity of
voices blurs the line between truthful and factual information, and questions whom to trust and
believe. There is no longer one fixed narrative that serves as a binding force for the people but
multiple frames of reference, a condition that breeds uncertainty and anxiety, and also leads to a
loss of authority and the indeterminacy of information.
Discursive authority lies with its effects, or what Bruce Lincoln has argued, ―the
conjuncture of the right speaker, the right speech and delivery, the right staging and props, the
right time and place, and an audience whose historically and culturally conditioned expectations
establish the parameters of what is judged ‗right‘ in all these instances, in such a way as to
produce attitudes of trust, respect, docility, acceptance, even reverence, in the audience.‖98 If
discursive authority rests with the ability to render an audience silent on an issue, then in
postmodernity generally, and with the state of conspiracy theories more specifically, authority is
in serious trouble. No longer are authorities (whether executive or epistemic) able to offer their
version of a story and have an audience docilely accept their interpretation.99 Authorities no
longer enjoy the presumption they were afforded in the past; official narratives are now just one
among a cacophony and have the same burden as any narrative to persuade their audiences that
they are offering the most complete, compelling, and consistent telling of events. If anything, this
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burden is increased for official narratives in light of revelations of official scandals and abuses of
power.
The loss of central authority, the loss of a fixed meaning ascribed to information has
given rise to a multiplicity of interpretations within the public sphere. As Smart notes, ―Central
to the postmodern condition is the notion that the legitimation procedures of knowledge have
been eroded, and that the assumption at the heart of legislative reason of the possibility and/or
acceptability of deriving prescriptions from denotative statements is no longer sustainable.‖100
Most telling of Smart‘s passage is the erosion of the belief in science. Intelligent design now
challenges the more scientific position of evolution; the etiology of HIV/AIDS is hotly disputed;
global warming deniers argue against scientific evidence of climate change; even whether there
was a moon landing is subject to speculation from various segments of the public. In JeanFrançois Lyotard‘s words, ―the grand narrative‖ of science ―has lost its credibility‖; everything is
now subject to competing interpretations.101 New forms of media technology, especially the
Internet, have diminished the ability to determine what is credible and what is incredible. The
line between legitimate and illegitimate information has become increasingly blurred. Such an
indeterminate climate has led to an enlargement of the public sphere which, Frederic Jameson
asserts, ―also results in an enormous enlargement of the idea of rationality itself, in what we are
willing to ‗understand‘ (but not endorse), as what we can no longer have removed from the
visual record as ‗irrational‘ or incomprehensible, unmotivated, insane or sick.‖102 Instead, more
―legitimate‖ forms of knowledge are in direct competition with various interpretations afloat
within the public sphere. The pother of information offered by competing voices within the
public sphere is a breeding ground for conspiracy thinking.
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The polyphony of competing voices, bolstered by the ease of posting and ―researching‖
information on the Internet, makes it increasingly difficult for the public to make informed
decisions. Each post has its own theory, its own interpretation as to what happened and why.
Exacerbating the competition among multitudinous voices is the cynical and suspicious attitude
directed toward the government by large segments of the public, brought about by the
clandestine and secret nature of some of its agencies as well as the uncovering of actual
governmental conspiracies.103 Amplified media coverage in the face of significant tragedies finds
conspiracists capitalizing on the misstatements, inaccuracies, and inconsistencies of
governmental officials in their statements to the press and in the testimony they provide in
investigations, and then weaving those problems into their narratives as proof that not all is as it
seems.
Conspiracy theories, which claim to know the ―truth,‖ are not so different from official
discourse. Indeed, like official discourse, conspiracy theories pose their adherence to ―facticity,
causality, coherence, and rationality.‖ What sets contemporary conspiracy theories apart from
official discourse, according to Jodi Dean, is ―suspicion.‖ Conspiracy narratives emphasize ―that
something has been withheld, that all the facts aren‘t known, that what we see isn‘t all there is.
Conspiracy theory demands more information. Too humble to offer a totalizing account, [the]
accumulated assertions [of conspiracy narratives] remind us that we don’t know.‖104 The
multiplicity of competing information casts suspicion onto more ―legitimate‖ forms of
knowledge. Knight explains, ―Conspiracy theories are a form of pop sociology cobbled together
on the fly as people try to gain a handle on the complexities of social and economic causation in
an era of rapid globalization. With the increasing overload of information from mutually
competing sources, none of which seem entirely trustworthy, a hermeneutic of suspicion has
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become a routine operating procedure.‖105 Belief in conspiracy becomes an almost necessary
response to the multiplicity of information, especially with the lack of a suitable explanation.
Even when an explanation is provided, enough questions are asked, enough ―evidence‖ is
brought to light, so as to cast doubt and suspicion onto the explanation. Any official discourse
that comes into being after doubt and suspicion have been leveled against ―legitimate‖
explanations has to at least attempt to assuage any existing doubts, which inherently alters the
substance and form of official discourse.106
The leveling of the discursive playing field precipitated by the loss of central authority
and the indeterminacy of information provides an opening for conspiracy theories to find
increasing prominence and belief. Conspiracy theories challenge and question authority and
capitalize on the strength of their own narratives, the inconsistencies of official accounts, and the
proliferation of conflicting information. Conspiracy theories are a mode of constructing meaning
in a rapidly changing and complex world. It is no longer automatically discrediting to label
something a conspiracy theory; authorities must prove their positions, write compelling and
believable accounts of events, and, ultimately, must get back in touch with their audiences if they
want the support of the people. Yet the ability for officials to connect with the people is
problematic because officials are no longer able to forward an affirmative argument simply
providing the causes or reasons behind an event. Officials are forced into a defensive position
brought on by claims of conspiracy existing prior to the crafting of an official response. For this
reason it is necessary to examine the power of conspiracy beliefs through the lens of official
discourse. If recent ―authoritative‖ texts are any indication, then there is a real danger that
conspiracy beliefs will usurp official explanations and become the preferred way of thinking.
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Uncertainty, Doubt, and Skepticism in the United States, post-WWII
Prior to the publication of the Warren Commission Report, the American people placed a great
deal of faith in the American government. According to the Pew Research Center, in 1958, the
first year a poll testing public trust in government was conducted, nearly 73 percent of the
American people trusted the federal government. That number increased to nearly 78 percent by
1963. By 1964, however, Americans‘ faith in their government was on a precipitous decline,
dropping to 65 percent in 1966, down to 36 percent in 1974, and bottoming at a dismal 25
percent by 1979. In the last thirty years, there have been spikes and dips in the poll numbers,
frequently corresponding with times of crises where faith in the government increased, and drops
during economic times of crisis. Even so, Americans‘ faith in their government has not reached
over 60 percent since 1969.107 At least part of the reason for the decline of the American people‘s
faith in government can be attributed to the eruption of revealed official scandals and abuses
enacted by the federal government and its agents that date back to the 1940s.
The late 1940s and early 1950s saw a litany of Americans accused, and in some cases
convicted, of espionage. The ―Pumpkin Papers‖ seemingly confirmed accusations that Alger
Hiss, a lawyer who worked for the New Deal policies of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt
and was involved in coordinating the creation of the United Nations, was a Soviet spy in 1948.108
The Hiss case, and Hiss‘s subsequent defense by Secretary of State Dean Acheson, prompted
Congressman Richard Nixon and other Republicans to forward claims of subversion within the
White House.109 The Eisenhower administration‘s cover-up of a top-secret American U2 spy
plane, shot down over Soviet air space on May 1, 1960, was one of the first instances where the
secret machinations of the president were publicly revealed.110 The election of President
Kennedy in 1960 had its own allegations of conspiracy and cover-up. David Steigerwald admits
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that Republican allegations that President Kennedy won the 1960 election through fraudulent
votes facilitated by Chicago Mayor Richard Daley were not without merit.111 Government
involvement in scandals and conspiracies after World War II and up to the election of President
Kennedy are at least nascent indicators of the loss of central authority, although the continued
scandals and conspiracies would exacerbate the erosion of faith the American people had in their
system of governance.
The assassinations of President Kennedy, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Robert Kennedy;
the escalation of the war in Vietnam; and the increasing violence associated with the Civil Rights
Movement and the student protests, all gave rise to a further cultural anxiety existing within the
public sphere. In the early 1970s, the fears that the federal government was engaging in
conspiracies against its own people were realized. The revelation of the secret domestic
intelligence program of the FBI known as COINTELPRO provided the American public with
proof that the FBI had engaged in illegal activities against the American people, including
Martin Luther King, Jr.112 ―The Pentagon Papers,‖ stolen by State Department employee Daniel
Ellsberg, provided evidence that the federal government had lied about U.S. involvement in
Vietnam.113 The Tuskegee Syphilis Experiments revealed that the United States government had
intentionally withheld treatment from African American men infected with the disease to study
its effects, even after penicillin was found to cure the disease.114 The coup de grace to faith in
American governance came with the uncovering of the Watergate scandal. President Nixon
resigned in disgrace after it was revealed that he was intimately involved with illegal campaign
activities in 1974.115 The decline of the American people‘s faith in their government, while not
recognized prior to the assassination of President Kennedy, steadily declined until the Watergate
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scandal erupted. The continued revelations of scandals and conspiracies enacted by the
government furthered spurred the loss of central authority.
The 1980s and 1990s revealed another spate of governmental scandals. The Savings and
Loan scandal saw American taxpayers shell out over $150 billion to rescue over 700 failed
institutions. Five U.S. senators were accused of corruption for illegally intervening in a
regulatory investigation into the Lincoln Savings and Loan Association on behalf of Charles
Keating, Jr.116 The Iran-Contra Affair uncovered that the U.S. had illegally sold weapons to Iran,
via Nicaragua, in exchange for American hostages held in Iran.117 The 1990s saw President
Clinton being investigated for alleged illegal activities involving a real estate company called the
Whitewater Development Company. Out of the Whitewater investigation came allegations that
President Clinton had had an affair with White House intern Monica Lewinsky, which the
president denied. President Clinton was later impeached by the U.S. House of Representatives
for perjury for lying about the affair under oath in 1998.118 Finally, the presidency of George W.
Bush was besieged by controversy. The collapse of Enron, warrantless wiretappings of American
citizens‘ domestic telephone calls, the outing of CIA operative Valerie Plame, allegations that
the U.S. was using torture as a means to interrogate terrorist suspects, the manufactured
yellowcake uranium evidence prompting the War in Iraq, the loss or destruction of millions of
emails from the White House, and claims that the dismissal of eleven federal prosecutors
occurred because they prosecuted Republicans and not Democrats, all helped to engender
uncertainty, even fear, within the public sphere.119
The American people, cognizant that they had been repeatedly lied to, even conspired
against, by their government, lost faith in central authority. The inability to determine what is
true and what is (conspiracy) theory becomes a question of interpretation because there is no one
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authority the people can turn to for the truth. The loss of a fixed meaning, the loss of one
authoritative way to view events, leads to the indeterminacy of information that further erodes
authority and provides an ample breeding ground in which conspiracy theories become
particularly salient in our contemporary society.

Complicating Conceptions of Conspiracy
Two documents, in particular, are important for understanding the power of conspiracy beliefs in
our time: The Warren Commission Report and The 9/11 Commission Report.120 The most
obvious significance of these two documents is that they represent discourses that were called
into being as the official accounts of two tragic events in American history: the assassination of
President John F. Kennedy and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Blue ribbon
commissions created to investigate national tragedies are hardly new. Indeed, almost every
national tragedy in our history has resulted in the formulation of a commission designed to
investigate the causes of the event and possible courses of action the administration in power
may take in order to assuage the public‘s concerns and fears.121 What makes these two
Commissions unique is the degree to which they were designed to limit belief in conspiracy
theories forwarded as explanations for the two events.
To some degree, the members of both commissions were aware of the conspiracy beliefs
permeating the public sphere prior to the completion of their reports. The Warren Commission
Report, in its preface, notes that the ―rumors and speculations‖ surrounding the death of
President Kennedy dictated that they not only investigate the alleged conspiracies, but also dispel
false rumors that had reached the public.122 Thomas Kean and Lee Hamilton, the Chair and Vice
Chair of the 9/11 Commission, were also acutely aware of the claims of conspiracy existing in
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the public prior to the publication of the 9/11 Commission Report. Kean and Hamilton, in their
memoir about the Commission stated ―September 11 has generated its own share of conspiracy
theories … These questions ranged from small to large, rational to irrational … Some questions
[the more irrational] we dealt with indirectly …. Other, more reasonable questions we dealt with
directly.‖123 Significant in this passage is Kean‘s and Hamilton‘s acknowledgement that not only
were they aware of conspiracy theories, but they directly confronted only those they deemed
rational and only indirectly confronted those they defined as irrational. In recognizing that
conspiracy theories were already in circulation, both commissions inadvertently acknowledge
areas of conflict—conflict between the discourse they constructed and the conspiracy arguments
they were attempting to dispel—within their texts. How both the commissions handled beliefs in
conspiracies in their discourses gives insight into the rhetorical choices that were made in the
course of compiling the responses.
In addition to being official discourse, the Warren and 9/11 Commission reports represent
two of the most significant responses to conspiracy theories in our time; interestingly, the
discourses that were shaped to combat these theories share some of the generic elements of
conspiracy arguments. As the above statements from commissioners on both the Warren
Commission and the 9/11 Commission indicate, these two reports were obligated to address
certain issues because of public discourses already in circulation. Neither report had the luxury
of simply setting out an affirmative case providing the official explanation of events. Both
reports are defensive and refutative, the agenda being largely set by popular conspiracy
discourse. Reconstructing the logic and reasoning in the reports is crucial in determining the
interplay that exists between official discourse and conspiracy beliefs. The Warren and 9/11
Commission reports are public documents, and, as such, official memos, minutes of meetings,
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and all other evidence not deemed a matter of national security are available, largely online.
Moreover, members of both Commissions have written memoirs about the proceedings and the
roles they played within them. Examination of the commission reports, in particular, and the
discourses surrounding them, provides a wealth of information that provides perspective about
the ways in which commissioners attempted to craft texts that spoke to the rhetorical exigencies
of the events themselves, but also what they did to attempt to quell the tide of conspiracy.
The Warren and 9/11 Commission reports are significant for another reason—both are
products of our contemporary era. These two reports represent two very different moments in our
era: the Warren Commission Report was written while the loss of central authority was
prepubescent, and the 9/11 Commission came into being after the loss of central authority was
thoroughly entrenched. As Knight notes, President Kennedy‘s assassination has been determined
by many postmodern scholars, including Frederic Jameson and Jean Baudrillard, as ―being on
the cusp of a crisis of representation.‖124 However, Knight argues that the culture of conspiracy
that has emerged, one that forwards a ―causally coherent narrative about growing skepticism
towards the authority of experts and the government,‖ finds its roots in the creation of the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1947 and the burgeoning intelligence community of the
security state.125 The erosion of the American people‘s faith in their government, precipitated by
the revelation of actual governmental conspiracies enacted by the government against the people,
raises the awareness that ―there is no certain way of knowing … [what] is true … [A] lingering
suspicion always remains; nothing is ever quite as it seems; no ‗final report‘ ever ensures that the
case is truly closed.‖126 Examination of the Warren and 9/11 Commission reports, two texts
existing at very different moments in our contemporary era, offers insight into the similarities
and differences in the challenges the commissioners faced while composing their discourse.

32
Finally, the most significant attribute of both commissions‘ reports is the degree to which
they have been unable to quell conspiracy beliefs. By many accounts, President Kennedy‘s
assassination is the ―mother lode‖ of all conspiracy theories with roughly 75 percent of the
American public believing that Lee Harvey Oswald did not act alone.127 However, the 9/11
Commission Report itself is gaining ground as more people begin to question the report. A 2006
Zogby poll indicated that 42 percent of the population believed that the 9/11 Commission and the
federal government were covering up significant evidence that points to the causes and reasons
behind the 9/11 terrorist attacks, while only 48 percent believed there was no cover-up. In the
same poll, 45 percent of the population believed that 9/11 should be reinvestigated while 47
percent believed it was a sound and thorough investigation.128 In a Scripps Howard poll, over a
third of the population believed that the United States government actually aided in the planning
and implementation of the terrorist attacks of 9/11.129 Although the 9/11 Commission was not
plagued with the same degree of disbelief that existed for the Warren Commission, the fact that
nearly half of those who were polled expressed doubt indicates there is a large degree of
skepticism existing within the public sphere.
On the surface, it seems claims of conspiracy of both the murder of President Kennedy
and the terrorist attacks of 9/11 follow current conceptions of conspiracy argument. A minority
(although a significant minority) of the population during a time of social strain and anxiety were
able to infect the larger public imagination with their suspicions. To some degree, both The
Warren Commission Report and The 9/11 Commission Report had to anticipate some of the
suspicions of conspiracists, and were thus drawn into a dialogue with conspiracy discourse. What
is significant is that neither document has been able to significantly quell claims of conspiracy.
In fact, over time, belief in conspiracy has grown rather than diminished. Why are conspiracy
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theories able to force official discourse into a dialectical relationship? What does this dialectical
relationship say about the conspiratorial contexts in which it was produced? What are the
political implications that such relationships between conspiracy theories and official discourse
have for the future? The answers lie within an examination of the power of conspiracy through
the lens of official discourses.

Uncovering the Genre and Crisis of Conspiracy
In order to explore the rhetorical power of conspiracy theories through the lens of official
discourse, I employ a multi-methodological approach to study my texts, which recognizes the
utility of drawing from a number of theoretical models that allow for the building of an artistic
and insightful theory while adhering to scholarly rigor. Although the Warren Commission Report
and the 9/11 Commission Report are themselves worthy of study, a more compelling reason is
understanding and exposing the intersection between these two texts and the conspiracy theories
that informed them while recognizing that there are other forces at work in the make-up of the
discourses. Notable scholars in the rhetorical community have used similar approaches in their
works to build highly influential and provocative theories in rhetoric. Such scholars include
James Darsey in The Prophetic Tradition and Radical Rhetoric in America, Michael Pfau in The
Political Style of Conspiracy: Chase, Sumner, and Lincoln, and Stephen O‘Leary in Arguing the
Apocalypse: A Theory of Millennial Rhetoric.130
Of particular import to this study is Lloyd Bitzer‘s discussion of the rhetorical situation.
Bitzer argues that discourse comes into being because of its rhetorical situation, which is ―a
natural context of persons, events, objects, relations, and an exigence which strongly invites
utterance.‖131 Bitzer explains that ―an exigence is an imperfection marked by urgency; it is a
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defect, an obstacle, something waiting to be done, a thing that is other than what it should be.‖132
Put more simply, an exigence is something that demands explanation. Exigencies are explained
by rhetorical audiences, which are those ―capable of being influenced by discourse and of being
mediators of change.‖133 Yet, audiences face constraints when constructing their discourses.
Constraints are elements that ―have the power to constrain decision and action needed to modify
the exigence‖ and consist ―of persons, objects, events, and relations.‖134 The combination of
exigence, audience, and constraints are constitutive of the rhetorical situation.
The tragic death of a young president and the terrorist attacks were certainly remarkable
enough to call forth the creation of discourse to modify the public‘s perceptions of the events. As
a direct result, two independent bipartisan commissions were created to serve as the rhetorical
audiences of the two tragedies. However, the exigencies of the assassination of President
Kennedy and the terrorist attacks of 9/11 contained more than just the assassination and the
attacks. The murder of Lee Harvey Oswald, President Kennedy‘s alleged assassin, while in
police custody complicated the exigencies of the assassination. Similarly, the subsequent
invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq after the terrorist attacks added intricacy to the exigencies of
the terrorist attacks. Uncovering the complexities of the rhetorical situations for both the Warren
and 9/11 Commission reports required examining numerous texts including various media
accounts, scholarly works, and the memoirs written by members of both Commissions. Within
these texts I looked for clues that would lend insight into the rhetorical situation and how it
influenced the shape of the Warren and 9/11 Commission reports. For instance, numerous
scholars have posited that the Warren Commission was formed to specifically combat conspiracy
beliefs that existed in the public sphere.135 The formation of the 9/11 Commission was
motivated, in part, by the very public lobbying of the 9/11 victims‘ families. The complicated
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exigencies that led to the creation of the Warren and 9/11 commissions, and the subsequent
discourses both commissions created in response, were subject to other forces that helped to
shape their missives.
In order to provide a ―fitting‖ response to the assassination of President Kennedy and the
terrorist attacks of 9/11, the Warren and 9/11 commissions had to address not only the rhetorical
situations, but also the greater social and political contexts into which they entered. Determining
the political, social, and historical contexts required examination of historical texts and media
that recounted what was transpiring in the country before and during the investigations of both
commissions. For instance, the Cuban Missile Crisis occurred just a year prior to the
assassination of President Kennedy, and the Civil Rights Movement was in full swing at the time
of the president‘s death. The highly contested presidential election of 2000 created a highly
partisan atmosphere in the public, and the collapse of Enron, just a month after the terrorist
attacks, further fueled the doubt and uncertainty in the public in the wake of the attacks. The
contexts into which each commission entered were marked by a high degree of uncertainty in the
public sphere.
Conspiracy theories, as we have seen, are more likely to flourish during times of social
strain. Conspiracy theories about the assassination and the terrorist attacks occurred almost
immediately after the events. In the case of the Warren Commission, most of the public believed
that President Kennedy‘s death occurred at the hands of a conspiracy. The terrorist attacks were a
conspiracy. Even so, theories about who was behind the attacks circulated within days. As time
passed beliefs in conspiracy theories grew as more information came out about the intelligence
failures of the FBI. Beliefs in conspiracy, for both commissions, inherently influenced their
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discourses. Of particular concern was uncovering the different conspiracy theories in circulation
in the public before the release of both commissions‘ reports.
A vast amount of literature exists on both the assassination of President Kennedy and the
terrorist attacks of 9/11. In order to determine which conspiracy theories were in circulation prior
to the publication of the Warren Commission Report, I relied on reading articles on the
―Academic JFK Assassination Website,‖ which provides an enormous amount of information on
the assassination of President Kennedy and the controversy surrounding it. Significantly, the
website provides pre-Warren Commission accounts of the assassination from the right, left, and
center of the political spectrum.136 On the website, Kenneth A. Rahn provides articles written in
response to President Kennedy‘s death beginning on November 22, 1963, through September 27,
1964. The articles that were the most informative about the conspiracy theories that existed prior
to the publication of the Warren Commission‘s report were written by Revilo P. Oliver, Martin
Dies, Bertrand Russell, M. S. Arnoni, Jack Minnis and Staughton Lynd, Harold Feldman, Eric
Norden, Victor Perlo, Leo Sauvage, and Mark Lane.137 From the articles, five central concerns
were raised by conspiracists: where the shots came from; the magic bullet and the problems the
autopsy evidence posed; the lack of a discernible motive on the part of Oswald and his actions
before and after the assassination; the underworld ties of Jack Ruby; and the possibility that
agents of the government were complicit in the assassination.138
Seemingly limitless sources detailing the conspiracy theories in the public sphere prior to
the release of the 9/11 Commission Report similarly exist. For the sake of expediency, I limited
my choice of texts. One of the most well-known and well-respected texts published before the
9/11 Commission‘s report is The New Pearl Harbor by David Ray Griffin.139 Within, Griffin
provides a compendium of some of the most popular conspiracy theories in circulation during the
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aftermath of 9/11. While my analysis is largely dependent on Griffin, other sources were used to
determine what conspiracy theories were circulating prior to the release of the Commission‘s
report. Mathias Broeckers‘ Conspiracies, Conspiracy Theories, and the Secrets of 9/11,
originally published in Germany in 2002, gave a more complete account of some of the
conspiracy theories alluded to in Griffin‘s book.140 Senator Bob Graham‘s book, Intelligence
Matters, was also instructive in illuminating some of the conspiracy theories that gained force
after the publication of Griffin‘s and Broeckers‘ books.141 From the literature, there are four
broad themes that they share and on which they base their theories of conspiracy: The reasons
behind the decision of the U.S. to invade Iraq; the problems concerning the inability for the FAA
and NORAD to effectively coordinate on 9/11; the mystery surrounding the flights of Saudi
nationals who were allegedly allowed to leave the country before the airspace ban was lifted, the
funding behind the terrorist attacks; and, the evidence that existed about Osama bin Laden‘s role
in the terrorist attacks.
Understanding the rhetorical situations that instructed both texts was only part of the
analysis. Genre criticism is an essential methodological tool for uncovering the interplay
between conspiracy arguments and the substance of the Warren and 9/11 Commission reports.
While I am not arguing that these two reports are representative of a rhetorical genre, others have
argued that conspiracy theories do represent a generic classification.142 The Warren Commission
Report and the 9/11 Commission Report, while being influenced by, and taking on significant
substantive, stylistic, and situational characteristics of, the conspiracy genre, lack the signature
element of conspiracy theories; their hermetically sealed nature. Both commissions‘ reports
inherently served as an intermediary step in the formation of the archetypal conspiracy argument.
In order to understand the degree to which both discourses were influenced by conspiracy
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arguments, and how they, in turn, influenced conspiracy theories, it is necessary to approach both
texts with generic sensitivity. Genre criticism provides a method that uncovers the individual
features of a discourse that, when combined, characterize a rhetorical form. In this way, genre
criticism allows for determining the degree to which discourses engage in dialogues with one
another, shape and influence each other‘s texts.
Work in rhetorical criticism posits that genres are characterized by substantive, stylistic
and situational constellations that make up these forms. ―A genre,‖ according to Karlyn Kohrs
Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, ―is a group of acts unified by a constellation of forms that
recurs in each of its members. These forms, in isolation, appear in other discourses. What is
distinctive about the acts in a genre is the recurrence of the forms together in isolation.‖143 While
individual forms attributed to conspiracy arguments may be found in other discourses, it is the
pattern of the forms, taken together, that signify the conspiracy argument. Building on Campbell
and Jamieson‘s classification of genre, Carolyn Miller argues that genres are dependent upon the
situations from which they arise.144 Miller asserts that genres are dependent on ―typified
rhetorical actions based in recurrent situations.‖145 For Miller, genres should be classified based
on ―the actions [they are] used to accomplish.‖146 Miller‘s conceptualization of genre is based on
a hierarchy of meaning. Form and substance fuse to make up a genre, and then that genre serves
as the substance of the next level of meaning. Context becomes an integral aspect of genre
precisely because it influences the way acts are viewed and understood.147 Both essays promote
the idea that the recurrence of substance, form, and situation are necessary components in a
given genre. Miller‘s work adds that the context must also be taken into consideration.
Genre criticism required a close reading of my primary texts in order to isolate the
substantive and stylistic characteristics that fused together to construct the form of the argument
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each commission employed. Reading the reports of both commissions through the lens of
conspiratorial discourse provides insight into how both texts were influenced by the conspiracy
theories in circulation in the public. Significantly, in combating claims of conspiracy, both
commissions‘ discourses took on some of the generic characteristics of conspiracy arguments.
Conspiracy theories about the assassination of President Kennedy were never marginal
beliefs.148 Unlike Hofstadter‘s assertion that once conspiracy theories are addressed by
authorities, they fade back into the periphery of society, conspiracy theories about the
assassination continued to grow after the release of the Warren Commission Report.149 The
inability of the Warren Commission to successfully contain conspiracy theories is indicative that
it was not able to maintain its discursive authority over conspiracy theories. Understanding why
the Commission was incapable of maintaining its authority required an examination of the nexus
between conspiracy theories and the Commission‘s report.
In my examination of the Warren Commission Report, I looked at rhetorical indications
of authority, presumption and the burden of proof in concert with the argument from absence, the
paradox of substance, the use of massive amounts of evidence, and internal consistency, which,
as noted above, are generic elements of conspiracy arguments. Of central concern was examining
how the Commission chose to handle claims that Oswald had a confederate in the assassination.
In refuting claims that Lee Harvey Oswald was involved in a conspiracy plot, the Warren
Commission directly confronted claims by attempting to negate them based on argument from
absence. Argument from absence, according to Darsey, is constructed to imply that the absence
of evidence is evidence for a proposition.150 In negating claims that there was a conspiracy in
place to assassinate the president, the absence of evidence of conspiracy becomes evidence that
there was no conspiracy. It is a negative argument used in an attempt to shift the burden of proof
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onto those who were making claims that there was a conspiracy. The Commission‘s decision to
directly confront conspiracy claims, and its use of argument from absence to do so, is indicative
that the Commission did not have argumentative presumption. If the Warren Commission had
presumption, then, as Whately characterizes it, one need do nothing.151 However, because the
Warren Commission felt compelled to attack conspiracy beliefs by asserting that the absence of
evidence of a conspiracy was evidence that there was no conspiracy, the Commission was,
rhetorically, indicating that it lacked presumption over conspiracy theories.
In addition to uncovering how the Warren Commission handled claims that the
assassination was the result of a conspiracy was determining how it managed claims that agents
of the government, especially those employed by the FBI, CIA, and Secret Service, were
involved in a conspiracy plot. The Warren Commission was put into a paradoxical position. On
the one hand, the Commission was supposed to conduct an independent and thorough
investigation. On the other hand, the Commission was dependent on the investigations of federal
legal agencies implicated in conspiracy charges. Being forced into a paradox because of
conspiracy claims is indicative that the Warren Commission, if it were to be believed, would
have to make a case for its position. The Commission attempted to resolve its position through
the use of the paradox of substance. A paradox of substance, according to Burke, is a declaration
of what something is not in order to determine what something is.152 Rhetorically, it was
necessary to look at the language the Commission uses to explain its relationship with the federal
legal agencies. The Commission‘s declaration of what its relationship was, based on Burke‘s
characterization, is indicative of what it is not. In essence, it was necessary to look at how the
Commission attempted to resolve the paradox of being dependent on and independent of federal
investigative agencies.
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The Commission took on other generic characteristics of conspiracy arguments. In
attempting to overcome the lack of a discernible motive for Oswald‘s actions, the Commission
faced a substantial task in piecing together something that would be creditable for the public to
believe in explaining why Oswald shot the president. The Commission examined everything
from Oswald‘s own writings, to reports from his childhood, to what information they could
harvest from Oswald‘s time in the Soviet Union. However, there was no single tangible reason
the Commission found to explain Oswald‘s action. As Hofstadter, Creps, Young, Launer, and
Austin, and Dean note, conspiracists churn out massive amounts of tangentially related evidence
in order to convince the audience of the soundness of their conclusions.153 Instead of being an
accumulation of the evidence that arrives at a sound conclusion, it is a desperate attempt to
provide the audience with overabundant proof in order to overcome the doubt that exists about
the conspiracist‘s conclusions.‖154 In piecing together a motive for Oswald the Commission
produced and overwhelming amount of tangentially related evidence in order to provide a
creditable motive for the alleged assassin and is indicative that the Commission was attempting
to overcome both its own, and the public‘s, doubt about why Oswald murdered the president.
Finally, it was necessary to uncover how the Commission attempted to overcome the
problems the evidence of the location of the shots, the nature and location of the president‘s
wounds, and the maneuverings the magic bullet posed. Significant contradictions existed among
the evidence. Conflicting reports about the location and nature of the president‘s wounds existed
between the doctors who attempted to save the president‘s life and the results of the autopsy
report. The FBI report‘s discussion of the number and targets of the shots fired directly
contradicted with the Commission‘s own explanation. In attempting to overcome the evidentiary
inconsistencies, the Commission resorted to drafting an internally consistent narrative in order to
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overcome the problems the evidence posed. Conspiracy arguments, according to Hofstadter,
allow ―no room for mistakes, failures, or ambiguities.‖155 The Commission went to great pains to
resolve any contradictions that existed between the varying accounts of the evidence. No
contradictions went unresolved, no ambiguities were left unexplained, all of the evidence the
Commission ushered to present its case had to unequivocally back its conclusion.
Examination of the 9/11 Commission Report was, in some ways, remarkably similar to
that of the Warren Commission, and completely different in others. Like the Warren
Commission, conspiracy theories were already in circulation within the public sphere before the
formation of the Commission. And, like the Warren Commission, conspiracy theories have
continued to flourish after the release of the 9/11 Commission‘s report. The 9/11 Commission,
unlike the Warren Commission, chose to handle conspiracy claims largely only indirectly rather
than directly. In examining the 9/11 Commission Report at looked at the areas of contestation
that existed between the conspiracy theories in the public and how the Commission handled
those of areas of conflict within its text.
While the 9/11 Commission did only indirectly disputed conspiracy claims, it still took
on some of the generic characteristics of conspiracy arguments. Specifically, the 9/11
Commission adopted the stance of the hyper-objective observer diagnosing the causes for the
evils that were unleashed. In recounting the failures that befell the coordination of the country‘s
defenses, the Commission used massively documented technical information. Accounting for the
financing of al Qaeda operatives and the flights of Saudi nationals from U.S. airspace saw the
Commission adopting argument from absence to refute conspiratorial understandings. Finally,
the Commission cast blame onto the shoulders of a single enemy cast into the role of the perfect
enemy.
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Conspiracists were overtly concerned with the reasons as to why the country invaded Iraq
after 9/11. In examining the 9/11 Commission Report, I looked at the Commission‘s explanation
for the war and, noticeably absent was the Commission‘s conclusions as to why Iraq was
invaded. Instead of taking on conspiracists claims, and rather than supporting the Bush
administrations reasons for war, the Commission, instead, cast itself in the role of the hyperobjective observer. According to Hofstadter, the use of hyper-objectivity is a defensive move.
Conspiracists, rather than attempting to persuade their audiences, simply relay the facts and let
them speak for themselves.156 In other words, hyper-objectivity is the absence of explanation for
information that confronts the one‘s stance. The information that is provided neither confirms
nor denies other positions, it only supports the position of the conspiracist.
While the linchpin in most 9/11 conspiracy theories centers on the War in Iraq,
significant concerns were raised about the failures of the FAA and NORAD to effectively
coordinate and prevent some of the damage. Conspiracists posited that the failures of the FAA
and NORAD were the result of a stand-down order issued by those in the highest reaches of
government and backed their claims by citing the protocols that were in existence between the
agencies as well as pointing to the inaccurate testimony provided by the agencies‘ officials. In
handling the failures of the FAA and NORAD to effectively coordinate, the Commission
employs a massively documented myriad of technical details to back their conclusion that the
failures of the FAA and NORAD stemmed from inexperience and a lack of information. Because
technical information is not the result of carefully constructed, replicable experiments, the
information can be carefully constructed to back anyone‘s position if argued correctly.157
Conspiracists used the protocols to make their case, and the 9/11 Commission used them to make
their case. In presenting its evidence, the 9/11 Commission provides an explanation of the
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protocols of in dense, technical prose. Instead of explaining what the protocols mean, the
Commission simply provides its evidence and arrives at its conclusion.
The Commission also had to account for the flights of the Saudi nationals who allegedly
left the U.S. prior to the re-opening of national airspace and the financing behind al Qaeda.
Conspiracists charged that the ability of the Saudi nationals to leave the country was evidence
that the White House was involved in covering-up the real causes behind the terrorist attack. As
Kean and Hamilton note, they chose to focus on the conspiracy theories about the Saudi
nationals and the financing of al Qaeda operatives because examination of these two areas of
contestation could provide insight into the operational maneuverings of the terrorists.158 In
confronting the evidence, however, the 9/11 Commission employs the absence of evidence as
evidence that no conspiracy existed. As noted above, the use of absence of evidence as evidence
that there is no conspiracy is an attempt to shift the burden of proof onto those who would
contend otherwise. It is a negative argument used in an attempt to prove a proposition that cannot
possibly proven.
The final conspiratorial strategy used by the 9/11 Commission was the construction of the
perfect enemy. Conspiracists had long charged that the real culprit behind the terrorist attacks
was the Bush administration. After all, how could anyone but a state power overcome the
defenses of the country? Instead of lending such claims any credence, the Commission cast
blame for the attacks solely onto the shoulders of Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda using a
carefully constructed perfect enemy. Hofstadter argues that the perfect enemy holds almost
mythical power, is infinitely cunning, can bend the will of history, and is motivated by evil.159
Rhetorically, depictions of the enemy are dramatic in form and contain lurid imagery in order to
impress on the audience the power the enemy possesses and the danger the audience is in.
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The constellation of argument from absence, paradox of substance, massively
documented evidence, and internal consistency is indicative that the Warren Commission, at
least to a degree, participated within the genre of the conspiracy argument. Unlike mature
conspiracy theories, the Warren Commission is unable to take on the signature element of the
conspiracy genre, its self-sealing nature, because the discourse is a closed, fixed narrative.
Similarly, the combination of the 9/11 Commission‘s use of hyper-objectivity, massively
documented technical information, argument from absence, and the construction of the perfect
enemy is indicative that it, too, participated within the conspiracy genre. And, like the Warren
Commission the 9/11 Commission lacked the hermetically-sealed signature element of the
conspiracy genre. The consonance of the substantive characteristics of the Warren and 9/11
Commission reports is indicative that both commission‘s arguments participated within the
conspiracy genre.
The rhetorical sleight-of-hand conspiracy arguments employ make them a particularly
slippery subject of study. Current conceptions of conspiracy offer that these tricky arguments are
based on absences, are self-reinforcing, and are hermetically sealed. Rather than the previously
diagnosed pathology, contemporary belief in conspiracy is indicative of a general suspicion of,
and cynicism about, institutions of power. Official discourses enter the public sphere severely
hampered by the loss of central authority and the indeterminacy of information, but also by the
persuasive force of conspiracy beliefs. Official discourses are no longer able to simply advance
affirmative arguments; they are forced to respond to the conspiracy discourses already existing
within the public sphere, which enters the two disparate discourses into a dialogue. Official
discourse is no longer in control of its own agenda and the intersection between conspiracy
beliefs and official discourse is a battleground for legitimacy being waged through, on the one
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hand, a discourse that is able to adapt to cultural and temporal changes, and on the other hand, a
discourse that is fixed and static but is supposed to signify the ―definitive‖ and ―final‖
conclusion. The Warren and 9/11 Commissions‘ reports, in particular, are examples of official
discourse affected by pervasive belief in, and power of, conspiracy in our era.
The significance of this dissertation is threefold; most significantly, it contributes to a
more precise and comprehensive understanding of the rhetorical power of conspiracy arguments
in contemporary society, specifically by demonstrating how conspiracy narratives shape official
narratives. Secondly, the study provides insight into the interaction of official discourses and
conspiracy discourses (especially as they currently exist). Finally, such a study has implications
for understanding the direction of political life under our current social and political conditions.

Chapter Overview
Chapter two provides an analysis of the relationship between conspiracy beliefs and the
discourse of the Warren Commission Report. I pay particular attention to instances where the
Warren Commission directly, and indirectly, confronts both the conspiracy theories that were in
circulation within the public sphere, and those that were reasonably expected to surface. These
moments of conflict are instructive as to how the Warren Commission employs rhetorical
techniques to construct its discursive authority, as well as its attempts to maintain its authority
over conspiracy theories. Moreover, I examine the Warren Commission‘s attempt to diminish
beliefs in conspiracy theories reasonably expected to surface as a result of the Commission‘s
discourse. Specifically, I examine the Commission‘s use of evidence in making its case for what
would come to be termed by conspiracists as the magic bullet as well as its attempt to construct a
compelling motive for the alleged assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald. A thorough examination of
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situational cues, constraints, and the instances where the report diminishes its own authority
gives insight into the agenda-setting capabilities of conspiracies and the inability of official
discourse to handle these claims in our era.
Chapter three examines the 9/11 Commission Report, my second case study. As with the
Warren Commission Report, I focus on the relationship between conspiracy beliefs and the 9/11
Commission Report, paying attention to the ways in which the discourse confronted conspiracy
claims and how the 9/11 Commission dealt with these claims. Furthermore, the 9/11
Commission came into a time in which conspiracy theories had already reached a level of
maturity unseen by the Warren Commission. While the Warren Commission had to anticipate
how conspiracy theories would burgeon, many of the conspiracy theories the 9/11 Commission
confronted had already displayed the trajectory of their arguments. The 9/11 Commission‘s
rationale for, and how they ultimately dealt with these more mature conspiracy theories is
particularly insightful, especially in the wake of the failures of the Warren Commission to
contain similar conspiracy claims. Finally, the terrorist attacks were a conspiracy and, in some
regards, there is a closer affinity between the discourse of the 9/11 Commission and those of
conspiracy arguments, especially as they pertain to the characterization of the enemy.
Chapter four highlights the implications of this study. This dissertation is ultimately
about the agenda setting power of conspiracies and the inability of official discourse to deal with
these claims effectively. The loss of central authority and the indeterminacy of information have
given rise to the power and belief in conspiracy theories. Roughly forty years exists between the
exigencies calling the two texts of this study into being. The 9/11 Commission Report, although
called into being by different exigencies but with a similar purpose to the Warren Commission
Report, built upon the strengths of the Warren Commission and attempted to alleviate any of its
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weaknesses. There is a discernable difference between the ways both texts handled claims of
conspiracy, but there are also remarkable similarities. The similarities and the differences
between the two discourses are expanded upon. Finally, the chapter focuses on how conspiracy
theories in our contemporary times affect governance. When conspiracy theories are unable to be
quelled by official discourse, when conspiracy theories become the preferred way of significant
segments of the public‘s understanding of the ways things are, then the ability for government
officials to do anything for the public good, be it enacting healthcare reform, expanding social
programs, or even attempting to cut taxes or create jobs, these attempts by officials can, and do,
get labeled as a conspiracy against the people. The ability to effectively govern is seriously
diminished because everything can be labeled, and be believed, as a conspiracy.
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CHAPTER 2

AUTHORITY, ETHOS, AND PARADOX:
REFUTING CONSPIRACY IN THE WARREN COMMISSION REPORT
”The very word ‘secrecy’ is repugnant in a free and open society; and we are
as a people inherently and historically opposed to secret societies, to secret
oaths and to secret proceedings. We decided long ago that the dangers of
excessive and unwarranted concealment of pertinent facts far outweighed the
dangers, which are cited to justify it.”
—President John F. Kennedy

Conspiracy theories about the assassination of President Kennedy circulated within the
public sphere nearly as soon as the first bullet rang out on that ill-fated November day in Dallas.
The events that continued to play out during that remarkable weekend—the capture and
detention of Lee Harvey Oswald, the subsequent uncovering of Oswald‘s defection to the Soviet
Union and his Cuban sympathies, and Oswald‘s murder by Jack Ruby—all led the country, its
leaders, and, indeed, leaders throughout the world, to believe that the death of President Kennedy
was the result of a conspiracy. Within a week of the assassination nearly 70 percent of the
American public, including President Johnson and Jacqueline Kennedy, believed that the deaths
of the president and Oswald were part of a conspiracy, despite the fact that the media latched
onto what Barbie Zelizer termed the master narrative of the lone gunman.1 Not surprisingly,
given the Cold War context in which the assassination took place and the fact that the suspect,
Oswald, had at one time defected to the Soviet Union, some of the first conspiracy theories
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circulating within the public sphere posited that President Kennedy‘s assassination was the result
of a vast Communist conspiracy.2 The fear that a Communist conspiracy was in place to
assassinate President Kennedy politicized the event and caused fear and anxiety within the
public.
Several notable historians and cultural scholars assert that because so many people
suspected a conspiracy, and because President Johnson believed that conspiracy beliefs left
unchecked could lead to nuclear war, the President‘s Commission on the Assassination of
President John F. Kennedy (which would become popularly known as the Warren Commission)
was convened.3 Thus, if the Warren Commission was convened, at least in part, to combat
conspiracy beliefs, then it was incumbent upon the Warren Commission to respond to and
investigate such claims.4 The subsequent investigation of, and response to, conspiracy claims is
indicative of a relationship between the Warren Commission and conspiracy theories that has
either not been recognized or has remained largely unexplored, a relationship that existed prior
to the compilation of the Warren Commission Report.5
The need to address conspiracy claims made it impossible for the Warren Commission to
simply make an affirmative argument by laying out the case against Oswald in the assassination
of President Kennedy, and telling the American people what happened, who was responsible,
and why it occurred. The cultural force of conspiracy theories complicated the means by which
the Commission could combat the very real fear that conspirators involved in the assassination
were still at large. Rather than providing the American public with discourse with which it could
relate, the Warren Commission attempted to contain belief in conspiracy by asserting its
authority in making its case. This turn to authority also led to the excesses and peculiarities of the
Warren Commission Report, and is what firmly grounds the report within the contemporary
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social and cultural conditions, namely, the loss of central authority. As Alan Nadel explains,
―The inability to produce a coherent narrative, because it is, and necessarily must be, duplicitous,
amoral, and promiscuous,‖ lies with the loss of central authority that is no longer recognized as
―monologic, theologic, and sexually domesticated.‖6 The attempt to reconstitute a monologic
authority, as engendered in the metanarrative of the Warren Commission Report, I argue, was a
direct result of the need to undermine belief in conspiracy, and it is this need that drew the
Warren Commission Report into a dialogue with conspiracy theories and led to the rhetorical
excesses in the text. In attempting to dispel conspiracy beliefs, the Warren Commission took an
aggressive stance against conspiracy theories through argument from absence, the paradox of
substance, the use of massive evidence, and the construction of an internally consistent narrative
that used technical language which made the narrative inscrutable to the general American
public. If conspiracy discourse is able to contort the official accounts of significant historical
events, then the cultural force and argumentative power of conspiracy theories is revelatory of
significant political and social implications, especially as they exist in our times.

The Early ’60s: A Center That Would Not Hold
The belief that President Kennedy was killed as a result of a Communist conspiracy was
engendered in the pervasive fears of communism in the postwar world. After World War II, the
United States emerged as the reigning military and political power in the world. The sole ability
of the U.S. to harness the power of nuclear weaponry gave a tactical advantage to the political
and militaristic moves of the country. Beliefs in American superiority permeated the cultural
landscape, but, regardless of those beliefs, there was a sense of anxiety that also permeated
society. The specter of communism loomed large over the U.S. As the horrors of Stalin‘s purges

52
became more widely known, and as Stalin continued to occupy more and more political states
and put them under his regime under what would become known as the Eastern Bloc, tensions
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union grew. Tensions between the two powers mounted in
postwar America, especially after it was learned that the Soviets had successfully detonated their
first nuclear bomb in September 1949.7 The loss of the monopoly the U.S. had over the nuclear
arsenal fueled fear and anxiety, and, as a result, Stephen Whitfield argues, a new kind of Cold
War warrior emerged consisting of a super-patriot who adopted draconian policies to contain not
only the threat of communism from abroad, but the perceived fear of communism within the
country.8 Nadel explains that while the official foreign policy of the United States was one of
containment, containment was also the rhetorical strategy used ―to foreclose dissent, preempt
dialogue, and preclude contradiction‖ among the American people.9 This politicization of
American culture, according to Whitfield, led to ―the suffocation of liberty and the debasement
of culture itself, frequently from Americans imposing repression on themselves.‖10 The superpatriots to which Whitfield alludes restricted freedoms and adopted the totalitarian ―methods of
their Communist enemies‖ in order to combat communism abroad and at home. Anyone who
was perceived as being sympathetic to the Communist cause was inherently suspect in the hypersensitive postwar world.
Fears of Communism played out in the battle that was waged in the 1960 election
between the Democratic candidate, Senator John F. Kennedy, and the Republican candidate,
Vice President Richard M. Nixon. Both candidates renounced Communism as a matter of course.
Nixon, in the 1952 campaign, had claimed ―there‘s one difference between Reds and Pinks. The
Pinks want to socialize America. The Reds want to socialize the world and make Moscow the
world capital.‖11 Nixon went further and identified ―the progressive wing of the Democratic
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Party‖ as Pinks.12 Since Nixon‘s anti-Communist stance was well known by the 1960 election,
Whitfield asserts that suspicion was directed at Kennedy for potential Communist sympathies.13
Kennedy fought such suspicions by arguing that the Republicans had allowed a missile gap
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and that they had allowed Communism to invade too
close to home on the island of Cuba.14 Kennedy won the 1960 election in one of the narrowest
margins in American history; his victory signaled a liberal re-awakening in the country and
fueled communist fears on the political right.15
One of President Kennedy‘s challenges was how to handle the problem of Communism.
Just months after his inaugural address, President Kennedy would give the go-ahead for the topsecret invasion of Cuba, which had been in the works of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
since the previous year under the Eisenhower administration. The Bay of Pigs Invasion, as it
became known, was a complete fiasco and dealt a crushing blow to President Kennedy and his
administration. According to David Steigerwald, the aftermath of the invasion ―won [Castro] an
enormous propaganda victory, and Kennedy looked weak.‖16 Critics on the right claimed that
President Kennedy‘s involvement in the Bay of Pigs Invasion was, as Revilo P. Oliver wrote, a
―disgrace … not merely by ignominious failure, but by the inhuman crime of having lured brave
men into a trap and sent them to suffering and death.‖17 Rightist critics would even find cause to
criticize President Kennedy‘s handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis, which occurred a little over a
year after the Bay of Pigs Invasion.
On October 16, 1962, U.S. intelligence revealed that the Soviet Union was building
missile sites in Cuba and President Kennedy issued a demand to the Soviet premier, Nikita
Khrushchev, for them to be dismantled. Six days after President Kennedy first learned of the
missiles, he ordered the U.S. Navy to blockade Cuba and then went on television and announced
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the crisis to the American people. The United States was on the brink of nuclear war with the
Soviets. But President Kennedy‘s strategy worked and Premier Khrushchev ―agreed to remove
the missiles in exchange for Kennedy‘s promise that the United States would never invade Cuba‖
and, in a secret deal between the two world leaders, President Kennedy agreed to remove U.S.
nuclear weapons from Turkey.18 Both the Americans and the Soviets were able to claim victory
over each other, and the Cuban Missile Crisis allowed President Kennedy to ease tensions with
the Soviets.19 The outcome of the crisis and the easing of tensions with the Soviets caused some
to believe that President Kennedy was working ―in close collaboration with Khrushchev … [in
order] to provide for several months a cover for the steady and rapid transfer of Soviet troops and
Soviet weapons to Cuba for eventual use against us.‖20
President Kennedy‘s support of the Civil Rights Movement also spurred criticisms from
the right. Marilyn Young argues that Robert Welch and the John Birch Society forwarded
arguments that the method the communists might use to take over the United States included
―fomenting … internal civil strife in this country, with the Communists aiding their side in every
way.‖21 As Young argues, the John Birch Society‘s position, as it pertained to the Civil Rights
Movement, was that the ―racial turmoil‖ that was occurring ―has been and is being fomented by
Communists.‖22 Thus, any aid that President Kennedy provided to the Civil Rights Movement,
including federalizing the Mississippi National Guard and sending regular Army troops to force
James Meredith‘s acceptance into the University of Mississippi, and the Kennedy
administration‘s proposed legislation that would lead to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, could, and
was, viewed as evidence of a Communist takeover by Welch and those who followed him.23
The early 1960s, plagued with fears of communism, fueled beliefs that the Communist
hold on America was increasing. Actions by President Kennedy that were perceived as soft on
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communism and his actions that backed the Civil Rights Movement served as proof for some of
the pernicious Communist influence running rampant in the United States. As the 1960s would
play out, the political left, too, would forward claims of a vast establishment conspiracy, but
those only largely gained hold after the publication of the Warren Commission Report. Instead,
the Warren Commission was thrust into an environment that was pervaded by fears of a
Communist takeover and nascent fears of an establishment coup. In such an environment, it
comes as no surprise that the explanation for the assassination of President Kennedy would
generate so much skepticism.

Forming an Authoritative Body
Upon release of the news that President Kennedy had been shot, bedlam erupted. The people
clamored for immediate information and the press tried to keep up with their demands. As
reporters waited outside of Parkland Memorial Hospital, inaccurate accounts of the president‘s
wounds, the number of shots fired, and even the premature announcement of the president‘s
death occurred as the press endeavored to gain information and to understand how, and most
especially why, such a young and vigorous man became the victim of an assassin‘s bullet.24
Tension and misinformation mounted upon the arrest of Lee Harvey Oswald.
With Oswald‘s arrest, Dallas Police Headquarters became the scene of utter
pandemonium. Reporters jammed into hallways and corridors, virtually blocking entrances and
exits. The police were unable to control the flow of information, which resulted in fragments
being reported and skewed.25 Speculation abounded, and questions of conspiracy flooded
newswires as well as television and radio broadcast accounts of the assassination, especially after
it was learned that Oswald had attempted to renounce his U.S. citizenship in favor of the Soviet
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Union and that he was a Cuban sympathizer.26 Newspapers reported on Oswald‘s guilt, dropping
the presumption of innocence, and while the world conveyed its shock and dismay over the
events in Dallas, fear and tension climbed as people claimed President Kennedy‘s death had all
of the earmarks of a government coup.27
Fear of a foreign conspiracy mounted when, fewer than forty-eight hours after the
president‘s death, Oswald, in full view of the cameras of national news networks, was shot and
killed while in police custody.28 Fidel Castro and the Soviet Union claimed the assassination was
part of a right-wing plot, and Castro blamed Mexico for implicating him in the murder of
President Kennedy.29 Others looked to the reputation of Dallas as a bastion of right-wing
radicals; the liberal Adlai Stevenson had been the victim of an attack only a month earlier while
visiting Dallas.30 While the media was attempting to assert its narrative authority over the
happenings in Dallas, blame and finger-pointing ensued as different legal agencies attempted to
explain the events surrounding the president‘s assassination.
As the press fought for access to information, local, state, and federal investigative
agencies lobbied for the authority to investigate the president‘s death. Initially, responsibility for
conducting the investigation of the assassination fell under the purview of the Dallas police.
After Oswald‘s death, the Dallas police issued a statement indicating they considered the case
closed. However, leading Dallas and state officials sought to reassure the public that the
importance of the case made it necessary for their investigation to continue. Texas Governor
John Connally, also wounded from the shots that felled President Kennedy, called for a state
inquiry. The Secret Service, worried about its reputation as the protector of the president, was
quick to look at what went wrong. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) launched its
investigation immediately after it became known the president was shot. President Johnson
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encouraged the FBI to continue its investigation after Oswald‘s death. The Department of Justice
(DOJ) sent Assistant Attorney General Herbert J. Miller, Jr., to Dallas in an advisory capacity,
despite the fact that the DOJ had no control over state and local investigations.31 The uncertainty,
questions, and claims of conspiracy circulating among the public, including beliefs that President
Kennedy was killed as part of a Communist plot, that there was a connection between Oswald
and Jack Ruby, that racists were the cause of the assassination, and that the bullet wound in
President Kennedy‘s neck was an entrance wound, coupled with the various legal agencies
posturing for the authority to investigate the assassination, necessitated that a unified and
communal means be constructed by which the assassination would be investigated and
understood.32
The exigencies of the assassination needed to be interpreted rhetorically; a coherent
narrative that would give meaning to the event was called for. The chaotic flow of information
surrounding the assassination, filled with as many facts as there were suspicions, and the
posturing for authority to investigate the president‘s and Oswald‘s murders culminated in a
climate filled with uncertainty about what had happened, who was responsible, why it had
happened, and, more important, who was in charge. Uncertainty engenders fear and requires an
explanation, one that reassures the public and simultaneously provides it with a means by which
to interpret the situation.33 In an effort to streamline information and to assuage the American
public‘s, and indeed the international community‘s, fears and anxiety, Kennedy‘s successor,
President Lyndon B. Johnson, called for a presidential inquiry into the events of President
Kennedy‘s assassination and Oswald‘s murder.34 The New York Times stated, ―President Johnson
has acted with wisdom and dispatch to clear up all the doubts surrounding President Kennedy‘s
assassination and the cycle of horror it initiated.‖35 This inquiry, as it became popularly known,
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was the Warren Commission. Headed by Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren, the sevenperson Warren Commission brought a wealth of legal knowledge to the investigation of
President Kennedy‘s death. The Warren Commission was to serve as the voice, the rhetorical
audience, of the assassination.
Significant constraints were leveled against the Warren Commission before it even began
its investigation, what Lloyd Bitzer, borrowing from Aristotle, refers to as artistic and inartistic.36
Although the Commission was given broad legal powers, including subpoena and immunity
powers, it lacked the funding and resources to conduct a completely independent investigation.37
Furthermore, the Commission was constrained by time. On the one hand, the Commission was
pressured by President Johnson to conduct its investigation quickly, pressure viewed by some as
inspired by the upcoming 1964 presidential election. On the other hand, the members of the
Commission were enormously busy men, dividing their time among such entities as the U.S.
House of Representatives, the U.S. Senate, the U.S. Supreme Court, the World Bank, and their
responsibilities to the Commission.38
In addition to time and responsibility constraints, the Commission faced significant
problems with the evidence. The primary suspect, indeed the only suspect, in the assassination of
the president was dead, which made it impossible for the Commission and the American people
to reach closure through trial proceedings. Key elements of the investigation were completed
(i.e., the collection of evidence at the scene and the autopsy of the president) before the
Commission had an opportunity to take part in the investigation, or to direct any subsequent
actions. Key pieces of evidence were overlooked, mishandled, or disappeared.39 Secret Service
agents, and other critical law enforcement officials, failed to secure the ―scene‖ of the
assassination with the first agents not returning until ―approximately 20 to 25 minutes after the
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shots were fired,‖ which opened up the possibility that witnesses were not detained to take their
statements.40 Governor Connally‘s shirt was sent to the dry cleaners before being examined by
forensic and ballistic experts; only two bullets were found (although the Commission repeatedly
asserts that three shots were fired); the original notes taken during the autopsy of President
Kennedy‘s body were burned; x-rays of the president‘s body went unexamined by the
commissioners (allegedly to protect the privacy of the president and his family); and the autopsy
report issued by the pathologists at Bethesda Naval Hospital directly conflicted with the autopsy
report issued by the FBI, which was largely summarized by the press after its release to the
Warren Commission.41 Similarly, conflicting evidence existed between the FBI report on the
assassination, which was released mere weeks after the assassination, and what the Warren
Commission would forward to the public, which would pose problems that the Commission
would have to overcome in its narrative.
Most significant, however, was the Commission‘s dependence on the secretive and
territorial federal legal agencies that were not only responsible for carrying out their own
investigations of the assassination and on which reports the Commission would largely rely, but
such agencies, especially the FBI, were implicated in conspiracy charges. Commissioner Gerald
Ford, in his memoir on the Warren Commission, wrote that, just weeks after the Warren
Commission convened for the first time, Texas Attorney General Waggoner Carr informed the
Commission of an allegation that Oswald was an FBI informant.42 The commissioners
immediately met to determine what could be done to not only determine the veracity of the
claim, but to also discuss how to proceed. According to Ford, Commissioner Allen Dulles, who
was the former director of the CIA, stated, ―This is a terribly hard thing to disprove.‖43
Moreover, Ford penned, ―Mr. Boggs observed with some uneasiness, ‗What you do is make out
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a problem, if this be true—make our problem utterly impossible, because you say this rumor
can‘t be dissipated under any circumstance.‘‖44 The inability to disprove such allegations,
according to Ford, weighed heavily on the Commission. Ford wrote, ―These observations by
Allen Dulles pinpointed the difficulty the Commission would face in dealing not only with the
possibility that Oswald might be an FBI agent but also with all the myriad rumors that the
imaginations of thousands of writers would create in the next thousand years. They dramatized
the complexity of the Commission‘s charge.‖45 Ford‘s passage is important for three reasons.
First, it demonstrates that the Commission was aware of the claims of conspiracy that were
circulating within the public. Second, it alludes to the overwhelming burden the Commission
would have in dispelling conspiracy beliefs. Finally, it demonstrates that the Commission was
cognizant of conspiracy claims that would undoubtedly come to light in the ensuing months and
years.
The Commission had to form a narrative that provided the American people with a
coherent accounting of the assassination and the myriad information that addressed the rhetorical
exigencies of the assassination, including the murder of Oswald, the conflicting news reports,
and the claims of conspiracy.46 Not only did the Warren Commission have to determine who was
responsible for the deaths of President Kennedy and Oswald, they simultaneously had to
overcome the serious constraints the evidence posed, and compete with other entities for
authority over the investigation; and, as Ford illustrated in his memoir, at least one underlying
reason for the discourse was to disprove conspiracy beliefs. Instead of simply telling the people
who killed the president, the Warren Commission was forced into creating a discourse that, in
Edward Jay Epstein‘s words, ―restore[d] public confidence, dispel[led] rumors of foreign
intrigue, and protect[ed] the national interest.‖47 In other words, the task of the Warren
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Commission was to contain the claims of conspiracy, both those that existed and those that could
be reasonably expected to arise. Attempting to dispel conspiracy beliefs forced the Commission
to take on an enormous burden of proof and undermined the Commission‘s authority to narrate
the events of the assassination of President Kennedy.

Authority, Presumption, Invention, and the Burden of Proof
The Warren Commission‘s reaction to, and subsequent dialogue with, conspiracy claims is
dependent upon the interrelationship between authority, presumption, invention, and the burden
of proof. The interplay among these elements inherently colors how the arguments within a
discourse are constructed. In any argument, it is incumbent for opposing sides to determine
where presumption and the burden of proof lie. Presumption, as Richard Whately characterizes
it, is ―such a pre-occupation of the ground, as implies that it must stand good till some sufficient
reason is adduced against it; in short, that the Burden of proof lies on the side of him who would
dispute it.‖48 The question of which side carries presumption is the determining factor for how,
in Whately‘s words, ―the whole character of a discussion will often very much depend.‖49 If one
has presumption on his/her side, then the rhetor has the option of simply refuting the claims
being brought against him/her. However, if it is the case that the rhetor is shouldering the burden
of proof, then he/she must make an affirmative case, and must provide the audience with enough
evidence that his/her position is viable. Generally, presumption resides with existing institutions
and with the status quo, thus the burden of proof rests with the side that counters prevailing
beliefs. If the goal in an argument is to change popular assumptions, it is necessary to shoulder
the burden of proof, which means it is necessary to give the audience good reasons to give up its
convictions in favor of a new attitude.50
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The distinction between presumption and the burden of proof, however, is not static.
Instead, the interplay between presumption and the burden of proof is dynamic; it changes
according to what is being argued. Whately states, ―It is to be observed, that a Presumption may
be rebutted by an opposite Presumption, so as to shift the Burden of proof to the other side.‖51 It
is within this counter-play between presumption and the burden of proof, claim and counterclaim, that the concepts of authority and invention enter into how a rhetor should, or could,
characterize his/her arguments. While presumption and the burden of proof exist in a dynamic
state, it is no stretch to say that authority usually maintains presumption, and, therefore, authority
rests with the status quo, existing institutions, and the like. Whately states, ―The person, Body, or
book, in favour of whose decisions there is a certain Presumption, is said to have, so far,
‗Authority‘: in the strict sense of the word. And a recognition of this kind of Authority,—an
habitual Presumption in favour of such one‘s decision or opinions—is usually called
‗Deference.‘‖52 Whately‘s characterization implies that audiences, in general, defer to authority,
and audiences defer to authority because, as Lincoln asserts, audiences subject to authority
operate under the assumption that authority has the ―‗capacity for reasoned elaboration.‘‖53
Lincoln posits that authority has ―the capacity to produce consequential speech, quelling
doubts and winning the trust of the audiences whom they engage.‖54 The ability for authority to
produce consequential speech leads Lincoln to unfold another type of authority, discursive
authority, which comes from the effect discourse has on an audience. Lincoln explains,
―Discursive authority is not so much an entity as it is (1) an effect; (2) the capacity for producing
that effect; and (3) the commonly shared opinion that a given actor has the capacity for
producing that effect.‖ When a speaker‘s discourse has the effect of rendering an audience silent,
then it is said to have discursive authority. When discursive authority is assured, it is not
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necessary for authority to forward an argument. Instead, if authority is sufficiently satisfied that
it is retaining presumption, and that the audience will be satisfied with authority‘s position, then
all authority need do is provide the audience with assertions, or claims that it ―knows‖ in order to
effectively silence an audience.
Possessing discursive authority, however, does not mean that authority cannot be
challenged. When assertions made by authority are challenged, according to Lincoln, it is
changed in subtle, but significant, ways because ―the relation of trust and acceptance
characteristic of authority is suspended, at least temporarily, in that moment.‖55 When assertions
from authority are not enough to appease the audience‘s expectations, and authority must,
instead, provide the audience with an argument, Lincoln states that, ―it ceases to be authority for
the moment and becomes (an attempt at) persuasion.‖56 It is this site of conflict that serves as a
determining factor in invention and inherently determines how a rhetor will argue his/her case.
Historically, rhetorical invention has been viewed as determining what to say and how to
say it. But, according to Yameng Liu, determining what to say is just one task of the rhetor. Liu
states, ―Equally important, and probably more difficult, is defining and redefining her own
rhetorical responsibilities in such a manner that she is justified, or, we may say, authorized, in
saying what she has to say, stopping where she feels like stopping, and bypassing what she does
not want to touch on.‖57 Liu argues that determining where a rhetor is authorized to speak not
only occurs prior to invention, but serves a different function than invention. Determining
―[w]hether, where, when, and in what detail‖ is something rhetors deal with throughout the
invention process.58 Moreover, invention occurs at the site of conflict over who has authority.
―To invent is, in this sense,‖ according to Liu, ―to pit one authority or presumption against one
another, or against itself, for the achievement of a new, relatively stable alignment of ‗reputable‘
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opinions.‖59 In essence, invention is dependent upon where the rhetor has, or is trying to
establish, authority and colors how the argument will be carried forth.60
Presumably, if an entity such as the Warren Commission has presumption and authority,
the Commission could simply lay out its case asserting what had happened, who had done it, and
why it was done. Furthermore, if the Warren Commission retained authority and presumption,
then it would have the option of choosing ―whether, where, when and in what detail‖ to refute
any counterarguments leveled against its discourse. If the Commission chose not to address
claims of conspiracy, that is, if it believed it maintained its argumentative presumption, then
addressing conspiracy claims would not be necessary. However, if the Commission believed that
its presumption was being challenged, if it believed that conspiracy claims had an equal or
greater presumption, then the Commission would be compelled to come out of its fortified
position and attack those claims. The choices the Commission made in confronting conspiracy
claims is indicative that it felt its authority and presumption were being challenged. Attacking
conspiracy claims provided them with legitimization. Whether or how the Commission chose to
confront claims of conspiracy is manifested within the corpus of the Warren Commission Report
and is most noticeable in the Commission‘s treatment of conspiracy theories.

Establishing and Challenging Authority
Various claims of conspiracy existed in the public sphere prior to the release of the
Commission‘s report, claims that had the capability, if left unanswered, to undermine the
Commission‘s conclusions. While the media may have lauded the efforts of President Johnson to
convene the Warren Commission, there were others who challenged not only President
Johnson‘s right to do so, but also questioned whether the Commission would uncover the ―truth‖
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about the assassination. Critics on the right of the political spectrum argued that the truth of the
assassination would never be known because of a vast and sinister Communist conspiracy.
Critics on the left believed that the truth would not be uncovered because the real power behind
the conspiracy would make sure that the ―real‖ evidence would never come to light. Both the
political right and left forwarded similar claims, although the villain behind the conspiracy
differed between the accounts, and both challenged the authority of the Warren Commission,
albeit in different ways.61
Critics on the political right claimed that the Warren Commission was an illegal act that
attempted to hide the truth of a vast Communist conspiracy from the American people. For
instance, Congressman Martin Dies, in the American Opinion, wrote:
What Constitutional authority is there for such a Presidential commission? Why was not
the Committee on Un-American Activities, or the Senate Internal Security SubCommittee permitted to conduct the probe? And why did President Johnson ignore the
proposal of a close personal friend of the President and a member of the Presidential
commission, that a bipartisan Committee of Congress conduct the investigation? Why
was it deemed necessary to establish a commission of dubious Constitutional authority—
to say the least—handpicked by a President seeking reelection?62
Dies further iterated he doubted whether the Warren Commission would arrive at the truth
because ―there are strong and compelling political reasons, as well as present international
factors, to influence this probe and prevent a full disclosure of all of the ugly facts that have been
camouflaged for years but have now come to a climax in the assassination of President
Kennedy.‖63 Similarly, Oliver wrote, ―In a hasty and thus far successful attempt to thwart an
investigation by legally constituted Authorities … an illegal and un-Constitutional ‗special
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commission‘ was improvised with the obvious hope that it could be turned into a Soviet-style
kangaroo court.‖64 While the right expressed doubts, not only about the legality of President
Johnson convening a commission, but also that the Warren Commission would uncover the truth,
i.e., the Communist conspiracy to take over the United States, the political left also expressed
doubts that the Warren Commission was capable of arriving at the truth and challenged the
actions of the Commission.
Members of the political left believed that the Warren Commission would fail to uncover
the truth because the powers that be, the secretive and territorial agencies of the federal
government who were the real power in the Washington establishment, would make sure that the
evidence the Commission received showed only what the power establishment desired. M.S.
Arnoni, in the Minority of One, wrote that the Warren Commission was ―primarily intended as a
whitewash, to convince the people that everyone has done his job and that no significant parts
are missing from the jig-saw puzzle.‖ Arnoni asserted that the Commission would ―primarily
review evidence gathered by other investigative bodies.‖ Such investigations would, according to
Arnoni, make any evidence ―indiscernible‖ because ―[t]he possibility can by no means be
dismissed that important men in Washington do know the identity of the conspirators, or at least
some of them, and that these conspirators are so powerful that prudence dictates that they not be
identified in public.‖65 Bertrand Russell similarly asked ―Why were all the members of the
Warren Commission closely connected with the U.S. Government?”66 Even though the
commissioners‘ ties to the government were damaging enough in Russell‘s mind, the conduct of
the Commission ―confirmed one‘s worst fears‖ about the veracity of the Commission‘s
findings.67
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In essence, the right was challenging the authority of the president to convene a
commission (which was evidence of a conspiracy), while the left was challenging the
verifiability of the information the Commission would receive and the veracity of its actions
(which was evidence of a conspiracy). Both the right and left claimed that truth about the
assassination would never come to light because of a vast and sinister conspiracy existing within
the government.
The Warren Commission attempted to combat such claims by strenuously arguing that it
had authority over the narrative of President Kennedy‘s assassination. Even in establishing its
authority, however, the Commission faced challenges that had to be dealt with within the text
and is indicative that the Commission was not wholly in charge of its own agenda, that its
authority was being challenged by other forces. Historically, Lincoln tells us that authority is
categorized into two types: executive and epistemic. Executive authority comes from those who
are ―in authority‖ and epistemic authority consists of those people who are ―experts.‖68 Because
both forms of authority have the capacity to ―produce consequential speech,‖ it is necessary to
demonstrate, through discourse, the type of authority the rhetor possesses. Both executive and
epistemic authorities were retained by the Warren Commission in investigating and narrating the
happenings of the assassination of President Kennedy.
The Warren Commission was empowered, was authorized, by President Johnson to
narrate the happenings of President Kennedy‘s assassination and the subsequent murder of his
alleged assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald. The Commission writes, ―President Lyndon B.
Johnson…created this Commission to investigate the assassination … of John Fitzgerald
Kennedy, the 35th President of the United States. The President directed the Commission to
evaluate all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the assassination and the subsequent
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killing of the alleged assassin and report its findings and conclusions to him.‖69 The Warren
Commission, by way of executive authority, was given the right to tell the story of the
assassination. Additionally, by way of being the investigative body, the Warren Commission also
took on the mantle of epistemic authority.
In order to demonstrate its epistemic authority, the Commission underscores the legal and
investigative expertise of the commissioners and its staff. For instance, the Commission states,
―As Chairman of the Commission, President Johnson selected Earl Warren, Chief Justice of the
United States, former Governor and Attorney General of the State of California.‖70 All of the
commissioners are introduced along with their current titles, which enhances their executive
authority through the mantle of their offices, or former offices, along with other information that
might heighten their epistemic authority. The same tactic is used in introducing the
Commission‘s staff when it states, ―The Commission has been aided by 14 assistant counsel with
high professional qualifications … This staff undertook the work of the Commission with a
wealth of legal and investigative experience and a total dedication to the determination of the
truth.‖71 In highlighting the credentials of the staff, the Commission was establishing its
epistemic authority.
Through its executive and epistemic authority, the Warren Commission established its
mandate to provide the American public with ―consequential speech,‖ which has the capacity to
―quell doubts and win the trust‖ of the American public in its narration of the assassination. To
do so, the Commission stated that its objective was ―to identify the person or persons responsible
for both the assassination of President Kennedy and the killing of Oswald through an
examination of the evidence,‖ ―and [to] report its findings and conclusions to [President
Johnson].‖72 The Commission further states, ―The task has demanded unceasing appraisal of the
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evidence by the individual members of the Commission in their effort to discover the whole
truth.‖73 It was important for the Commission to set forth its epistemic authority in investigative
matters to instill confidence in the audience that it had the capacity for reasoned elaboration.
Indeed, the Commission was so concerned with establishing its epistemic authority that it framed
its report as an extension of the guiding principles of the United States, ―a country dedicated to
the concepts of reasoned argument and peaceful political change‖ through the recognition of ―the
right of people everywhere to full and truthful knowledge.‖ 74 As a matter of course, the Warren
Commission ―endeavor[ed] to fulfill that right and to appraise this tragedy by the light of reason
and the standard of fairness … with a deep awareness of [its] responsibility to present to the
American people an objective report of the facts relating to the assassination.‖75 The
Commission was arguing that its report was an extension, not only of its own epistemic
authority, but also the epistemic authority of the American people.
Given the executive and epistemic authorities of the Warren Commission, it should come
as no surprise that the commissioners viewed their mandate as the singular, definitive, and final
narrative of the assassination. The Commission states that it ―viewed … [its task] as an
unequivocal Presidential mandate to conduct a thorough and independent investigation.‖76 The
Commission‘s method for arriving at its conclusion ―necessarily differed from those of a court
conducting a criminal trial of a defendant before it, since under our system there is no provision
for a posthumous trial.‖77 As a result of its objective, and the necessary departure from criminal
proceedings, ―the Commission functioned neither as a court presiding over an adversary
proceeding nor as a prosecutor determined to prove a case, but as a factfinding [sic] agency
committed to the ascertainment of the truth.‖78 In essence, the Commission asserted that it was
serving what Kenneth Burke classified as a subordinate of the scene from an essentially
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materialist philosophical view.79 In other words, the Commission claimed that it was simply
providing unvarnished information, simply the facts of the president‘s and Oswald‘s deaths.
The Commission, however, had to address the fear that the president‘s murder was the
result of a conspiracy. The opening paragraphs of the report build emotive intensity for the
necessity of an independent investigation. ―The subject of the Commission‘s inquiry was a chain
of events which saddened and shocked the people of the United States and of the world ... In the
United States and abroad, these events evoked universal demands for an explanation.‖80
Essentially, the Commission was attempting to tap into the grief of the nation in order to
legitimize its existence, which is further iterated two paragraphs later. The Commission writes:
The events of these 2 days were witnessed with shock and disbelief by a Nation grieving
the loss of its young leader … Theories and speculations mounted regarding the
assassination. In many instances, the intense public demand for facts was met by partial
and frequently conflicting reports from Dallas and elsewhere. After Oswald‘s arrest and
his denial of all guilt, public attention focused both on the extent of the evidence against
him and the possibility of a conspiracy, domestic or foreign. His subsequent death
heightened public interest and stimulated additional suspicions and rumors.81
While the Commission acknowledges that rumors and suspicions mounted as a consequence of
the media frenzy that ensued in the wake of the assassination, the promise behind the
Commission‘s prose is that it, in its subsequent pages, will reveal the answer to the mystery
surrounding the assassination. It was aware of the fears gripping the public, but the Commission
was committed to finding the truth.
Interestingly, while the Commission goes to great lengths to establish its authority, the
emotional needs of the public center on addressing the fears that a conspiracy was responsible
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for the death of President Kennedy. If the Commission felt it was maintaining its argumentative
presumption, and if the Commission felt it was maintaining its discursive authority, then the
choice by the Commission to address conspiracy fears would not be necessary. The fact that the
Warren Commission felt compelled to address claims of conspiracy within its discourse is
indicative that it felt that its presumption and authority was being challenged by other forces. The
conflict between the authority of the Warren Commission to narrate the story of the
assassination, and that of conspiracy theories, is indicative of the burdens the Commission was to
bear throughout the corpus of the text. These sites of contestation are not only a challenge to
authority, but are also the locations where the Warren Commission is drawn into a dialogue with
conspiracy theories.
Walter Fisher contends that dialogues are not only a literary form, but (citing Martin
Buber) are instances ―‗where each of the participants really has in mind the other or others in
their present and particular being and turns to them with the intention of establishing a living
mutual relationship between himself and them.‘‖82 While the Warren Commission may not have
wanted to establish a dialogue, a relationship, between itself and conspiracy claims, its
acknowledgement of ―rumors and suspicions,‖ and its investigation of them, gives such claims a
modicum of legitimacy. And, in creating a dialogue with conspiracy theories, it was important
for the Commission to know what the counter-position was so that it could argue against it.
Michael Billig argues, ―The rhetorical approach emphasizes that any attitude is more than an
expression in favour of a position: it is also implicitly or explicitly an argument against a
counter-position. Thus, in order to understand an attitudinal position, one must know the counterattitudinal position. This is especially relevant to the conspiracy theory of politics.‖83 Inherently,
by being aware of, and attempting to combat claims of, conspiracy, the Warren Commission
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established a dialogue with conspiracy arguments and, in doing so, took on some of the generic
characteristics of the conspiracy narrative.
While the Commission went to great lengths to establish its authority to investigate the
assassination of President Kennedy, the need for it to address conspiracy theories within the text
is indicative of the erosion, however slight, of authority. Had the Commission had simple
authority, then the need to address conspiracy claims would not have come into play. However,
because conspiracy claims were already believed by a significant portion of the population, it
was necessary for the Commission to address such claims. What is particularly salient is how,
rhetorically, the Commission chose to respond and, equally important, where it believed it had
presumption and where it was shouldering the burden of proof.

Presumption, Authority, and Argument from Absence
The interrelationship between presumption and authority is manifested in the Commission‘s use
of argument from absence and serves as an indicator that not only is the Commission engaged in
a dialogue with conspiracy arguments, but, in doing so, takes on the characteristics of conspiracy
argument. Using argument from absence suggests that the Commission was attempting to negate
beliefs in conspiracy by attempting to make conspiracy arguments shoulder the burden of proof,
an indication that, at the very least, there were two entities, in Whately‘s words, vying for
presumption—the Warren Commission and the status quo (or conspiracy arguments). The
Commission attempted to win this presumptive war through its use of argument from absence.
The ability of proponents of conspiracy theories to shift the burden of proof onto their
opponents has long been noted by rhetorical scholars and serves as one of conspiracy theories‘
most powerful tools.84 David Zarefsky notes that, because conspiracy theories are virtually
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impossible to prove or disprove, the side that wins—the conspiratorial side or the side arguing
against a conspiracy—depends ―upon who shoulders the burden of proof.‖85 Generally, when
offering a claim, it is incumbent upon the proponents to provide a prima facie case to support
their contention. Conspiracy theories, however, reverse this position. Conspiracists offer claims
and then defy disputants to disprove such claims. Frequently, those countering conspiracy
arguments are forced into arguing there is no conspiracy by asserting that there is no evidence to
support the claims. In the logic of conspiracy arguments, however, the absence of evidence
becomes evidence that there is a conspiracy afloat. The use of absence of evidence, then, allows
for those making conspiracy claims to retain presumption. Whately states, ―If you have the
‗Presumption‘ on your side, and can but refute all the arguments brought against you, you have,
for the present at least, gained a victory: but if you abandon this position, by suffering this
Presumption to be forgotten, which is in fact leaving out one of, perhaps, your strongest
arguments, you may appear to be making a feeble attack, instead of a triumphant defence.‖86 The
Commission‘s use of argument from absence to counter conspiracy claims is indicative that it
was attempting to force the burden of proof onto the shoulders of conspiracists and assert its
authority.
There was a very real fear within the public that the assassination of President Kennedy
was the result of a conspiracy. Considering that the Warren Commission was, in part, convened
in order to root out conspiracy claims, the Commission was forced to take on a double burden of
proof—proving that Oswald was the lone assassin while simultaneously proving that there was
no conspiracy. The Commission was placed into an untenable situation; it was forced to attempt
to disprove claims of conspiracy, a task that is impossible. In its attempt to disprove conspiracy
theories, the Commission resorted to the use of argument from absence.
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The narrative of the Commission‘s report is bedeviled with places where argument from
absence, rather than accumulation of evidence, is used to make the argument, although the most
telling examples are contained within the chapter titled, ―Investigation of Possible Conspiracy‖
and the Appendix titled ―Speculations and Rumors.‖87 The Commission asserts that most of the
conspiracy claims brought to bear centered on four basic questions: ―Was Lee Harvey Oswald
really the assassin of the President; why did he do it; did he have any accomplices; and why did
Ruby shoot Oswald?‖88 While most of the chapter is dedicated to the investigation of Oswald‘s
background, including his time in the Soviet Union and his political activities once he returned to
the United States, a significant amount of rhetorical energy centers on refuting the possibility of
Oswald having a confederate in planning the assassination.
The Commission, in several instances, used argument from absence as a means to combat
conspiracy claims. For instance, Oliver argued that Oswald might ―have missed connections
with some agent of the Conspiracy who was to transport him to the airport, and it may be
significant that, when observed on the street, he was walking directly toward the apartment of the
Jakob Rubenstein (alias Jack Ruby) who later silenced him.‖89 The Commission countered such
claims by asserting, ―There is no evidence that Oswald and Ruby knew each other or had any
relationship through a third party or parties. There is no evidence that Oswald knew where Ruby
lived. Accordingly, there is neither evidence nor reason to believe that Oswald was on his way to
Ruby‘s apartment when he was stopped by Tippit.‖90 In essence, the Commission was not only
negating claims that Oswald and Ruby knew each other, it was similarly negating beliefs that
there was more to the conspiracy than simply the assassination, that Oswald, as a result of getting
caught, had to be ―taken out.‖
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Similarly, if other testimony existed that seemingly linked Oswald with a confederate, the
Commission impugned the testimony of the witnesses by calling into question the credibility of
the witnesses and the veracity of their claims. For instance, numerous claims were made
implying a relationship between Oswald and Ruby. Far too frequently, no real evidence is given
to support the Commission‘s stance. For instance, ―Wilbryn Waldon (Robert) Litchfield II‖
claimed to have seen Ruby and Oswald together at the Carousel Club. The Commission
responded to this claim by asserting that it ―had substantial doubts concerning Litchfield‘s
credibility‖ because he had failed to inform the Commission of ―his observation until December
2, 1963,‖ and he ―had twice been convicted of offenses involving forged checks.‖91 The
Commission furthers its stance by proclaiming, ―All assertions that Oswald was seen in the
company of Ruby or anyone else at the Carousel Club have been investigated. None of them
merits any credence.‖92 A great deal of time is spent attempting to negate the Ruby-Oswald
connection because of beliefs that the mafia was somehow involved in the assassination plot. In
order to combat claims of a mafia motive behind the actions of Ruby, who is, as Eric Norden
writes, ―A petty hoodlum with ties to Chicago and Los Angeles gangs and a record of union
racketeering,‖ the Commission responds with, ―There is no credible evidence that Jack Ruby was
involved in the criminal underworld. Investigation disclosed that no one in either Chicago or
Dallas who had any knowledge that Ruby was associated with any organized criminal activity.‖93
The Commission is attempting to negate an organized crime angle by asserting that there was
―no evidence to support‖ such claims.
The Commission concluded that Oswald acted alone in the assassination because it
―found no evidence that anyone assisted Oswald in planning or carrying out the assassination,‖ it
―found no evidence that Oswald was involved with any persons or group in a conspiracy to
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assassinate the president,‖ and it ―found no evidence to show that Oswald was employed,
persuaded, or encouraged by any foreign government to assassinate President Kennedy.‖94
Because there was no evidence to support conspiracy claims, there was, by the Commission‘s
logic, no conspiracy. But, a negative argument, by definition, cannot be proven. Although hardly
a representative sample, the prolific use of argument from absence by the Commission is being
used as evidence to refute conspiracy claims, thus attempting to shift the burden of proof onto
those who had raised conspiracy charges by attempting to cast doubt onto the evidence that was
used to support beliefs in conspiracy.
The Commission similarly uses argument from absence to disabuse the American public
of the belief that Oswald was acting under the direction of a foreign power. The Commission
notes that there were allegations that Oswald ―received aid from one or more persons or political
groups, ranging from the far left to the far right of the political spectrum, or from a foreign
government, usually either the Castro regime in Cuba or the Soviet Union.‖95 For instance, Dies
asserts that Oswald‘s communist beliefs are proof that he was operating under the direct
commands of the Soviet Union because ―Communists never commit political crimes except in
obedience to orders of superiors.‖96 To back up his assertions, Dies offers an excerpt taken from
―the first Report issued unanimously by the Dies Committee—composed of Democrats,
Republicans, ‗Liberals,‘ and conservatives.‖ The Dies Committee disclosed that ―The
Communists in the United States openly admit their allegiance to the Communist International at
Moscow, and glory in the fact that they obey all the orders issued from there immediately and
implicitly.‖ Furthermore, Dies adds, ―The Communist International is dominated by the Russian
Communist party and Soviet officials, and could not exist without the wholehearted support of
the leaders of the Russian Communist party and the financial backing of the Soviet
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Government.‖97 By Dies‘ logic, the fact that Oswald had defected to the Soviet Union and was
an avowed Marxist, which Dies asserts is synonymous with Communist, and because
Communists never enact political crimes without express commands from the leaders in the
Soviet Union, the only possible explanation was that the assassination of President Kennedy was
the result of a Communist conspiracy.98
While the Commission acknowledges that there may have been a political motive
behind Oswald‘s actions, it does virtually everything within its power to liberate the audience
beliefs that the USSR was involved in a conspiracy. For instance, the Commission asserts that
Oswald ―volunteered to give the Soviet officials any information that he had concerning Marine
Corps operations, and intimated that he might know something of interest.‖99 However, the
Commission immediately follows the passage by cautioning that ―[n]o evidence had been found
that they used him for any particular propaganda or other political informational purposes.‖100
Similarly, the Commission quotes Secretary of State Dean Rusk as saying, ―I have seen no
evidence that would indicate to me that the Soviet Union considered that it had an interest in the
removal of President Kennedy or that it was in any way involved in the removal of President
Kennedy.‖101 Secretary Rusk further iterated, ―I have not seen or heard of any scrap of evidence
indicating that the Soviet Union had any desire to eliminate President Kennedy nor in any way
participate in any such event.‖ Secretary Rusk concludes by stating that ―it [orchestrating the
assassination of President Kennedy] would be an act of rashness and madness for Soviet Leaders
to undertake such an action as an active policy. Because everything would have been put in
jeopardy or at stake in connection with such an act. It has not been our impression that madness
has characterized the actions of the Soviet leadership in recent years.‖102 The Commission used
an absence of evidence, almost to the point of inanity, to reiterate the point that there was no
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evidence to indicate there was a political conspiracy involving the USSR afloat. The
overabundant use of phrases such as there ―is no evidence‖ is indicative that there was doubt,
suspicion, of a political conspiracy. The Commission further attempted to deflate beliefs in a
political conspiracy by including Secretary Rusk‘s characterization that such actions would be
―rash‖ and ―mad‖ on the part of the Soviets. Thus, the Commission was attempting to negate
beliefs that there was a political conspiracy, but they were further attempting to prove that a
political conspiracy would have been ―mad‖ on the part of the Soviet Union.
The double burden of proof into which the Warren Commission was thrust, proving
Oswald was the lone gunman and proving that there was no conspiracy, necessitated that the
Commission alleviate any doubt that there was a conspiracy behind the assassination of the
president. In essence, the Warren Commission was forced into disputing conspiracy claims by
using the same type of argument conspiracists use to forward their own claims of conspiracy.
The Commission‘s use of argument from absence was an attempt to shift the burden of proof
onto conspiracy charges in order to cast doubt upon the assertions of conspiracists, but
conspiracy theories, by definition, refuse to shoulder the burden of proof. As Whately stated,
when one is shouldering the burden of proof, then one must provide the audience with good
reasons to give up its beliefs. Instead, the Warren Commission was simply providing the
American public with negations of conspiracy claims; it was providing the audience with a set of
assertions that there was no conspiracy instead of providing the audience with reasons. The logic
the Commission used to arrive at its conclusion, that there was no conspiracy, was based on the
absence of evidence that there was a conspiracy.
While arguments from absence are most notably used by conspiracy theorists, they are
not isolated to conspiracy arguments. Darsey notes that such arguments may be made in haste,
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desperation, or even disinformation.103 Inherently, in order to assuage the conspiratorial fears and
doubts of the audience, the Commission had to resort to using a defensive argument, a legislative
strategy used by an entity that was not conducting a trial. Using the absence of evidence as
evidence makes the argument become tautological, one that echoes the age-old debate between
parents and their offspring that answers the question ―why‖ with ―because I said so‖ rather than
an actual attempt to persuade the audience that there was no conspiracy. But, the absence of
evidence as evidence is more than tautological; it is a paradox, and paradox is used to counter
other conspiracy beliefs and to attempt to resolve the problem of authority.

Authority and Paradox
The Warren Commission faced far more complex claims of conspiracy, ones that could not be
simply refuted by the Commission through argument from absence or argument from authority.
Instead, the Commission was forced into a paradox of substance because of its dubious
relationships with the secretive and territorial agencies of the federal government. What made the
relationship between the Warren Commission and federal agencies so problematic was that these
agencies themselves were implicated in conspiracy claims to assassinate the president. As noted
above, the Warren Commission was made aware of claims that Oswald was a paid informant of
the FBI early in its investigation. The American people were similarly made aware of such
claims. For instance, an article in The Nation asserted that the Warren Commission ―must tell us
if the FBI or any other government intelligence agency was in any way connected with the
alleged assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald. At this moment, the possibility of such associations in the
young man‘s life is intolerably a subject for speculation.‖104 The Commission acknowledges that
there were ―[r]umors and speculations that Oswald was in some way associated or used by the
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agencies of the U.S. Government … Insinuations were [also] made that Oswald had been a CIA
agent or has some relationship with the CIA.‖ In addition to the alleged relationship with the
CIA, there were also allegations that Oswald was an operative for the FBI. The Commission
notes that there was ―[s]peculation that he [Oswald] had some working relationship with the
FBI.‖105 Yet the Commission was utterly reliant on using these same agencies to investigate the
assassination, thus setting up a paradox the Commission could not completely reconcile.
Burke notes that the ―word ‗substance,‘ used to designate what a thing is, derives from a
word designating something that a thing is not.‖106 For Burke, this moment represents alchemy,
where a rhetor is able to capitalize on the inability to resolve two incommensurate claims and
exploit the situation for their own personal gains. Hark Paul Moore offers that the conjunction of
the two opposing claims that form the paradox allow for a more ―insightful truth‖ than either
claim, separately, could produce.107 What Burke and Moore are alluding to is that through an
examination of what a proposition is stated to be, compared to what the competing proposition is
stated not to be, we can uncover the actual relationship between the two propositions. What
makes paradox so compelling in conspiracy theories, Darsey notes, is that ―Paradox is a form of
innuendo and … lacks refutable substance; it is purely formal argument.‖108 One of the reasons
paradox is so compelling for the conspiratorial argument is that it leads to what Jodi Dean
identifies as the signature element of the modern conspiracy: suspicion.109 Suspicion, according
to Dean, serves to reinforce what we don‘t know rather than clarifying what we do.110 The most
obvious place where the Warren Commission is drawn into a paradox is its treatment of the
evidence provided by the FBI and other legal agencies.
The Commission had to make some interesting rhetorical maneuvers in order to make its
case that the FBI or CIA were not involved in a conspiracy, and these moves led the Commission
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into paradox. Rather than simply relying on the FBI, CIA, Secret Service and other agencies to
conduct the investigation of the assassination, ―The Commission concluded that the public
interest in insuring [sic] that the truth was ascertained could not be met by merely accepting the
reports or the analyses of Federal or State agencies … [T]he premises and conclusions of those
reports [were] critically reassessed.‖111 Instead of simply asserting that their investigation was
independent and thorough, the Commission further amplifies its stance by stating it ―directed
requests to the 10 major departments of the Federal Government, 14 of its independent agencies
or Commissions, and 4 congressional committees for all information relating to the assassination
or the background and activities of Lee Harvey Oswald and Jack Ruby.‖112 The critical
reexamination to which the Commission alluded consisted of examining the agencies‘ reports,
asking for all ―underlying investigative materials,‖ and submitting ―detailed requests for
statements of witnesses and examinations of physical evidence.‖113 In essence, the Warren
Commission examined the reports, determined if there were points of contention, asked for
further information from the same agencies, and then had agents and directors of the agencies
testify under oath.
The Warren Commission, however, could not completely conduct its own investigation,
partially because it lacked the funding and resources necessary to accomplish such a feat, and
partially because of the Director of the FBI, J. Edgar Hoover.114 Instead, the Commission
couched its dependence by asserting, ―Because of the diligence, cooperation, and facilities of
Federal investigative agencies, it was unnecessary for the Commission to employ investigators
other than the members of the Commission‘s legal staff.‖ The due diligence to which the
Commission referred consisted of approximately 25,500 interviews conducted by the FBI along
with 25,400 pages of text submitted in its subsequent reports and the 1,550 interviews
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administered by the Secret Service and the 4,600 pages of information delivered to the
Commission.115 Certainly the sheer volume of information the agencies supplied was impressive.
Still, in essence, the Warren Commission is praising the FBI, the Secret Service, and the CIA for
their commitment to helping solve the murder of the president. Yet the Commission is forced to
reiterate its recognition ―that special measures were required whenever the facts or rumors called
for an appraisal of the acts of the agencies themselves.‖ The fact that there were allegations that
implicated the secretive and territorial agencies of the federal government as part of a larger
conspiracy forced the Commission into a paradoxical position where, in order to conduct a
complete investigation, it would have to investigate the same institutions that it was reliant on,
partly because the scope of the Commission‘s investigation necessitated that they investigate the
conduct of the agents protecting the president and keeping tabs on Oswald and partly because no
other investigative agencies had the access to the information the Commission desperately
needed.
Conspiracy beliefs that federal legal agencies were involved in a conspiracy to
assassinate President Kennedy was not the only paradoxical position into which the Commission
was thrust; the Commission also faced a paradoxical position between the inner workings of the
secretive agencies on which it relied and the public interest these agencies served. Edwin Black
notes the paradox that institutions that inherently deal with lies, innuendo, and secrets are the
same institutions that are frequently called upon to disclose the truth. Black states, ―And so the
paradox is, to put it crudely, that an institution bound to artifice is formed to yield disclosure.
Drama puts fakery at the service of truth.‖116 Black‘s observation needs only minor extension
when dealing with secretive and territorial federal investigative agencies.
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Secrecy, by its very nature, breeds distrust; it is an intentional concealment that
represents a commodity, a privilege, one that is akin to mystery. Sissela Bok states, ―To think
something secret is already to envisage potential conflict between what insiders conceal and
outsiders want to inspect or lay bare.‖117 Only those who have access understand the mystery
because they have the benefit of full disclosure. In politics, secrets serve a hierarchical function.
Black observed, ―We must observe the general associations of the term ‗classified‘ with ideas of
having been contained, enclosed, encompassed within a category, placed in a class, ranked. We
have but to extend these associations to the political sphere to see again a remarkable consonance
between the idea of secrecy and the ideas of hierarchy.‖118 ―Confidential,‖ ―classified,‖ ―eyes
only‖ are all determinants of order and serve to regulate who gets to view what information
while simultaneously protecting it from being seen by those unworthy.
The actions of FBI and CIA operatives are, themselves, secret, only open to those
initiated, those worthy of inclusion. Yet through their actions they are attempting to ascertain the
truth, the truth to serve the public interest. Having entities implicated in a conspiracy charge
conducting significant portions of the investigation of the alleged conspiracy is, by its very
nature, paradoxical. It stands to reason that if the FBI, CIA, and/or Secret Service were somehow
involved in a conspiracy, then those agencies would be unlikely to provide evidence to the
Warren Commission of their involvement.
The Commission not only had to try to reconcile the problems encountered in relying on
the investigative prowess of entities implicated in conspiracy beliefs, they had to reconcile
claims that measures that should have been taken to protect the president were not, or, even
worse, that they were consciously neglected. For instance, Bertrand Russell wrote:
The President‘s route for his drive through Dallas was widely known and was printed in
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the Dallas Morning News on November 22. At the last minute the Secret Service changed
a small part of their plans so that the President left Main Street and turned into Houston
and Elm Streets. This alteration took the President past the book depository building from
which it is alleged that Oswald shot him. How Oswald is supposed to have known of this
change has never been explained. Why was the President’s route changed at the last
minute to take him past Oswald’s place of work?119
What is significant about this claim is that it implies that the Secret Service consciously made the
decision to take the motorcade past the place of employment of a known subversive. As Russell
argues, Oswald was the first person identified on a list of twenty-three known subversives. Yet,
while most of the known subversives on the list were followed, Oswald was left alone.120 If
Russell‘s assertions were true, that the Secret Service changed the motorcade route at the last
minute to facilitate it passing the Book Depository in order to facilitate the assassination, then
claims that Oswald was working in concert with governmental agencies in the assassination of
the president could promote greater belief in a conspiracy.
To combat claims the Secret Service was negligent, or even that it willfully chose the
route in order to facilitate the assassination, the Commission asserts that, ―the route was not
finally selected until November 18; it was announced in the press on November 19, only 3 days
before the President‘s arrival. Based on the circumstances of Oswald‘s employment and the
planning of the motorcade route, the Commission has concluded that Oswald‘s employment in
the Depository is wholly unrelated to the President‘s trip to Dallas.‖121 The fact that the
Commission felt compelled to explain that the choice of the route was ―wholly unrelated‖ to
Oswald is an attempt to refute conspiracy charges. Furthermore, the Commission repeatedly
asserts that the route was the most expedient and most logical route to maximize President
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Kennedy‘s exposure to the public within the forty-five minutes allotted. The report states, ―The
police officials agreed that the route recommended by Sorrels was the proper one and did not
express a belief that any other route might be better.‖122 Additional testimony was added
offering, ―The route impressed the agents as a natural and desirable one‖ and ―Selection of the
motorcade route was … entirely appropriate and based on such legitimate considerations as the
origin and destination of the motorcade, the desired opportunity for the President to greet large
numbers of people, and normal patterns of traffic.‖123 While these statements seemingly
underscore the logic used to arrive at the route of the motorcade, they are simultaneously
attempting to quell conspiracy charges that the route was chosen to facilitate the assassination.
Additional moves to reaffirm that Secret Service agents were in compliance with their
duties but were not complicit in a conspiracy include such observations that before, during, and
after the assassination, agents were operating according to ―standard procedure.‖ For example,
the Commission states, ―No arrangements were made for police or building custodians to inspect
buildings along the motorcade route since the Secret Service did not normally request or make
such a check. Under standard procedures, the responsibility for watching the windows of
buildings was shared by local police stationed along the route and Secret Service agents riding in
the motorcade‖ (emphasis added). The Commission adds, ―The agents in this car (the
presidential follow-up car), under standard procedure, had instructions to watch the route for
signs of trouble‖ (emphasis added).124 Secret Service agents were also in compliance when they
left behind the bubbletop frequently used to cover the open limousine because the weather was
clear and sunny. The bubbletop was not bulletproof, so it would not have afforded any additional
protection for President Kennedy.125 Moreover, under President Kennedy‘s own instructions, he
preferred that Secret Service agents not ride on the running boards of the presidential limousine
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―except when necessary.‖126 By appealing to the standard, normal, and logical actions of the
Secret Service, the Commission is attempting to allay suspicions that the route was changed in a
last minute effort to facilitate the assassination and that the Secret Service was not part of a
larger conspiracy to assassinate the president.
Relying on information provided to the Commission by entities implicated in conspiracy
claims forced the Commission into a paradoxical position. On the one hand, the Commission was
charged with investigating the assassination and stated that they investigated the ―rumors and
suspicions‖ alleging a possible conspiracy. On the other hand, the Commission relied on the
investigations of federal legal agencies, agencies implicated in claims of conspiracy, for
significant parts of their own investigation. If the FBI, CIA, or Secret Service were involved in a
conspiracy, it is unlikely that those agencies would willingly disclose information that implicated
them in the same conspiracy. What the Commission‘s position indicates is that it was forced into
an untenable situation by the conspiracy theories already in the public sphere, and that it was in a
battle for discursive authority over the investigation. The Commission attempted to assuage the
audience‘s fears and doubts about the independence of its investigation by offering a series of
assertions that spoke to the thoroughness of the investigation and the dedication of the agents of
the FBI, CIA, and Secret Service. Yet, the Warren Commission was combating fear by appealing
to ethos. It also underscores, however, that the Warren Commission believed that its authority
would be enough to overcome the incommensurability between the its stated independence and
its utter reliance. The tenuous hold the Commission had over discursive authority is further
manifested in the attempt to determine a motive for President Kennedy‘s alleged assassin.
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Authority by (Massive) Evidence
One of the larger problems the Commission faced in its investigation and subsequent report was
the lack of a discernible motive on Oswald‘s part. There was no manifesto uncovered revealing
Oswald‘s reasons for murdering President Kennedy; there was no single event for which Oswald
was seeking revenge by slaying the president. Instead, the Commission was forced to guess as to
why Oswald would perform such a dastardly deed. As mentioned above, there were conspiracy
theories in place that linked Oswald to a political motive to assassinate President Kennedy, but
the Commission attempted to denigrate such claims by using argument from absence. In the Cold
War world, where the world was divided between capitalists (us), and communists (them), a
political motive to kill the president of the most powerful capitalist country carried considerable
weight. Depicting Oswald as a profligate traitor would have been a simple and believable motive
for the American public, but could also have served as a potential death knell for the relatively
stable, albeit strained, relations that existed between the United States, the Soviet Union, and
Cuba. In essence, the Warren Commission had to come up with a motive that could compete
with the compelling and believable motives being forwarded by conspiracists such as Dies,
leading the Commission to generate massive amounts of evidence to make its case, further
demonstrating that it had to argue for authority rather than simply being vested with it.
The massive amount of evidence the Warren Commission uses to ―convince‖ the
audience of Oswald‘s motive not only mimics one of the major tools of conspiracists, it also
indicates that the Commission felt the need to persuade the audience that such a mundane villain
had a compelling enough motive to murder the president. Richard Hofstadter noted, ―One of the
most impressive things about paranoid literature is precisely the elaborate concern with
demonstration it almost invariably shows … The very fantastic character of its conclusions leads
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to heroic strivings for ‗evidence‘ to prove that the unbelievable is the only thing that can be
believed.‖127 Earl Creps similarly demonstrated that conspiracy arguments present evidence en
masse, overwhelming audiences with the sheer volume of information and making it virtually
impossible for the audience to assess it all.128 Creps states, ―[T]he persuasive force of the
conspiracy case is produced not by a single portion of testimony, but by simultaneous
consideration of hundreds of pieces of evidence,‖ which are tangentially related and allow the
conspiracist to, according to Marilyn Young, Michael Launer, and Curtis Austin, give the
impression that the conspiracists know more than can be proven.129 Jodi Dean, however, takes
these observations a bit further when she notes that ―conspiracy theory‘s irreconcilable doubt [is
what] generates massive amounts of evidence.‖130 Conspiracy theories contain massive amounts
of evidence because, in Dean‘s words, ―conspiracy thinking is so uncertain that one is rarely
fully convinced; instead, one becomes involved in a reiterative back-and-forth that mobilizes
doubt and reassurance into a never-ending, never-reconciled account of possibility.‖131 One need
only look at the massive amount of tangentially related evidence used to provide Oswald with a
motive to illustrate the Commission‘s own doubt and, therefore, uncertain authority.
The quest for the Warren Commission to determine a satisfactory motive behind
Oswald‘s actions that could compete with the political motives being forwarded by conspiracists
forced the Commission to shoulder the burden of proof, indicating that the Commission, at least
as far as motive was concerned, did not have discursive authority, that it was attempting to invent
a motive that would resonate with the American public. In order to do so, the Commission had to
provide the American people with a compelling reason why Oswald would do such an
unspeakable act. In its attempt to determine Oswald‘s motive, the Commission stated that it
―considered many possible motives for the assassination, including those which might flow from
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Oswald‘s commitment to Marxism or communism, the existence of some personal grievance, a
desire to effect changes in the structure of society or simply to go down in history as a well
publicized assassin.‖132 While the Commission states that ―[n]one of these possibilities
satisfactorily explains Oswald‘s act if it is judged by the standards of reasonable men,‖ the
Commission attempts to discern a motive by linking Oswald‘s psychological and ideological
states, which are peppered throughout the commission‘s report garnishing, everything from the
narrative of the assassination to Oswald‘s alleged ties with Jack Ruby. Indeed, the Commission
provides Oswald‘s biography in three separate places within its report.133 Taken together,
Oswald‘s psychology and his ideology (though only tangentially related) ―and the many other
factors which may have molded the character of Lee Harvey Oswald,‖ states the Commission,
―there emerged a man capable of assassinating President Kennedy.‖134
One of the other means by which the Commission teases out a possible motive for
Oswald is through the use of psychoanalysis, even though the Commission could not ―reach any
definite conclusions as to whether or not he was ‗sane‘ under prevailing legal standards.‖135 By
using reports garnered during Oswald‘s childhood, and interviewing those who knew him as an
adult, the Commission used psychoanalysis to demonstrate that Oswald was an alienated and
disaffected loner incapable of establishing any meaningful relationships. For instance, the
Commission includes excerpts detailing the emotional neglect Oswald suffered at the hands of
his mother coupled with the absence of a father figure and family life, which led psychologists
from Oswald‘s troubled youth to diagnose him with ―‗personality pattern disturbance with
schizoid features and passive-aggressive tendencies‘‖ and to urge Mrs. Oswald to get Oswald the
help he needed.136 To reiterate its claims about Oswald‘s emotional problems, the Commission
offered that Oswald was ―‘disturbed about disrobing in front of‖ other boys who resided with
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him while at Youth House in New York and that he ―slept with his mother‖ until he was nearly
eleven.137 Oswald, according to the Commission, attempted to compensate for his emotional
neglect by virtue of a ―‗vivid fantasy life‘ turning around the topics of omnipotence and power,
through which he tried to compensate for his present shortcomings and frustrations‖ and led him
to believe he would be recognized as a ―political prophet‖ and linked with other great historical
leaders.138 Similarly, the Commission notes that Oswald had ―a severe inability to enter into
relationships with other people.‖139 Oswald was ―profoundly alienated from the world in which
he lived. His life was characterized by isolation, frustration, and failure. He had very few, if any,
close relationships with other people and he appeared to have great difficulty in finding a
meaningful place in the world. He was never satisfied with anything.‖140 In essence, in order to
combat conspiracy claims of a political motive the Warren Commission was attempting to
assemble an overwhelming amount of evidence in order to paint Oswald as a kook, as a
malcontent, as a man who was unwilling and incapable of forming any type of relationship.
Not only did the Commission generate a massive amount of evidence to characterize
Oswald as a disaffected loner incapable of maintaining any kind of relationship, the Commission
employed the same strategy to assert that Oswald was intensely dissatisfied with capitalism and
with his adopted communist ideology. In order to support its claim, the Commission offered the
testimony positing that ―[s]ome of his [Oswald‘s] acquaintances in Dallas and Forth Worth had
the impression that Oswald was dissatisfied in having been given a menial job and not assigned
to an institution of higher learning within the Soviet Union.‖141 The Commission‘s inclusion of
this testimony bridges Oswald‘s beliefs in his own importance and his growing dissatisfaction
with the Soviet Union. To further iterate Oswald‘s dissatisfaction with Communism specifically,
and the Soviet Union more generally, the Commission offers some of Oswald‘s own writings.
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For example, Oswald wrote ―‗there can be no mediation between those systems [capitalism and
communism] as they exist to-day [sic] and that person. He must be opposed to their basic
foundations and representatives.‘‖142 Moreover, Oswald penned, ―‘No man, having known,
having lived under the Russian Communist and American capitalist system, could possibly make
a choice between them, there is no choice, one offers oppresstion [sic] the other poverty. Both
offer imperilistic [sic] injustice, tinted with two brands of slavery.‖143 Writings such as these led
the Commission to conclude that ―Oswald‘s decided rejection of both capitalism and
communism seemed to place him in a situation in which he could not live with satisfaction either
in the United States or in the Soviet Union.‖144 Furthermore, in providing the audience with these
writings, the Commission was reiterating Oswald‘s disaffection with the world and also
undermining the possibility that he was working for a foreign power. If Oswald was unable to
form any lasting relationships and if he was unhappy with both communism and capitalism, then,
by the Commission‘s logic, Oswald was incapable of entering into a relationship with anyone to
form a conspiracy, let alone to work on behalf of powers he hated.
In order to combat beliefs that Oswald was acting within a vast and sinister Communist
conspiracy, the Warren Commission used the absence of evidence (noted above) coupled with
the presentation of an overwhelming amount of evidence to pound home the idea that Oswald
was a deeply troubled man whose intense dislike of the United States, his problems with
authority, his proclivity for violence, and his desire to make his mark on history, taken together,
made him capable of the assassination of President Kennedy. Yet, these reasons for Oswald‘s
behavior can only tangentially be related to the assassination. There is no direct link, no smoking
gun, between Oswald and President Kennedy. Oswald, instead, was characterized as a scared,
lonely, angry man, a portrayal that was not strong enough to withstand conspiracy claims that
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more sinister, more evil, and more destructive forces were at large, although the Warren
Commission did try, repeatedly. The incredible amount of rhetorical sweat the Commission
exerts to provide Oswald with a motive is indicative of the Commission‘s own doubt about the
motive and is an acknowledgement that it did not ―know‖ the answer. The massive evidence
garnered in support of the Commission‘s stance indicates that the Commission was attempting to
persuade itself of the reasons for the assassination on November 22, 1963. The Commission‘s
irreconcilable doubt, indicative of its increasing uncertainty about its discursive authority,
continued to play out and is most notably exemplified in the tension between the Commission‘s
own account of the assassination, and that of the FBI, especially as they pertain to a single
disputed projectile.

Authority by Internal Consistency
Perhaps the greatest obstacle the Warren Commission had to overcome was the inconsistencies
in testimony and evidence related to the number of shots fired and the location and nature of the
president‘s wounds. For instance, The New Republic published a story that questioned:
(1) How Lee Oswald, from a position behind and slightly to the right of President
Kennedy, fired a shot which entered the President‘s neck just below the Adam‘s apple;
(2) how Oswald, using a bolt-action rifle, fired three shots with deadly accuracy in five
and one-half seconds at a target 75–100 yards away moving about 25 miles an hour;
[and] (3) how the three shots could have produced four bullets.145
Questions such as these raised concerns that there was more than one gunman involved in the
assassination because, if the president‘s neck wound was an entrance wound, then a second
shooter would have had to have been involved.
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Complicating the Commission‘s charge to tell the ―truth‖ about the assassination of the
president was evidence from the FBI report that directly conflicted with the Commission‘s. The
FBI report concluded that three shots had been fired from Oswald‘s rifle, and that each of those
three shots had found a target. However, during the Commission‘s investigation, evidence was
found that either directly disputed the FBI‘s three shots/three hits scenario, or left open the
possibility that a second shooter was involved, thereby leaving room for future conspiracy
beliefs. If the Warren Commission‘s conclusion, that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone, was to be
believed, and if the Commission was to retain its discursive authority, then it had to reconcile
any inconsistencies in the testimony pertaining to the number of shots fired, and the location and
nature of the president‘s wounds; it also had to resolve any inconsistencies that existed between
its report and that of the FBI‘s and disabuse any potential future notions that a second shooter
was involved. This put the Warren Commission into the unenviable position of shouldering the
burden of proof to make its case that its explanation of the shots was what happened because the
position of the FBI was already widely circulated, and, therefore, had presumption.
The doubt existing between conflicting testimony and the position of the Warren
Commission caused the Commission to overwhelm the audience with evidence to back its
claims. The Commission had to assemble its ―facts‖ into what Walter Fisher terms an internally
coherent narrative in order to arrive at its conclusion.146 In reconciling inconsistencies, the
Commission‘s report, again, falls into the realm of the conspiracy argument. Hofstadter argues:
The typical procedure of the higher paranoid scholarship is to start with such defensible
assumptions and with a careful accumulation of facts, or at least what appear to be facts,
and to marshal these facts toward and overwhelming ‗proof‘ of the particular conspiracy
that is to be established. It is nothing if not coherent—in fact, the paranoid mentality is
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far more coherent than the real world, since it leaves no room for mistakes, failures, or
ambiguities.‖147
In essence, Hofstadter is claiming that conspiracy theories attempt to display a pseudo-scholarly
concern in marshalling evidence to back its claims. In putting forth such an argument, every
piece of contradictory evidence, every discrepancy existing among witnesses, every potential
source of conflict has to be discredited, omitted, or refuted, characteristics attributed to
conspiracy narratives.
The single most disputed element in the entire Warren Commission Report centers on
what critics have dubiously labeled the ―magic‖ or ―pristine‖ bullet. Conspiracy claims were
made that there were at least four shots fired and the FBI‘s position asserted that President
Kennedy received two bullet wounds taken from two different shots and that Governor Connally
was wounded from the third shot. Both conspiracy charges and the FBI‘s report directly
confronted the Commission‘s assertion that the first shot, or the ―magic‖ bullet, hit President
Kennedy in the back, passed through his neck, hit Governor Connally in the back, ―passed
through his chest; tumbled through his wrist with very little exit velocity, leaving small metallic
fragments from the rear portion of the bullet; punctured his left thigh after the bullet had lost
virtually all of its velocity, and had fallen out of the thigh wound‖ where it ended up on a gurney
in the corridor of Parkland Memorial Hospital with very little damage to the bullet.148 The
second shot, according to the Commission, was the fatal head wound received by the President.
The third and final shot missed. Even though the Commission asserted that it was ―not necessary
to any essential findings to determine just which shot hit Governor Connally,‖ the Commission
spent an enormous amount of time arguing that the ―pristine‖ bullet was the same one that
produced President Kennedy‘s neck wound as well as the injuries Governor Connally
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received.149 The Commission, instead of simply asserting its case for the single bullet, goes
through exacting detail as to how it arrived at its conclusion.
The Commission used several strategies to overcome the evidentiary inconsistencies. One
of the most noticeable ways the Commission attempts to alleviate any doubt about its stance on
the magic bullet is by clearing up any inconsistencies that existed in the testimony and evidence.
For instance, the Commission attempted to mitigate inconsistencies that occurred between the
doctors at Parkland Hospital who attended the president and those of the doctors who performed
the autopsy on the president. The Commission offers, ―Considerable confusion has arisen
because of comments attributed to Dr. [Malcom] Perry concerning the nature of the neck wound.
Immediately after the assassination, many people reached erroneous conclusions about the
source of the shots because of Dr. Perry‘s observations to the press.‖150 Dr. Perry, during the
press conference to which the Commission alludes, stated that the neck wound suffered by
President Kennedy ―appeared to be one of entrance.‖151
To clear up the misperception that the neck wound the President sustained was an
entrance wound, the Commission disclosed the findings of the autopsy report stating that the
neck wound was one of exit and located the back wound at ―approximately 5 ½ inches (14
centimeters) from the tip of the right shoulder joint and approximately the same distance below
the tip of the right mastoid process, the bony point immediately behind the ear.‖152 Furthermore,
the Commission iterated:
The autopsy examination further disclosed that, after entering the President, the bullet
passed between two large muscles, produced a contusion on the upper part of the pleural
cavity (without penetrating that cavity), bruised the top portion of the right lung and
ripped the wind pipe (trachea) in its path through the President‘s neck. The examining
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surgeons concluded that the wounds were caused by the bullet rather than the
tracheotomy performed at Parkland Hospital.153
After revealing the autopsy findings, the Commission then disclosed the testimony of Dr. Perry.
When asked, ―Based on the appearance of the neck wound alone, could it have been either an
entrance or an exit wound?‖ Dr. Perry answered, ―It could have been either.‖ However, when
asked to take into consideration the findings of the autopsy report, Dr. Perry stated, ―A full
jacketed bullet without deformation passing through the skin would leave a similar wound for an
exit or an entrance wound and with the facts which you have made available and with these
assumptions, I believe that it was an exit wound.‖154 The pattern the Commission used is
consistent; the report stated that a potential controversy existed over the evidence or testimony
pertaining to the magic bullet, provided the ―real‖ findings, and then cleared up any
inconsistencies in the testimony.
Clearing up inconsistencies is something the Warren Commission would have had to
accomplish regardless of its task, and, in itself, is not enough corroboration to assert that its
concerns over conspiracy beliefs caused it to produce so much evidence. But more insight is
gleaned based on the nature of the evidence provided to the audience to prove that the same
bullet did hit both President Kennedy and Governor Connally. Sophisticated recreations of the
shots fired from the sniper‘s nest in the Book Depository and simulations of the same caliber
bullet and the assassin‘s rifle were enacted to determine that not only was it possible to get three
shots off with the necessary accuracy in the time allotted by the Zapruder Film, but that one
bullet could cause so much damage and remain largely intact and unscathed.155
Recounting the recreations entails traversing through a myriad of details from the type of
car and physical characteristics of the stand-ins, to the repositioning of cardboard boxes in the
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Book Depository, which were explained as measures taken to recreate the scene of the
assassination in order to determine precisely when the shots were fired and in how much time.156
To give an example, when discussing the minute examination of the Zapruder Film and the
trajectory of the shots taken from the Texas Book Depository in relation to the film, the
Commission argues:
The President‘s reaction is ‗barely apparent‘ in frame 225, which is 15 frames or
approximately eight-tenths second after frame 210, and a shot much more before 210
would assume a longer reaction time than was recalled by eyewitnesses at the scene … A
surveyor then placed his sighting equipment at the precise point of entry on the back of
the President‘s neck, assuming that the President was struck at frame 210, and measured
the angle to the end of the muzzle of the rifle positioned where it was believed to have
been held by the assassin. That angle measured 21° 34‘. From the same points of
reference, the angle at frame 225 was measured at 20°11‘, giving an average angle of 20°
52‘30‖ from frame 210 to frame 225 … That angle was consistent with the trajectory of a
bullet passing through the President‘s neck and then striking Governor Connally‘s
back.157
In essence, the Commission was attempting to quell doubts raised about whether one bullet could
cause seven separate wounds based on from where the shot was fired. In doing so, the
Commission is also refuting charges that the president‘s neck wound was one of entrance.
Similarly, the Commission provides testimony to ―prove‖ that there were only three shots
fired by providing the audience with as much detail as possible in order to ―convince‖ the people
that Oswald had ample time to carry out three shots. For instance, the Commission notes that
―Examination of the Zapruder motion picture camera by the FBI established that 18.3 pictures or
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frames were taken each second, and therefore, the timing of certain events could be calculated by
allowing 1/18.3 seconds for the action depicted from one frame to the next.‖158 ―Tests of the
assassin‘s rifle,‖ states the Commission, ―disclosed that at least 2.3 seconds were required
between shots.‖159 Based on the recreation of the assassination coupled with the examination of
the Zapruder Film, the Commission concluded that ―the evidence indicated that the President
was not hit until at least frame 210 and that he was probably hit by frame 225.‖160 From yaw to
trajectories, angles to velocity, frames to seconds, seconds to actions, the terms that the
Commission used in presenting its ―overwhelming‖ evidence that Lee Harvey Oswald was the
lone gunman is indicative that the Warren Commission was not only attempting to refute
conspiracy claims, but that it was also attempting to establish and maintain discursive authority
through the use of precise, scientific information.
Questions raised about the location of the president‘s wounds, the number of shots fired,
and the time it would have taken to fire three shots forced the Commission to clear up any
inconsistencies that existed in the evidence. Moreover, such questions, which would, if left
unanswered, give credibility to claims that there was a second shooter involved in the
assassination, forced the Commission to overwhelm the audience with evidence asserting its
case. The massive amount of evidence the Commission uses to make its case against conspiracy
is far too frequently built upon driving the audience to an inevitable conclusion based on not the
argumentation contained within, but from sheer volume. If the Commission had simple authority,
if it had presumption, then the need for it to argue in great detail as to why its interpretation of
the ―magic bullet‖ was correct would not exist. But, because of conflicting evidence and
testimony and because the Commission could reasonably deduce that such a discrepancy could
lead the American public to doubt the Commission‘s findings and undermine its entire
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investigation and report, the Commission had to prove a virtually unprovable position, which led
the Commission into generating massive amounts of evidence in great scientific detail in order to
reconcile the discrepancies and led to the Warren Commission‘s unbelievable conclusion.

Conclusion
The peculiarities of the Warren Commission Report stem, at least in part, from the Commission‘s
attempt to establish its monologic authority over the narrative of the assassination of President
Kennedy. Most of the Commission‘s report focuses on proving that Oswald acted alone in the
slaying of President Kennedy. However, the Commission was similarly forced into proving that
there was no conspiracy in place to assassinate the president. In essence, the Commission was
forced into a double burden of proof, a direct result of the wide belief that the assassination of
the president and the subsequent murder of Oswald were the result of a conspiracy and thus
entered into a dialogue with conspiracy theories. The Commission‘s need to address conspiracy
claims is indicative that it was not wholly in charge of its own agenda or argumentative burdens.
If the Warren Commission had possessed naked authority, then there would have been no need to
prove that there was not a conspiracy. More troubling, however, was the Commission‘s inability
to contain conspiracy beliefs about the assassination. In attempting to prove there was no
conspiracy, the Commission‘s report took on some of the generic elements of conspiracy
argument and participated within the conspiracy genre.
The Warren Commission, though not the characteristic conspiracy argument, participated
within its genre by demonstrating the elements of argument from absence, paradox of substance,
the generation of a massive amount of evidence, and an internally consistent narrative. While the
Commission may have many of the constitutive elements of the conspiracy argument, the
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foremost element of the conspiracy argument, its self-sealing ability, is noticeably absent from
the Commission‘s arguments. The conspiracy theories present prior to the release of the Warren
Commission Report largely consisted of queries, questions, and demands directed at the
Commission. The Commission responded by addressing the conspiracy fears through using
many of the same techniques the conspiracists, themselves, use in making their cases. However,
conspiracy theories that came into being after the completion of the report did demonstrate the
self-sealing attribute of the conspiracy argument.
While conspiracy theories about the assassination were never a marginal belief, after the
completion of the Warren Commission Report, they were able to gain greater prominence in the
public sphere. The first mainstream criticisms of the Warren Commission, i.e. Mark Lane‘s Rush
to Judgment, and Edward Jay Epstein‘s Inquest, were not the full-blown conspiracy theories of
the assassination; they were simply criticisms pointing out the flaws and inaccuracies of the
report.161 Even though the conspiracy theories about the assassination had yet to take on the
signature self-sealing characteristic of the conspiracy argument, the early critics laid the
foundation for such a task.
Epstein and Lane pointed out the most troubling areas of the Commission‘s report, which
cast doubt onto the veracity of the findings within, and fueled fear within the public that, at the
very least, the Warren Commission had covered up salient information about the assassination.162
As Knight and Kurtz point out, the controversies that surrounded the Commission‘s report after
its publication centered on where the shots came from, the magic bullet and the problems the
autopsy evidence posed, the lack of a discernible motive on the part of Oswald, the underworld
ties of Jack Ruby, and the possibility that agents of the government were complicit in the
assassination.163 Significantly, all of the areas of contestation focused upon after the completion
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of the Warren Commission Report were present before its completion and are the same areas
where the Commission took on some of the characteristics of the conspiracy argument. In
essence, the narrative of the Commission was influenced by conspiracy claims, and then served
to inform later conspiracy theories. As more evidence was uncovered, as more questions were
raised, conspiracists were able to point to the areas of contestation between conspiracy theories
and the Warren Commission and make a compelling case that there was a conspiracy in the
assassination of President Kennedy. In essence, the Warren Commission was unable to prevail
over conspiracy theories because it was an integral step in the development and maturity of the
conspiracy theories about the assassination.
The Warren Commission participated within the conspiracy genre both by way of
addressing conspiracy claims while simultaneously adopting some of the substantive elements of
the conspiratorial form, and by serving as a necessary informational step in the maturity of the
conspiracy arguments about the assassination. It was not until after the release of the Warren
Commission Report that the conspiracy theories about the assassination took on their self-sealing
form. Conspiracists were able to point to the absence of evidence, the inscrutable prose, the lack
of a discernible motive on the part of Oswald, along with new information that came to light
after the investigation, and tie their theories into compelling narratives rife with victims, villains,
and a dramatic plot. In taking on conspiracy theories, the Warren Commission inherently
resigned itself to falling victim to the supremely more seductive and flexible conspiracy
argument. It is difficult, if not impossible, to refute a conspiracy, and agents of the government
are inherently constrained in what they can reveal. The inability to disclose all of the information
available allows for an opening for conspiracy theories because there will always be something
that has yet to be revealed.
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CHAPTER 3

HIDDEN AGENCY: CONSPIRATORIAL CONTROL
OVER THE SHAPING OF THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT

Let us never tolerate outrageous conspiracy theories concerning the
attacks of September the eleventh; malicious lies that attempt to shift
the blame away from the terrorists, themselves away from the guilty.
—President George W. Bush

September 11, 2001, at 8:46 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time, American Airlines flight 11
crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center in New York City. The first reports of
the crash were sketchy. While some reports openly wondered if the aircraft was a commuter or
private plane and if pilot error caused the aircraft to hit the North Tower, others speculated
whether the crash might have been an act of terrorism; those speculations were effectively
silenced when a second plane, United Airlines flight 175, crashed into the South Tower of the
World Trade Center at 9:03. There was no longer any doubt; the United States was witnessing
the largest terrorist attack in its history. As the country watched in horror, two more planes
would crash: American Airlines flight 77, which crashed into the Pentagon at 9:37, and United
Airlines flight 93, which crashed outside of Shanksville, Pennsylvania, at 10:03. In addition to
the hijacked aircraft, the nation watched the majestic buildings of the twin towers crumble to the
ground, with the South Tower falling at 9:59 and the North Tower at 10:28. Thousands of people
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died, and that day, which would colloquially come to be known as 9/11, left an indelible mark on
the American psyche.
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks, President George W. Bush, speaking from
Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana, reassured the American people that the ―full resources of
the federal government [were] working to assist local authorities to save lives and to help the
victims of [the] attacks.‖ The president affirmed that ―The United States will hunt down and
punish those responsible for these cowardly acts.‖1 Later that same day, President Bush asserted
that ―America was targeted for attack because we're the brightest beacon for freedom and
opportunity in the world. And no one will keep that light from shining. Today, our nation saw
evil—the very worst of human nature—and we responded with the best of America.‖2 Although
the president reassured the public that the culprits of 9/11 would be punished in the following
days, the White House was remarkably silent on the formulation of a commission to investigate
the flaws in America‘s defenses, a surprising move considering that virtually all national
tragedies have had the benefit of independent commissions to investigate how the tragedies
occurred and how they could be prevented in the future.3 Indeed, it would take over fourteen
months for a commission to be formed to investigate the terrorist attacks.
The securities in place to protect the American people failed at all levels of the federal
government on and before 9/11. Our intelligence agencies were unable to assemble enough
information on the perpetrators and the plot of 9/11 to disrupt them before their deeds were
carried out in New York, Washington, D.C., and Pennsylvania. Our security in the skies was
compromised by insufficient security measures at airports and while aloft. Our military was
unable, once the hijackings occurred, to prevent any of the death and destruction. For the world‘s
only superpower, for the world‘s mightiest and most technologically advanced military, for the
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world‘s greatest economic power, the ability of a ragtag group of terrorists to topple the towers at
the center of the global capital and to damage the epicenter of the U.S. military defied belief and
required explanation. While the American people were told by government officials, rather
quickly, that the failures of U.S. intelligence stemmed from a lack of interagency communication
and collaboration, the remarkably long time it took to convene the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, which would come to be known as the 9/11
Commission, and the years that elapsed between the terrorist attacks and the release of the
Commission‘s final report, left an explanatory void, one conspiracists were able to capitalize on
to spin their own tales of deceit and corruption.
In the nearly three years that elapsed between the terrorist attacks and the issuance of The
9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon
the United States (9/11 Commission Report), a deluge of alternative theories arose as to what
happened on 9/11 and why. Theories spouted by the political right insisted that, at the very least,
President Bill Clinton had had the opportunity to kill Osama bin Laden but chose not to, while
others argued the attacks were planned and carried out by Israeli agents.4 The conspiracy theories
that garnered the most support, however, were the product of the political left. Such theories
asserted that the Bush administration either had prior knowledge of the terrorist attacks and
chose to let them happen, or that it was active in the planning and implementation of the attacks
so that it would have an excuse to invade, and then gain greater control of, the oil-rich Middle
East.5 The hesitancy of the White House to back a bipartisan independent commission, the War
in Iraq, scandals such as Abu Ghraib and the outing of CIA operative Valerie Plame, and other
information that came to light before and during the 9/11 Commission‘s investigation
exacerbated the situation and created a climate ripe for conspiracy theories.
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Conspiracy theorists pointed to all of the peculiarities surrounding the terrorist attacks
and the actions of the Bush administration and claimed that not all was as it seemed. Even those
without a conspiratorial bent were at a loss to explain the oddities of the actions of the Bush
administration and the failures of the U.S. intelligence agencies and the military in protecting the
American people. In the absence of a compelling explanation for such failures, conspiracy
theories were able to gain a foothold in the public sphere. It is this uncertainty, this
indeterminacy of information, this inscrutability of human motivations that makes conspiracy
theories so popular and powerful.
As the body of conspiracy claims grew, and as the public outcry for an investigation into
the terrorist attacks increased, the need to form an independent bipartisan commission was
finally realized. Haunted by the failures of past commissions to contain conspiracy theories, the
9/11 Commission Report, I argue, was shaped in part by the number of conspiracy theories
burgeoning within the public sphere and implicating the federal government as complicit in the
terrorist attacks. The 9/11 Commission, in combating conspiracy beliefs, adopted elements of the
conspiracy argument in shaping its discourse, including the hyper-objective stance of an observer
diagnosing the problems associated with the military response to the terrorist attacks on 9/11.
Similarly, the Commission ascertained the reasons behind the inability of the federal intelligence
agencies to effectively gather, share, and prevent the terrorist attacks. The hyper-objective stance
the Commission adopted was a defensive move, designed to prevent the Commission‘s discourse
from being drawn into conspiracy debates. When the Commission could not completely sidestep
claims of conspiracy, it adopted the use of argument from absence in order to cast the burden of
proof onto conspiracists. Ultimately, the Commission‘s approach left it able to cast blame for the
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terrorist attacks onto a cabal of terrorists, led by, in Peter Knight‘s words, an ―enemy‖ portrayed
―as completely alien, inhuman, all-powerful, and, above all, evil.‖6

Considering Contexts
Understanding the proliferation of conspiracy theories within the public sphere following 9/11,
and the conspiracy theories with which the 9/11 Commission would eventually grapple, requires
careful consideration of the greater social and political climates between the times of the terrorist
attacks and the release of the 9/11 Commission Report. The environment into which the 9/11
Commission Report was propagated was rife with indeterminacy precipitated by the actions of
the Bush White House and the greater social and political climates, all of which gave rise to
alternative theories of the events of 9/11 within the public. It is no great secret that the United
States was deeply politically divided prior to the terrorist attacks. The presidential election in
2000, which resulted in the Supreme Court declaring the winner of the election, cast a pall over
the presidency of George W. Bush. Embittered leftists claimed that President Bush won the
election because of the machinations of a conspiracy. It was simply too convenient that the
contested votes, which would eventually result in the Supreme Court‘s decision, were in Florida,
the same state where the president‘s brother, Jeb, was governor.7
While such sentiments may have gained play in the public for a while, after the terrorist
attacks they were effectively silenced. As is common during times of crisis, the American people
rallied around the flag and backed the president. President Bush was able to maintain remarkable
control over how the country responded to, and interpreted, the terrorist attacks for several
months after 9/11. However, this control began to wane with a series of disclosures indicating
that U.S. intelligence agencies possessed far more information about the terrorist attacks than
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was first disclosed, the linking of the terrorist attacks to Iraq and the resultant invasion of Iraq,
and a series of revealed scandals and perceived acts of retribution for defying President Bush‘s
authority, all of which left an opening for the proliferation of alternative explanations of 9/11.
The control President Bush exerted over the narrative of 9/11 was exhibited, at least in
part, during the series of speeches he gave in the aftermath. In a speech delivered to a joint
session of Congress on September 20, 2001, President Bush addressed the American people and
identified those who were ultimately responsible for the terrorist attacks. Stating that ―loosely
affiliated terrorist organizations known as al Qaeda,‖ and its leader, ―a person named Osama bin
Laden,‖ were to blame, the president went on to assert that ―The leadership of al Qaeda has great
influence in Afghanistan and supports the Taliban regime in controlling most of that country.‖8
The President then leveled a series of demands to the Taliban in Afghanistan warning that,
―These demands are not open to negotiation or discussion. The Taliban must act, and act
immediately.‖ If the Taliban did not ―hand over the terrorists …, then they [would] share in their
fate.‖ ―You are either with us,‖ stated President Bush, ―or you are with the terrorists.‖9
Herbert Simons argues that the ―short-term effectiveness‖ of the ―basic melodramatic
binaries‖ used in ―[t]he president‘s post-9/11 rhetoric … conferred enormous power upon the
president, which he has been able to use not just to persuade, but also to intimidate, coerce, and
control,‖ most notably as the binaries under which ―the ‗war on terror‘ was launched.‖ 10
President Bush‘s post-9/11 rhetoric, asserts Simons, was able to ―gain control over the terms and
limits of permissible debate.‖11 Within a year, however, the president began to lose interpretive
control over the terrorist attacks with the revealed information that the FBI, CIA, and the White
House knew far more about the impending attacks than was first disclosed.
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Troubling disclosures revealed by the media in the spring of 2002 raised concerns about
how much the Bush administration and the FBI knew prior to September 11 about the possibility
of a terrorist attack. In May 2002, the media revealed that weeks prior to the attacks FBI agents
in Phoenix and Minneapolis had forwarded intelligence memos to the FBI about the behaviors of
―Middle Eastern men‖ at flight schools in their respective cities, reports that were effectively
ignored. FBI agents in Phoenix, concerned about the actions of some Middle Eastern men who
―attended civil aviation colleges and universities in the state of Arizona,‖ sent a memo to the
Counterterrorism Division at FBI Headquarters warning that the actions of such men might be
indicative ―of the possibility of a coordinated effort by Osama bin Laden to send students to the
United States‖ to attend such schools. The memo suggested that the FBI should discuss the
memo with the CIA and other intelligence agencies and that the FBI ―should consider securing
authority to obtain visa information on persons seeking to attend flight schools.‖12 It was also
revealed that FBI agents in Minneapolis had arrested a French citizen, Zacarias Moussaui, nearly
a month before the terrorist attacks. Although agents in Minneapolis requested a ―Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act‖ (FISA) warrant to search Moussaui‘s belongings, ―FBI lawyers,‖
according to David Kohn, ―decided they would not even try to get a warrant.‖13 When agents
searched Moussaui‘s computer after 9/11, it was revealed that Moussaui was intimately involved
in the terrorist plot. Even more troubling was the fact that French authorities had Moussaui on an
international terrorist watch list as early as 1999, information that CBS News said French
officials made available to the FBI.14 At the very least, the disclosures that the FBI had warnings
about suspected terrorists in the months prior to 9/11 raised questions as to whether 9/11 could
have been prevented.
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The FBI was not the only entity that raised questions about what was known, or should
have been known, about the impending terrorist attacks. Within days of the disclosures of the
missed opportunities at the FBI, President Bush also came under fire after it was revealed that he
had received an intelligence briefing from the CIA about the possibility of Bin Laden planning to
hijack airplanes in the U.S.15 The White House, while admitting that President Bush had received
such a briefing, stated ―that the warnings did not contemplate the possibility that the hijackers
would turn the planes into guided missiles for a terrorist attack.‖16 CBS News reported, however,
that a 1999 analysis ―prepared for U.S. intelligence warned that Osama bin Laden's terrorists
could hijack an airliner and fly it into government buildings like the Pentagon.‖17 Again, the
White House acknowledged that the president knew of the 1999 analysis, but countered by
asserting that ―the document did not contain direct intelligence pointing toward a specific plot
but rather included assessments about how terrorists might strike.‖18 CBS further noted that
―Former CIA Deputy Director John Gannon, who was chairman of the National Intelligence
Council when the report was written, said officials long have known a suicide hijacking was a
threat.‖19 Gannon stated, ―‘If you ask anybody could terrorists convert a plane into a missile,
nobody would have ruled that out.‘‖
The combination of the missed opportunities by the FBI and the disclosure that the CIA
had not only warned the president that Bin Laden was ―determined to strike‖ in the United
States, but that intelligence analysis suggested that Bin Laden and al Qaeda might hijack planes,
fill them with explosives, and fly them into the Pentagon or the White House launched the first
salvo against the Bush administration‘s iron-fisted control over the narrative of the terrorist
attacks. Congressional leaders began to raise concerns that the government had far more
foreknowledge about the terrorist attacks than was first believed. The Minority Leader,
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Representative Richard Gephardt, stated, ―I think what we have to do now is to find out what the
president, what the White House knew about the events leading up to 9/11, when they knew it
and, most importantly, what was done about it at that time.‖20 CBS reported that ―Sen. Charles
Grassley, a senior member of the Senate Judiciary and Finance Committee, demanded the CIA
inspector general investigate the report, which he called ‗one of the most alarming indicators and
warning signs of the terrorist plot of Sept. 11.‘‖21 Similarly, ―Senator Richard C. Shelby of
Alabama, the ranking Republican on the Senate Intelligence Committee, said the intelligence
information should have spurred action.‖22 With Congressional leaders of both parties alarmed at
the intelligence failures of the FBI and CIA, and with the added knowledge that the president had
been warned of an impending attack, renewed cries for an independent investigation into the
terrorist attacks began to mount. Questions about the government‘s knowledge and subsequent
actions persisted and were further fueled by the War in Iraq.
As early as the State of the Union Address in 2002, the Bush administration began
linking the 9/11 terrorist attacks to Saddam Hussein and Iraq.23 The rhetorical maneuverings of
the president and his administration would have over 60 percent of the American public
believing that Saddam Hussein was somehow involved in the attacks of 9/11.24 On March 20,
2003, the United States, the United Kingdom, and some of their allies began the invasion of Iraq
under the guise that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) that could
be used against the United States. In essence, the Bush administration constructed a conspiracy
argument in order to gain support to combat a conspiracy theory. The U.S. was engaged in
another war despite the fact that Osama bin Laden had yet to be captured and things in
Afghanistan were anything but stable.25 By May 1, 2003, when President Bush, on the deck of
the USS Abraham Lincoln, declared that major combat operations in Iraq had ended, no WMDs
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had been uncovered.26 While the War in Iraq continued to rage, and while the rhetorical reasons
for war continued to change, larger segments of the public began questioning why the U.S. was
in Iraq, questions that gained momentum with revealed scandals in relation to the War on Terror
and continued to tear apart the remarkable unity that had existed among the public after the
terrorist attacks.
Joseph Wilson, former ambassador to Gabon under President George H. W. Bush and
former head of African Affairs at the National Security Council under President Bill Clinton,
wrote an editorial in The New York Times on July 6, 2003. Wilson had been chosen by the CIA
to travel to Niger and investigate whether there was any foundation to the claims that Saddam
Hussein had attempted to purchase any uranium in the country.27 In his piece, Wilson concluded
that the Bush Administration ―had manipulated intelligence on Saddam Hussein‘s weapons
programs‖ to justify the invasion of Iraq.28 Wilson‘s comments were particularly damaging
because they implied the Bush administration had knowingly lied in making its case for invading
Iraq, which pointed to a conspiracy on the part of the Bush administration.
Kathryn Olmsted argues that members of the Bush administration immediately began
denouncing Wilson ―as an attention-seeker, a liar, and a beneficiary of nepotism.‖29 On July 14,
just eight days after Wilson‘s editorial, Robert Novak of the Chicago Sun Times ―outed‖ Valerie
Plame, Wilson‘s wife, as an operative for the CIA and implied that Plame had arranged for
Wilson‘s trip to Niger.30 In essence, the Novak article argued against conspiracy claims by
implying that there was a different conspiracy. This information, provided to Novak by senior
officials in the Bush White House, launched a maelstrom in Washington.31 More important,
however, is the doubt it cast on the reasons the United States entered into the war in Iraq;
Wilson‘s disclosure gave conspiracists fuel for their charges that the Bush administration had, at
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the very least, ignored intelligence about the impending terrorist attacks so that it could pursue its
own agenda in the Middle East.
The Plame affair, however, was not the only scandal connected to the War in Iraq. In
April 2004, pictures taken at Abu Ghraib prison, a U.S.-controlled detention facility in Iraq,
documented the sexual humiliation of inmates by American soldiers. The acts of abuse were bad
enough, but they were amplified by images of U.S. soldiers grinning and giving a ―thumbs up.‖
Exacerbating the scandal were allegations that the abuse was encouraged by military intelligence
officers.32 Editorials in The New York Times and The Washington Post voiced concerns that the
U.S. military, in particular, and the Bush administration more generally, were running roughshod
over the Geneva Convention and that Congress should assert its authority.33 The New York Times
added that the abuse witnessed at Abu Ghraib was a result ―of a morally dubious culture of legal
expediency and a disregard for normal behavior fostered at the top of this [the Bush]
administration. It is part of the price the nation must pay for President Bush‘s decision to take the
extraordinary mandate to fight terrorism that he was granted by a grieving nation after 9/11 and
apply it without justification to Iraq.‖34 At best, the scandals surrounding Abu Ghraib diminished
the notion that the War in Iraq was a noble pursuit; at worst, such actions caused speculation in
the public sphere about what was really happening and how much control the Bush
administration had over what had occurred, and would continue to occur.
The continued revelation of information about what and how much was known before
9/11, coupled with the War in Iraq and the scandals involving the outing of Plame and the
prisoner abuses at Abu Ghraib, led to a climate filled with indeterminacy. On the one hand, the
Bush administration was implicated in secretive and conspiratorial activities by the media and
members of the FBI. On the other hand, those who were uncovering the secretive dealings of the

113
Bush administration were being accused of engaging in secretive and conspiratorial activities by
the Bush administration. In essence, the American people were left with no real means to
determine which of the competing stories was true; the climate was marked with scandal and the
information indeterminate. Once ―‗scandal,‘‖ according to Mark Fenster, moves from ―an event
[to] a structure of feeling, legitimacy can no longer be produced through normal channels.‖ 35
The public is left with questions that can never be satisfactorily addressed because there is no
way to determine who is telling the truth.
Conspiracy theories were able to take root because of the continual revelation of
information and the inability to ascribe a fixed meaning to the actions of the Bush administration
and other governmental agents and agencies. The discovery that the intelligence agencies had far
more knowledge about an impending attack than was first revealed, the War in Iraq, Abu Ghraib,
and the Plame affair exacerbated public concerns. The continued actions of the Bush
administration, which pushed through legislation in the name of the War on Terror ―ranging
from corporate tax giveaways, fast-track trade negotiating authority, and the enhancement of the
surveillance state, to raiding the Social Security trust fund and weakening environmental laws,‖
aided in the growth of conspiracy theories, in Michael Niman‘s words, ―like dandelions on a
suburban lawn.‖36 Even for those without a conspiratorial bent, the greater social and political
contexts had, at the very least, raised serious doubts and concerns about the Bush administration
and created a highly partisan atmosphere. Such concerns would continue to flourish with the
Bush administration‘s stonewalling of an investigation into the 9/11 attacks.
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Regarding the Rhetorical Situation
The exigencies in the wake of the terrorist attacks, coupled with the persistent rumors and
conspiracy theories, were remarkable enough to call for the creation of a Blue Ribbon
Commission. The United States had seen terrorist attacks before, both instigated and carried out
by foreign and domestic terrorists, but none of the scope and degree that 9/11 wrought, and the
public needed a means by which to view and make sense of the events.37 Generally, commissions
are convened to investigate the policy concerns of the administration in power and have included
everything from employment to education reform.38 In the face of national tragedies, however,
commissions are typically assembled to provide the American people with the perception that the
president and Congress are doing something to account for the tragedy and are frequently a
means, according to Kenneth Kitts, to ―defuse crises, deflect criticism, and maintain the initiative
in national security decisionmaking [sic.].‖39
Congressional leaders launched the idea of forming an independent commission within
days of the terrorist attacks. Legislation authorizing an investigation into the terrorist attacks was
introduced and discussed on the floors of the House and Senate no fewer than seven times
between September 12, 2001 and September 18, 2002.40 The attempts by legislators to bring
about a commission and the delays they encountered can largely be attributed to squabbling that
occurred between Congressional Democrats and Republicans. To a large degree, President Bush
lacked political capital until 9/11. After the terrorist attacks, however, President Bush gained the
backing of the American people and Republicans wanted to ensure that the president and other
Republican leaders were not unduly assigned blame. Democrats, on the other hand, wanted to
protect the legacy of President Bill Clinton.41 The New York Times, anonymously quoting a
member of Congress, reported that ―‗Democrats were trying to stop going back too far into what
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President Clinton did or did not do, or his functionaries. The Republicans tried to stop Bush and
his functionaries from having to take any bullets for what they did in the run-up to 9/11.‘‖42 As
questions mounted as to how much the president, the FBI, and the CIA knew prior to the attacks,
Congressional leaders began renewing their interests in an independent investigation, a desire
that was, in part, further fueled by the very public demands of the families of the victims of 9/11.
The victims‘ families had long supported the notion of an independent commission to
investigate the terrorist attacks. In the summer of 2002, during a rally held outside the Capitol
designed to drum up support for an independent investigation into the terrorist attacks, Kristen
Breitweiser, the widow of one of the 9/11 victims, told the Washington Post, ―‗Our call for an
independent commission has nothing to do with politics. … It has everything to do with seeking
answers that we so rightly deserve.‘‖43 Even though Congress did institute a Joint Commission to
investigate the intelligence failures of 9/11, Stephen Push, who headed the organization Families
of September 11, stated, ―We still need an independent commission that would have a broader
mandate to look at all of the elements of Sept. 11.‖44 Similarly, Kathy Ashton recounted to
Newsweek, ―‗Look at all of the investigations that have been held to examine the Enron collapse,
a financial thing … Why, eight months later, are we not investigating the mass murder of 3,000
human beings on American soil by an enemy of the United States that was enabled to carry out
this mass murder because many agencies in this country dropped the ball.‘‖45
The increased demand from members of Congress as well as the increasing public
demands of the families of the victims of 9/11 covered by a sympathetic media was an indication
that the president‘s narrative control over 9/11 was waning. As Michael Hirsh and Michael
Isikoff wrote, ―Once upon a time, a stern word from George W. Bush on the war on terror would
have been enough. But this time the Democrats, and even Republicans like Richard Shelby and
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John McCain, weren‘t buying the Teflon patriotism.‖46 With the growing demand for an
independent commission, President Bush conceded that he would ―cooperate with an
investigation if it's done the right way.‖47
President Bush and Vice President Cheney had publicly argued that a commission
―would divert time and attention from the war on terror,‖ ―waste resources,‖ and ―‗tie-up‘ key
administrators.‖ Vice President Cheney also argued that a commission would increase the risk
that sensitive U.S. intelligence information would be leaked during the course of the
investigation.48 In line with the concerns of the president and vice president, and in line with the
Bush administration‘s desire to control as much of the 9/11 narrative as possible, the legislation
authorizing the commission was remarkably narrow in scope.
In order for President Bush to provide support for an independent commission to
interrogate the terrorist attacks, it was stipulated in the legislation that a commission subpoena
required the backing of both the chair and vice chair and a minimum of four of the other eight
commissioners. Such requirements assured that subpoenaed information would not be a matter of
partisan interests.49 Furthermore, the legislation required that ―unnecessary duplication‖ of
investigations be avoided. In other words, the 9/11 Commission had to base its investigation on
the findings and conclusions of previous investigations into the terrorist attacks unless these prior
investigations were deemed insufficient or if they failed to investigate some ―area the
commission deemed pertinent.‖50 Added to the narrow scope of the commission was a grossly
inadequate $3 million allotted to the Commission to conduct its investigation and a demand that
its investigation be completed by May 2004.51 On November 27, 2002, over fourteen months
after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, President Bush signed the legislation creating the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. The legislation called for a ten-person
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committee with the chair being chosen by the president and the vice chair by the Democratic
leaders in the Senate and House of Representatives.52
While the Bush administration was forced into acquiescing to public demands to back the
creation of an independent commission, the president still attempted to control the Commission‘s
investigation into 9/11, a move that would lead to questions about what the president was trying
to hide and why. In what was seen as an attempt to control the investigation of the commission,
President Bush‘s initial choice to chair the commission was former Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger. The choice of Dr. Kissinger was controversial from the onset. Editorials sprang up
commenting on Dr. Kissinger‘s secretive and duplicitous nature. Some of those editorials posited
that President Bush‘s selection was an attempt to block the 9/11 Commission from uncovering
anything potentially damaging to the president and the intelligence agencies. Maureen Dowd of
The New York Times wrote, ―If you want to get to the bottom of something, you don‘t appoint
Henry Kissinger. If you want to keep others from getting to the bottom of something, you
appoint Henry Kissinger.‖53 Not all of the editorials about the choice of Dr. Kissinger were so
obviously negative; William Safire argued that there was no one better to uncover the problems
plaguing the intelligence agencies than one of the people who was instrumental in bringing them
about.54 The choice of Dr. Kissinger fueled beliefs, especially on the political left, that the
president was less than serious about finding the truth and more concerned about covering up his
own misdeeds.55 After a contentious two weeks, ones where the families of the victims‘ of 9/11
demanded that Kissinger turn over the names of all his clients to ensure that there were no
conflicts of interest, Kissinger resigned from the Commission.56 The president‘s choice for chair
of the Commission then fell to Thomas H. Kean, former Republican governor of New Jersey and
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president of Drew University, while the Democratic leadership chose former House member Lee
Hamilton as the vice-chair of the Commission.57
Even with the acceptance of Kean and Hamilton serving as chair and vice-chair of the
Commission, significant doubts were raised about the independent nature of the Commission. To
fill the role of executive director of the Commission, Kean and Hamilton appointed Philip
Zelikow. The choice of Zelikow was controversial from the outset. Having co-authored a book
with National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, and having served on the transition team of
the George W. Bush White House, conspiracists argued that the Commission, with Zelikow at its
helm, was doomed to be a whitewash.58 Conspiracists were not the only ones uncomfortable with
Zelikow‘s appointment. According to Philip Shenon, ―many of the 9/11 families‖ saw Zelikow
as a White House ―mole‖ who had been put in place ―to make sure that George Bush and
especially [his] close friend Condoleezza Rice were protected from too much scrutiny,
particularly over the seeming failure of the White House to act on dire terrorist threats in the
months before September 11.‖59 Zelikow‘s perceived role as a mole was just one of the many
problems conspiracists and the 9/11 families would have with the Bush White House.
Doubts about the White House‘s commitment to investigating the terrorist attacks
continued to swirl within the public sphere and were bolstered by insufficient access to
information. In a battle that would play out in a media storm, when asked by the 9/11
Commission to supply it with access to the highly classified Presidential Daily Briefings (PDBs)
of both the Bush and Clinton White Houses, the Bush White House summarily denied the
Commission access. After months of negotiations and the threat of a subpoena, the White House
finally agreed that members of the Commission could view the documents, but with very
stringent conditions. Philip Shenon of The New York Times wrote that ―under the accord two
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members … of the commission would have access to the full library of daily briefings prepared
in the Bush and Clinton administrations and that two other members would be allowed to read
just the copies of the briefings that the White House deemed relevant to the inquiry.‖60 Some
members of the Commission, as well as members of the victims‘ families, found such restrictions
too empowering for the White House. The Washington Post reported that Max Cleland and
Timothy Roemer stated ―that the arrangement gives too much power to the White House to
withhold information.‖61 The same article stated that family members of the victims of 9/11
―condemned the agreement, arguing that ‗all 10 commissioners should have full, unfettered and
unrestricted access to all evidence‘ related to the attacks. ‗As it now stands, a limited number of
commissioners will have restricted access to a limited number of PDB documents,‘… [which]
‗will prevent a full uncovering of the truth and is unacceptable.‘‖62 The Commission‘s quest for
access to information, however, was not over.
Newsweek reported that the White House was contemplating invoking ―executive
privilege over key documents relating to the attacks in order to keep them out of the hands of
investigators for‖ the 9/11 Commission.63 Members of the Commission were frequently denied
access to classified information, even if they were part of the team that had assembled the
information. For instance, according to Mark Isikoff and Mark Hosenball of Newsweek, ―former
democratic [sic] congressman‖ Timothy Roemer was denied access ―to read transcripts of three
days of closed hearings that had been held [in the fall of 2002] by the House and Senate
Intelligence Committees—hearings that Roemer … had actually participated in.‖64 Isikoff and
Hosenball further reported that before members of the Commission were allowed access to
classified material, White House lawyers would ―review‖ the material for ―privileged‖
information.65 In another peculiar move, the White House refused to allow members of the
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Commission to review the notes they took on the PDBs they had reviewed, which prompted the
Commission to threaten to subpoena the White House for a second time.66 While the
Commission did gain access to the information it sought, it was not until after a very lengthy and
very public battle. Similar moves would be used to deny the Commission access to top Cabinet
officials in the Bush White House, including the president himself.
Questions arose as to whether the Commission was receiving the level of cooperation
from government officials necessary for a full investigation. Interviews with members of the
president‘s Cabinet, such as National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, were severely
restricted. For example, Kitts argues that when Rice met with the Commission, the meeting was
conducted in private; was considered ―voluntary;‖ and was classified as a ―meeting‖ instead of
an interview; Rice was not placed under oath; there was an imposed time limit; and there was a
limit on the number of commissioners and/or commission staff who were allowed to be present
for the ―meeting.‖67 When the commission requested that Rice testify in public and under oath,
the request was denied outright with the White House arguing that providing ―formal testimony
was a matter of constitutional principle and that to do so could erode the separation of powers
between the executive branch and Congress.‖68 However, after the public testimony of Richard
Clarke (former counterterrorism chief in the administrations of Presidents George H. W. Bush,
Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush), where he leveled a searing public indictment against the
George W. Bush administration for what he claimed was its lax attention to the threat Bin Laden
and al Qaeda posed, the White House reversed its decision and allowed Rice to testify.69 As an
article from The New York Times stated, the ―credibility‖ of the Bush administration and its
handling of the terrorist threat rested on the testimony of Rice.70 The Commission‘s work,
however, could not be viewed as complete without the testimony of President Bush.
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When asked by the Commission to meet with them, President Bush at first only agreed to
be questioned by Kean and Hamilton. After Clarke‘s riveting testimony and after it was made
known that President Clinton had agreed to meet with the Commission, the White House
changed its stance. The president would meet with the entire Commission if he were allowed to
make a joint appearance with Vice President Cheney, and if the commission only took notes and
did not record what was said during the interview. Furthermore, the Commission was required to
put, in writing, that it would not ask for any public testimony from the president or vice
president, and that neither the president nor the vice president would testify under oath.71 The
chair of the Commission, Kean, told The New York Times that the White House‘s reversal
―seemed [like] a good compromise ‗in exchange for getting all 10 commissioners to be able to
ask any questions they wanted to.‘‖72
For each constraint leveled against the Commission, Kean and Hamilton engaged in a
public fight in order to gain access to information, funding, time, and officials. As Kean and
Hamilton note, when they met an obstacle, they would take their case to members of Congress,
the media, the families of the victims, and to the executive branch.73 In making their fights with
the Bush administration public, the Commission exposed the Bush administration‘s repeated and
continual derision for an independent investigation into the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Even though
the Commission was eventually given enough funding to conduct its investigation, more time in
which to conduct it, and access to information and key White House officials, there was still the
sense that the Commission had, in the words of Kean and Hamilton, been ―set up to fail.‖74
The hesitancy of the White House to convene a commission, the severe restrictions it
leveled against the Commission, and its continued stonewalling of information had already
inflamed suspicion among certain segments of the public. If President Bush had nothing to hide,
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so the logic went, then why was he attempting to do everything in his power to prevent the 9/11
Commission from conducting a thorough investigation? Such questions, taken together with the
indeterminacy of the social and political contexts, provided conspiracy theorists ample fodder for
their musings. Conspiracists posited that the only logical explanations for the actions and
scandals of the Bush administration, in concert with the War on Terror and the continued
stonewalling of the 9/11 Commission, was that the Bush administration either knew more about
the terrorist attacks than it first let on but effectively ignored the information so that it would
have an excuse to invade, and thus gain greater control over, the oil-rich Middle East, or that the
Bush administration was complicit in the planning and implementation of the terrorist attacks.
Indeed, David Ray Griffin, in his book The New Pearl Harbor, offers a twenty-four part
argument positing that the Bush administration was complicit in the attacks.75
The official discourse the 9/11 Commission crafted in response to the exigencies of the
terrorist attacks had to address the rhetorical situation from which it was created, including the
constraints leveled against it during its investigation and the broader social and political climates
into which it was thrust. The political climate included the growing alternative explanations for
the terrorist attacks making the rounds in the public sphere. Ultimately, the Commission had to
craft a narrative that assuaged any doubts the public had about the completeness of the
Commission‘s investigation, accounted for the exigencies of the terrorist attacks, accounted for
the failures of the government to protect the public, united the public against a common enemy,
and dispelled any fears of governmental involvement, a task that had the Commission adopting
some of the narrative and rhetorical strategies used by conspiracy theories.
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Ghosts of Commissions Past and Hyper-Objectivity
On July 22, 2004, nearly three full years after the terrorist attacks, the 9/11 Commission issued
its final report ―to the president of the United States, to the United States Congress, and the
American people;‖ the report served as the official perspective from which the terrorist attacks of
9/11 were to be viewed.76 The response from the press was overwhelmingly positive. Citing the
openness and honesty of the Commission, the press concluded that the 9/11 Commission had
conducted a fair, thorough, and open investigation into the horrors of 9/11.77 Not only was the
content of the report lauded, but the Commission‘s report was so celebrated that it became a
finalist for the National Book Award in 2004, a feat no other federal commission can claim.78
Despite the celebratory atmosphere in which the 9/11 Commission Report was received, the
Commission‘s prose attempted to accomplish far more than its stated purpose, ―to provide the
fullest possible account of the events surrounding 9/11 and to identify lessons learned.‖79 The
9/11 Commission, haunted by the failure of past commissions to contain conspiracy theories,
adopted a hyper-objective stance in order to keep the Commission out of the fray of the
conspiracy theories already in existence, as well as those that would come to light, a technique
conspiracy theorists employ to defend themselves from counter-attacks.
Members of the 9/11 Commission were certainly aware of the conspiracy theories
circulating within the public sphere. Kean and Hamilton noted that the Commission received
―emails, letters, pamphlets, articles, books, videotapes, and Web site addresses from conspiracy
theorists‖ throughout their investigation.80 Moreover, Kean and Hamilton acknowledged that, ―In
public forums or on call-in television and radio shows, we often confronted questions about one
conspiracy theory or another. Before and after our public hearings, it was common for somebody
to approach us and demand to know why we weren‘t taking questions about one theory or
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another.‖81 These theories, according to Kean and Hamilton, ―ranged from small to large,
rational to irrational.‖82 Explicit within this statement is the division between what Kean and
Hamilton deemed as ―rational‖ conspiracy theories, and those that were considered ―irrational.‖
Kean and Hamilton argued that the more ―irrational‖ theories were ones that questioned
whether ―the U.S. government [had] foreknowledge of the attacks,‖ or if ―the military issue[d] a
‗stand-down‘ order on 9/11 to allow the attacks to take place.‖ 83 Kean and Hamilton conceded
that the 9/11 Commission ―talked … about how to deal with such theories;‖ what is particularly
noteworthy is Kean‘s and Hamilton‘s acknowledgement that ―we established core principles for
our inquiry in part to avoid the kinds of conspiracy theorizing that have followed in the wake of
other inquiries.‖84 Two Commissions, in particular, were ―cautionary tales‖ on what to avoid
when devising the 9/11 Commission Report: the Roberts Commission, which investigated the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, and the Warren Commission, which investigated the
assassination of President John F. Kennedy. 85
The Roberts Commission, and the conspiracy theories surrounding it, provided a
cautionary tale about the role of partisanship in writing a report. Kean and Hamilton noted that,
―There are still … theories that the United States or the United Kingdom had foreknowledge of
the Pearl Harbor attack,‖ but these theories were able to flourish, stated Kean and Hamilton,
partially because, ―Neither the Roberts Commission nor the subsequent congressional inquiry
into Pearl Harbor in 1946 provided an authoritative account of the Japanese attack on Hawaii.‖86
Instead, Kean and Hamilton wrote, ―the Pearl Harbor inquiries were seen as partisan—intent on
finding individuals to blame, and not looking at the flaws across the government that had enabled
the attack to take place.‖87 Moreover, the Roberts Commission ―looked at the attack from only
one side: ours. The other half of the story—the Japanese intent, planning, and execution of the
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strike—was ignored.‖88 Assigning partisan blame and failing to address Japan‘s side of the story
inevitably led to the doubt and rumors circulating within the public about what was, and was not,
known before the Japanese attack.
The 9/11 Commission, however, found its most cautionary tale from the workings of the
Warren Commission. Kean and Hamilton wrote, ―There is of course a veritable industry around
the question of who killed John F. Kennedy.‖89 ―For decades,‖ Kean and Hamilton stated, ―the
Warren Commission‘s findings have been poked and prodded by conspiracy theorists, in large
measure because the commission is not perceived as having full access to the most secretive
material in the government.‖90 In addition to not having access to all of the available evidence,
the Warren Commission ―convinced‖ Kean and Hamilton ―of the need to clearly reference our
sources.‖91 The ability for conspiracy theories touting that President Kennedy was killed at the
hands of a conspiracy rather than the lone gunman Lee Harvey Oswald to gain prominence
occurred, in part, because the Warren Commission failed to look at all of the evidence and
because it failed to provide the American people with easy access to the evidence. ―To avoid
such accusations,‖ stated Kean and Hamilton, ―we had to be able to stand up in front of the
American people and say, ‗We have asked for everything that has to do with the 9/11 story, and
have seen everything that we asked for.‘‖92 Furthermore, Kean and Hamilton asserted that
―[S]ecrecy is a precursor to cynicism and conspiracy theories. … We wanted to give an
authoritative account of 9/11; we did not want to give fodder to the conspiracy theorists who
could question why we were undertaking our investigation in secret.‖93 Taken together, Kean
and Hamilton asserted that if the 9/11 Commission were to combat conspiracy claims, it could
not make the mistakes of assigning partisan blame, failing to see and to clearly reference all of its
evidence, or operating in secret. The fact that the 9/11 Commission discussed, and then
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implemented, methods specifically designed to avoid the conspiracy theories that float in the
wakes of commissions past, is an affirmative acknowledgement of the power of conspiracy
theories to shape the agenda of official discourse.
Conspiracy theories, at least in part, were able to force the Commission into adopting a
hyper-objective stance. The hyper-objectivity of the Commission reflects Hofstadter‘s concern
with the pedantic nature of conspiracy discourse. Hofstadter wrote, ―The plausibility of the
paranoid style … lies, in good measure, in this appearance of the most careful, conscientious,
and seemingly coherent application to detail, the laborious accumulation of what can be taken as
convincing evidence for the most fantastic conclusions.‖94 Frequently, according to Hofstadter,
the evidence conspiracists amass is not an attempt to convince those hostile to their claims,
rather, according to Hofstadter, such actions are defensive rather than offensive. Hofstadter
wrote that the evidence a conspiracist procures ―protects him from having to attend to disturbing
considerations that do not fortify his ideas. He has all of the evidence he needs; he is not a
receiver, he is a transmitter.‖95 In essence, the 9/11 Commission crafted a hyper-objective
narrative to defend itself against the conspiracy theories about 9/11.
The discourse of the 9/11 Commission Report largely echoes the musings of Kean and
Hamilton. The Commission noted, ―We have come together with unity and purpose because our
nation demands it. September 11, 2001, was a day of unprecedented shock and suffering in the
history of the United States. The nation was unprepared. How did this happen, and how can we
avoid such tragedy again?‖96 ―We have sought,‖ stated the Commission, ―to be independent,
impartial, thorough, and nonpartisan.‖97 To provide force for its assertions, the 9/11 Commission
was not simply able to put together a report where a majority of the Commissioners reached their
conclusions; it had to be unanimous. In providing a document where ―five Republicans and five
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Democrats chosen by elected leaders from our nation‘s capital at a time of great partisan
division‖ presented their findings ―without dissent,‖ the Commission was offering a document
that did not speak to the right or left of the political spectrum (both of which had their own
theories about 9/11), but was rather making an argument against politics itself.98 Unanimity also
necessitated that the Commission forgo blame. The Commission noted, ―Our aim has not been to
assign individual blame. Our aim has been to provide the fullest possible account of the events
surrounding 9/11 and to identify lessons learned.‖99 In asserting that it was providing a
nonpartisan unanimous report that did not assign blame for the causes of the terrorist attacks, the
Commission was applying what it learned from the problems associated with the Roberts
Commission Report and was, as Hofstadter noted, making a defensive attempt to combat the
conspiracy theories surrounding the terrorist attacks and to stifle dissenting opinions as to what
really occurred on that awful day.
The Commission could not simply rely on forgoing blame and providing the American
people with a unanimous report; it also, if it were to avoid the mistakes made by the Warren
Commission, had to make a case for the openness and thoroughness of its investigation. To this
end, the Commission stated that it ―endeavored to provide the most complete account [it could]
of the events of September 11‖ by sharing ―as much of the investigation with the American
people‖ as possible, holding ―19 days of hearings,‖ taking ―public testimony from 160
witnesses,‖ and maintaining a discourse project on the Web so that the audience could track the
progress of the Commission‘s recommendations.100 What was divulged to the Commission was
laid bare for the public to see. But the Commission also had to make a case for the thoroughness
of its investigation. The Commission stated, ―In pursuing our mandate, we have reviewed more
than 2.5 million pages of documents and interviewed more than 1,200 individuals in ten
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countries. This included nearly every senior official from the current and previous
administrations who had responsibility for topics covered in our mandate.‖101 In addition to the
myriad documents read and the endless people interviewed, the Commission‘s report contains
over 100 pages of endnotes, a testament, at the very least, to the ―elaborate concern with
demonstration‖ to which Hofstadter alluded. Again, the Commission‘s adherence to openness
and thoroughness is a defensive move to counteract any claims of conspiracy. The core
principles of forgoing partisan blame and demonstrating the thoroughness of its investigation
served as defensive tactics against conspiracy claims, and ultimately shaped the form of the
Commission‘s narrative, but the Commission‘s adherence to hyper-objectivity and its need to
defend itself against claims of conspiracy also determined the form of other arguments the
Commission encountered within the bulk of its discourse.
One of the most illustrative ways the Commission‘s adherence to hyper-objectivity
determined the form of its text pertained to the War in Iraq. On the one hand, the Bush
administration made its case for the War in Iraq by implying that Saddam Hussein and Iraq were
involved in the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Carol Winkler noted that, while making the case against
Iraq, the Bush administration linked the known personal ties of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi to Osama
bin Laden, and Zarqawi‘s presence in Iraq, as evidence that, if the United States were to be free
from future terrorist attacks, it would have to adopt a ―blend of defensive and preventive
measures.‖ The Bush administration, according to Winkler, ―made the U.S. move on Iraq a
portion of the war that began with the attacks of 9/11.‖102 In essence, the Bush administration
linked seemingly disparate pieces of evidence into a narrative that, while not explicitly stating
that Hussein was involved in the terrorist attacks, implied that he and Iraq were involved. A
conspiracy narrative was constructed in order to legitimize invading Iraq.
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On the other hand, conspiracists claimed that the Bush administration‘s penchant for the
War in Iraq was evidence of its complicity in the terrorist attacks. The War in Iraq was the
linchpin for conspiracists‘ claims that the Bush administration was, at the very least, using the
terrorist attacks as an excuse to promote its hyper-agenda in the Middle East. Citing a letter
written in 1998 to President Bill Clinton from the Project for a New American Century (PNAC),
and signed by some of the soon-to-be top leaders within the Bush administration, conspiracists
pointed to the central thesis of the letter, which indicated the United States needed to rid Iraq of
its despot leader, Saddam Hussein, and implement a hyper-aggressive foreign policy in the
Middle East. The letter implored President Clinton ―to take the necessary steps, including
military steps, to protect our vital interests in the Gulf … American policy cannot continue to be
crippled by a misguided insistence on unanimity in the U.N. Security Council.‖103 However, the
letter stated that the American people would never support such actions unless a tragic event,
such as Pearl Harbor, occurred. In a bit of serendipity for advocates of PNAC, the terrorist
attacks of 9/11 occurred and gave the Bush administration an excuse to invade Afghanistan and
Iraq. The War in Iraq, coupled with the desires of PNAC, were ―proof‖ of the Bush
administration‘s complicity in the terrorist attacks.104
Taken together, the Commission faced a conundrum. If Saddam Hussein and Iraq were
involved in the terrorist attacks, then it would be required to investigate such ties. But, if there
were no ties between Iraq and 9/11, then the pretense under which the U.S. invaded Iraq would
be invalidated. In order to avoid being drawn into the debate between the competing
conspiracies, Kean and Hamilton asserted that they were ―the 9/11 Commission, not the Iraq War
Commission.‖105 Regardless of the desire to stay out of the Iraq debate raging within the public,
the Commission was forced to deal with the question of Iraq because ―the subject came up
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repeatedly throughout our hearings and our work.‖ In essence, the cultural force of conspiracies
involving the War in Iraq required the Commission to address the issue. In order to maintain its
hyper-objective stance, the 9/11 Commission confirmed, at least to some degree, claims on both
sides of the conspiracy debate without passing judgment about the information the Commission
provided.
The Commission gave the Bush administration purchase for its arguments for the War in
Iraq when it acknowledged that there were ties between Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda and Iraq.
For instance, the Commission noted that as early as 1991, ―Bin Ladin was … willing to explore
cooperation with Iraq.‖106 While there was not much contact between Hussein and bin Laden for
years, after bin Laden publicly announced his fatwa against the United States in 1998, in March
of that year, ―al Qaeda members reportedly went to Iraq to meet with Iraqi intelligence.‖107
Furthermore, the following July ―an Iraqi delegation traveled to Afghanistan to meet first with
the Taliban and then with bin Ladin.‖108 ―Similar meetings between Iraqi officials and Bin Ladin
or his aides,‖ stated the Commission, ―may have occurred in 1999 during a period of some
reported strains with the Taliban. According to the reporting, Iraqi officials offered Bin Ladin a
safe haven in Iraq.‖109 The Commission further indicated that the reports it examined ―described
friendly contacts [between Iraq and al Qaeda] and indicate some common themes to both sides‘
hatred of the United States.‖110 By identifying that there were ―friendly ties‖ between Bin Laden
and Hussein, the Commission was providing support for the Bush administration‘s reasons for
invading Iraq. In essence, the Commission was arming itself against attack from the Bush
administration. Had the 9/11 Commission not uncovered ties between Iraq and al Qaeda, then it
would have been susceptible to acts of retribution as evidenced by the White House‘s treatment
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of Joseph Wilson. At the same time, however, the 9/11 Commission also gave further fuel to
conspiracy claims.
The Commission was careful to note, ―To date we have seen no evidence that these
earlier contacts ever developed into a collaborative operational relationship. Nor have we seen
evidence indicating that Iraq cooperated with al Qaeda in developing or carrying out any attacks
against the United States.‖111 In adding the caveat that there ―was no evidence‖ that Iraq and al
Qaeda worked in concert to plan and implement 9/11, the Commission provided evidence to
conspiracists that the Bush administration lied its way into war in order to implement its agenda
in the Middle East. The Commission furthered such beliefs when it noted the actions and beliefs
of the Bush administration in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks. According to the
Commission, Richard Clarke testified that ―on the evening of September 12, President Bush told
him and some of his staff to explore the possible Iraqi links to 9/11 … While he believed the
details of Clarke‘s account to be incorrect, President Bush acknowledged that he might well have
spoken to Clarke at some point, asking him about Iraq.‖112 Similarly, the Commission wrote that
Donald Rumsfeld ―thought the U.S. response should consider a wide range of options and
possibilities. The secretary said his instinct was to hit Saddam Hussein at the same time—not
only Bin Ladin.‖113 Indeed, the Commission acknowledged that several Bush administration
officials, especially Paul Wolfowitz, argued in favor of attacking Iraq if ―there was even a 10
percent chance that Saddam Hussein was behind the 9/11 attack.‖114 By providing evidence that
members of the Bush administration were very concerned about the possibility that Iraq was
somehow involved in the 9/11 attacks, and that they were arguing for an immediate attack, the
9/11 Commission provided conspiracy theorists with ―proof‖ that, at the very least, the Bush
administration used 9/11 as an excuse to invade Iraq and implement its hyper-agenda in the
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Middle East, or, even worse, that the Bush administration was complicit in the planning and
implementation of the terrorist attacks. Again, the 9/11 Commission was defending itself against
attacks from conspiracists, ones who could impugn the veracity of the Commission‘s findings for
failing to investigate the Bush administration‘s desire to invade Iraq.
As an independent bipartisan investigation into the terrorist attacks, it stands to reason
that the 9/11 Commission would act as an objective observer. But, as Richard Posner wrote, the
Commission‘s determination to have unanimity among all of the commissioners ―encourages just
the kind of herd thinking now being blamed for that other recent intelligence failure—the belief
that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction.‖115 ―Unanimity,‖ Posner furthers,
―deprives decision makers of a full range of alternatives … The premium placed on unanimity
undermines the commission‘s [sic] conclusion that everybody in sight was to blame for the
failure to prevent the 9/11 attacks.‖116 Moreover, unanimity required that the Commission cast
blame equally on both the Bush and Clinton administrations, ―whatever the members actually
believe.‖ Compromises may also have had to be made in order to achieve a unanimous report. In
essence, the desire for complete unity casts the Commission into the realm of the hyperobjective. The lack of dissenting opinions, while giving the perception of unity, was more of a
smokescreen to hide the ―real‖ considerations the Commission would have to attend to if it were
to allow for dissention among its ranks, and dissenting opinions would open the Commission up
for attack from all segments of the conspiracy debate raging in the public sphere.
In forgoing partisan blame, demonstrating the thoroughness of its investigation, and
subscribing to hyper-objectivity, the Commission cast itself in the role of a transmitter of
information. The Commission relayed the information and let the facts speak for themselves. In
using defensive techniques designed to allay conspiracy charges, the Commission, in
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Hofstadter‘s words, is protected from ―having to attend to disturbing considerations that‖ did not
―fortify‖ the Commission‘s ―ideas.‖117 The Commission was using an element of conspiracy
argument to protect itself from being drawn into conspiracy. The use of hyper-objectivity
allowed the Commission to sidestep the issue of motive on the part of the Bush administration‘s
decision to invade Iraq. In so doing, however, it leaves the question of motive, especially as it
pertains to the War in Iraq, open. The 9/11 Commission also had to explain the failures of other
actors within the 9/11 drama, namely those on the part of the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) and the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).

Hyper-Objectivity, Massive Evidence, and the Technical Sphere
One of the more popular and troubling claims leveled by conspiracists was that a stand-down
order was issued to NORAD on 9/11. To make their case, conspiracists cited the protocols
existing between the FAA and NORAD, the public testimony given by FAA and NORAD
officials, and the conflicting evidence provided by members of the Bush Cabinet and other highranking officials during their public testimony as to when a shoot-down order was given, and
even whether a shoot-down order required the coordination of the president and the Secretary of
Defense.118 Lending credence to conspiracists‘ arguments were the observations that the
evidence provided by FAA and NORAD officials suggested there was ample time, based on the
time the reports of the four hijacked flights were received, for scrambled jets to intercept the
planes well before they crashed into the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and a field in
Pennsylvania.119 Even Kean and Hamilton admitted that had ―the military had the amount of
time they said they did … and had scrambled their jets, it was hard to figure how they failed to
shoot down at least one of the planes.‖120 Such inconsistencies provided conspiracists with
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―evidence‖ that not only was there prior knowledge of the 9/11 attacks, but that they were
willfully allowed to happen.121 For instance, Griffin argues that the evidence that ―U.S. political
and military leaders made misleading and even false statements about their response to the
hijackings,‖ coupled with the evidence that ―the presently accepted official account … was
invented some days after 9/11‖ were proof that ―the attacks of 9/11 could not have succeeded
without an order from the highest level of government to suspend normal operating procedures
for response to hijackings.‖122
In order to combat claims of conspiracy, while simultaneously addressing the anomalies
among the varying accounts of what happened on 9/11, the Commission chose to use the hyperobjectivity of technical information in concert with a massive amount of evidence to back its
claims. Hyper-objectivity, as indicated above, is a defensive move used to protect conspiracists
from having to consider information that does not support their contentions. Hyper-objectivity
simply relays facts and information; there is no interpretation of the information, no explanation
of terms, and no resolution between seemingly contradictory information. By adopting the tenets
of hyper-objectivity and by using technical information that obscured the understanding of a lay
public, the Commission was suggesting, according to Fenster, that ―because it happened this way
according to this evidence, it could not have happened any other way.‖123
Conspiracists also have a tendency, according to Earl Creps, to provide evidence for their
claims by presenting it ―en masse.‖124 Frequently, Creps contends, conspiracists assemble a
―huge quantity of data … simply to give the impression of ‗overwhelming‘ proof for a specific
contention.‖125 The hyper-objectivity and massive evidence the Commission uses in explaining
the failures of the FAA and NORAD to effectively coordinate on 9/11 to prevent at least some of
the death and destruction falls, also, into another realm where conspiratorial imaginations run
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rampant, that of the technical sphere. According to James Darsey, technical, or scientific,
information has long purported itself to be the ―objective‖ truth. When experts in technical fields
fail to offer a solidified, univocal front based on carefully constructed, replicated experiments,
and when there are competing interests using the same technical information to back their own
interpretations of what the information means, technical information loses its presumptive
objectivity and can be seen as the workings of a cabal of conspirators ―plotting to have their way
with the world.‖126 One need only look at the debates over climate change to see how the role of
―objective‖ information can be skewed to support those who support beliefs in climate change,
vs. those who vociferously deny climate change, to see Darsey‘s point. In the same vein,
conspiracy theorists used the conflicting testimony of FAA and NORAD officials as proof of a
conspiracy, while the Commission was put into the position of refuting conspiracy charges using
the same information.
Understanding what went wrong in coordinating the United States‘ defenses on 9/11
required careful reading of the densely technical prose used to explain the multiple procedures
and actions of the various agents and agencies of the federal government on 9/11. For instance,
the Commission argued, ―The protocols for the FAA to obtain military assistance from NORAD
required multiple levels of notification and approval at the highest levels of government.‖127 The
protocols existing between the FAA and NORAD in hijacking situations on and before 9/11
―assumed that the aircraft pilot would notify the controller via radio or by ‗squawking‘ a
transponder code of ‗7500.‘‖128 Once a ―hijack was confirmed, … the hijack coordinator on duty
[was] to contact the Pentagon‘s National Military Command Center (NMCC).‖129 The hijack
coordinator would then ask for ―a military escort aircraft to follow the flight, report anything
unusual, and aid search and rescue in the event of an emergency.‖130 From there, ―The NMCC
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would … seek approval from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to provide military
assistance.‖131 Once approval was granted, the orders ―would be transmitted down NORAD‘s
chain of command.‖132 Even with approval for military assistance, ―the protocols did not
contemplate an intercept.‖133 Instead, the protocols ―assumed the fighter escort would be
discreet, ‗vectored to a position five miles directly behind the hijacked aircraft,‘ where it could
perform its mission to monitor the aircraft‘s flight path.‖134 But then the Commission
acknowledges that, ―[b]efore 9/11, a shoot-down order had to be issued by the National
Command Authority, consisting of the President and the Secretary of Defense.‖135
Providing the audience with the details of the protocols between the FAA and NORAD
required the audience to sift through an overwhelming amount of information to understand the
prescribed procedures. Moreover, such a move also gives the impression that the Commission
was simply laying out the ―facts‖ for the audience to consider. There is no interpretation, simply
information; the audience is left to draw its own conclusions. For instance, the audience is left to
determine what a discreet vectored position means. Presumably, it means that the scrambled jet
is hidden from the aircraft it is tracking, but the technical nature of the information obfuscates
what the protocols mean. The lack of a closed, fixed meaning is also located in the discussion
between an interception and a shoot-down order. On the one hand, the Commission states that
the protocols ―did not contemplate an intercept‖ of a hijacked aircraft. On the other hand, the
Commission admits that a shoot-down order had to be given by the National Command
Authority. While the two claims are not commensurate with one another, an interception and a
shoot-down are not the same thing; for a lay public unschooled in the vagaries of military
command the two claims seem to contradict one another. If the protocols did not contemplate an
intercept, then, for an inexpert audience it might seem odd that there are protocols for a shoot-
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down. After all, shooting down an aircraft is the ultimate form of interception. Moreover, the
audience is left to interpret whether a shoot-down order had to be agreed upon by both the
president and the Secretary of Defense, or just one of them. The lack of a stable meaning
ascribed to the protocols leaves the meaning behind them obscure and mysterious.
The mystery of technical information, argues Darsey, is ―the result of the immediate
illegibility and recondite nature of the objects of scientific inquiry, the exclusiveness of its
methods for comprehending those objects, and the obscurity and density of the manner in which
findings are reported.‖136 While the protocols existing between NORAD and the FAA are not
scientific, they are technical in that full comprehension of the protocols requires that the
audience be versed in aviation and militaristic terms and commands. As Chaїm Perleman and
Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca wrote, ―technical terms, which are supposed to be as univocal as
possible in the context of the discipline, in fact summarize an aggregate of acquired knowledge,
rules, and conventions. Because he is not familiar with these, the layman completely fails to
understand these terms, as technical terms. Entry into a specialized group requires initiation.‖137
Without possessing the necessary technical vocabulary to navigate the Commission‘s
explanation, coupled with the Commission‘s thick description of the protocols, the audience is
left with a baffling array of information, which it cannot wholly connect. Instead, for
conspiracists, the Commission‘s explanation becomes a bit of legerdemain, an obfuscation of the
facts and circumstances surrounding the terrorist attacks.138
Even with the Commission‘s attempt to objectively relay the protocols between the FAA
and NORAD, the Commission could not completely maintain its objective stance when
explaining why the FAA failed to follow protocols on 9/11, or why NORAD officials made
inaccurate statements during their public testimony. Instead, the Commission had to ascribe a
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reason, a motive, for the failures of FAA and NORAD to effectively coordinate on 9/11. As
Darsey stated, ―The primary burden of the conspiracy theorist is to provide credible purpose as
the preeminent element of motive. The unity of the conspiracy is grounded in the unity of
purpose that drives it.‖139 Motive, even in the technical sphere, must, according to Darsey, be a
purpose recognizable from and consonant with purposes we have experienced to be possible in
everyday life.‖140 The motive has to make sense; it has to resonate with the audience in order for
it to be believed. Generally, evil is isolated as the motive force propelling the conspiracy
forward, whether the evil is compelled by greed or the desire for power.141 Indeed, as has been
noted, conspiracists argued NORAD failed to perform its duty to protect the United States
because a stand-down order had been issued by the Bush administration. Yet, the 9/11
Commission, if it were going to effectively dodge the conspiracy bullet of motive, had to devise
a motive that would satisfy the public‘s desire, in Fenster‘s words, ―to make sense of the
historical agent behind the events‖ and that would effectively combat conspiracy claims.142
In explaining the failures of the FAA and NORAD to follow protocol on 9/11, the
Commission offers, ―NORAD and the FAA were unprepared for the type of attacks launched
against the United States on September 11, 2001. They struggled, under difficult circumstances,
to improvise a homeland defense against an unprecedented challenge they had never before
encountered and had never trained to meet.‖143 Similarly, the Commission stated, ―The defense
of U.S. airspace on 9/11 was not conducted in accord with preexisting training and protocols. It
was improvised by civilians who had never handled a hijacked aircraft that attempted to
disappear, and by a military unprepared for the transformation of commercial aircraft into
weapons of mass destruction.‖144 Ultimately, the Commission was offering that the strenuous
situation that 9/11 posed, coupled with a lack of experience and a lack of imagination, were the
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reasons, the motive, behind the FAA and NORAD‘s failures to follow protocol. The rather weak
motive the Commission used to explain the failures to follow protocol was an attempt to refute
conspiracy claims.
In essence, the Commission was attempting to provide the simple motive of inexperience
and human failing to explain why the FAA and NORAD failed to prevent any of the death and
destruction on 9/11 (what conspiracists have dubiously labeled an ―incompetence‖ theory) and to
combat beliefs that the Bush administration had issued a stand-down order. Zarefsky argues that
when there is simple motive to explain evil, then conspiracy beliefs will not get much play
within the public sphere.145 To illustrate his point, Zarefsky wrote, ―It is far easier to explain the
attack on Pearl Harbor by reference to faulty intelligence than to a conspiracy in Washington to
drag the nation into war.‖146 Simple motives, however, are only successful if they exist in a
relatively stable climate. In an indeterminate climate, the likelihood that the public will attend to
a motive of evil that resolves the ambiguity existing within the public sphere is greatly
increased.147
Plagued by the failure of other commissions to avoid being drawn into conspiracy
theories, the 9/11 Commission used the strategy of hyper-objectivity to keep its discourse from
falling into the realm of conspiracy theories. In so doing, however, the 9/11 Commission was
using a tactic exploited by conspiracy theorists. In setting itself up as the objective observer,
much like a physician providing a patient with a diagnosis, the Commission could point to the
problems associated with the defenses in place in the United States on and before 9/11 without
having to address the troubling problems of an evil motive. Instead, the motives behind the War
in Iraq and the improper execution of protocol between the FAA and NORAD are either left
unexamined, or are ascribed to the simple motive of human failing. The ―facts‖ are left for the
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audience to interpret. Failing to address the ambiguities and anomalies of the failures for the
FAA and NORAD to effectively coordinate the defenses of the United States creates a sense of
mystery, of obscurity, and of doubt. If the greatest military power in the world is unable to
prevent hijacked commercial aircraft from causing death and destruction because of human
failing, then what does that say about the country‘s preparedness in facing an attack from a
foreign military power? The question of motive, then, becomes obscure, secret, and mysterious, a
problem that is exacerbated with the use of technical information. The inadequacies of motive
provided by the Commission further create an indeterminate climate where conspiracy theories
flourish.
If the question of secrecy or mystery hinges upon the question of motive in the technical
sphere, then the Commission‘s failure to address motive, coupled with the use of technical
information, further obfuscates and mystifies what actually happened on 9/11 and why. The
audience is left with a mystery, something that has yet to be determined, has yet to be solved to
the satisfaction of the audience. The Commission‘s lack of a full explanation leaves open the
possibility of multiple interpretations of what transpired on 9/11, interpretations that provide
fuller explanations, however erroneous, of what happened and why. The audience is provided
with reasons that resonate and provide them with a creditable motive, reasons that tap into the
fears of the public. When held in sharp relief against conspiracists‘ claims that the evil
machinations of the Bush administration were the cause of the terrorist attacks, the
Commission‘s objective stance, its determination to provide the unvarnished truth, fails to
provide a satisfactory narrative fix for the terrorist attacks. Furthermore, the failure of the
Commission to refute conspiracy claims becomes, in the logic of conspiracy theory, an
admission of guilt, an acknowledgement that there is something behind the curtain that is too
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nefarious for the Commission to acknowledge. Even with the Commission‘s attempt to prevent
itself from being drawn into the fray of conspiracy arguments, the Commission does attempt to
deal with some of what it deemed ―rational‖ conspiracy theories.

Argument from Absence
Conspiracists raised questions about the relationship among the Bush, bin Laden, and Saudi
royal families and implied that the relationship among the three families was suspicious.148 The
questions raised by Griffin and others posited that ―the failure to capture bin Laden may be
connected with the close relations between the Saudi royals, the bin Laden family, and the Bush
administration.‖149 These same questions led some to believe that the Bush administration was
actively seeking to impede a full investigation into the 9/11 terrorist attacks, which, conspiracists
claimed, was evidence of the government‘s duplicity.150 To add force to their claims,
conspiracists argued that flights loaded with Saudi nationals and members of the Bin Laden
family left the country prior to the reopening of U.S. airspace. Considering that most of the
terrorists hailed from Saudi Arabia, and considering that members of the Bin Laden family, who
may or may not have contact with their infamous relative, were able to allegedly leave the
United States before U.S. airspace reopened and without being fully vetted by the intelligence
agencies, conspiracists argued that the Saudi flights ―could have been made possible only
through political intervention from the White House.‖151 These flights, conspiracists posed,
served as proof of governmental complicity in the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The White House, it was
argued, was shielding Saudi Arabia from the close scrutiny that may have resulted if the public
became aware of just how cozy the Bush administration was with state sponsors of terrorists.152
The Commission, in attempting to dispel beliefs that there was a conspiracy in place on 9/11,
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used the conspiracy technique of argument from absence, a technique, as I noted in chapter two,
used to shift the burden onto the conspiracy theorists and away from the Commission.
The 9/11 Commission explicitly took on the claims of the Saudi flights when it states,
―Three questions have arisen with respect to the departure of Saudi nationals from the United
States in the immediate aftermath of 9/11: (1) Did any flights of Saudi nationals take place
before national airspace was reopened on September 13, 2001? (2) Was there any political
intervention to facilitate the departure of Saudi nationals? (3) Did the FBI screen Saudi nationals
thoroughly before their departure?‖153 ―[W]e found no evidence,‖ stated the Commission, ―that
any flights of Saudi nationals, domestic or international, took place before the reopening of
national airspace on the morning of September 13, 2001.‖154 ―To the contrary,‖ stated the
Commission, ―every flight we have identified occurred after national airspace opened.‖155
Furthermore, the Commission iterated, ―[W]e found no evidence of political intervention. We
found no evidence that anyone at the White House above the level of Richard Clarke participated
in a decision on the departure of Saudi nationals. … None of the officials we interviewed
recalled any intervention or direction on this matter from any political appointee.‖156 Even
though, according to the Commission, ―White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card remembered
someone telling him about the Saudi request shortly after 9/11, he said he had not talked to the
Saudis and did not ask anyone to do anything about it.‖157 Moreover, the commission added,
―None of the officials we interviewed recalled any intervention or direction on this matter from
any political appointee.‖158
In using statements such as, ―we found no evidence,‖ the Commission is not only making
an explicit appeal that no one from the Bush administration made the operational decision to
allow the Saudi flights to leave the United States, but is also shifting the burden of proof onto
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conspiracists in order to put them in the position of having to ―prove‖ their case. But the use of
the absence of evidence is doing something else; it is implicitly asserting that the absence of
evidence is proof that there was no complicity on the part of the White House. If the White
House was not aiding Saudi flights to leave the country, then there was no complicity on the part
of the White House. If there was no complicity, then the White House had nothing to hide about
its relations with the Saudi royal and bin Laden families.
In addition to the alleged problems with the Saudi flights, claims were leveled against the
Saudi Arabian government and the Saudi royal family asserting that they had wittingly and
unwittingly funded the operations of al Qaeda. Senator Bob Graham implied that there was a
conspiracy to obstruct finding out the truth about possible sources of financing for al Qaeda
operatives in the United States. Senator Graham, who co-chaired the Joint Inquiry, argued that
the entire twenty-seven pages of the Joint Inquiry Report pertaining to the Saudi government and
its financing of the 9/11 terrorists; was redacted from public view ―for reasons other than
national security.‖159 It was alleged in Senator Graham‘s book, Intelligence Matters, that some of
al Qaeda‘s funding for the terrorist attacks came from members of the Saudi government and the
Saudi royal family. Senator Graham revealed that two of the alleged hijackers—Nawaf al Hazmi
and Khalid al Mihdhar—were ―friendly‖ with an FBI informant while living in San Diego and
Hazmi even rented a room from the informant.160 Furthermore, Senator Graham implied that
Omar al Bayoumi, a suspected Saudi spy and a well-known acquaintance of Hazmi and Mihdhar,
seemingly funded the two terror suspects from income garnered from a ―ghost job‖ with Ercan,
―a contractor of the Saudi government.‖161
The Saudi government, however, was not the only Saudi entity Senator Graham
implicated in funding Hazmi and Mihdhar. Saudi Princess Haifa al Faisal, wife of Prince Bandar
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bin Sultan, the Saudi ambassador to the United States, was alleged to have funneled money to
terrorists, albeit unknowingly. As Senator Graham explains, Princess Haifa was sending checks
in the amounts of ―$2,000 and $3,000 a month‖ to a Saudi woman (the wife of Osama Bassnan
and alleged friend of Bayoumi) in need of thyroid surgery. However, the checks being sent by
Princess Haifa to Bassnan‘s wife were being signed ―over to a woman named Manal Bajadr—the
wife of Omar al-Bayoumi.‖162 Such revelations led Senator Graham to conclude that, ―It looked
suspiciously like another back-door way of channeling money to al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar.163 At
the very least, Senator Graham was implying that the Saudi government and members of the
Saudi royal family were funneling money to terrorists under the noses of the FBI. But Senator
Graham took these observations further by stating that he believed that 9/11 was ―an avoidable
tragedy‖ and that the White House orchestrated a ―cover-up … to protect not only the agencies
that had failed but also America‘s relationship with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.‖164 If
Graham‘s assertions were true, then they could cause a serious political firestorm in Washington,
especially considering that conspiracists had already charged that the Bush administration‘s ties
to the bin Laden and Saudi royal families had impeded a full investigation into the terrorist
attacks. The Commission set out to refute claims that a foreign government, especially Saudi
Arabia, had any part in funding the 9/11 terrorists by refuting conspiracy claims with a
conspiracy tactic.
The Commission wrote, ―Saudi Arabia has long been considered the primary source of al
Qaeda funding, but we have found no evidence that the Saudi government as an institution or
senior Saudi officials individually funded the organization. (This conclusion does not exclude the
likelihood that charities with significant Saudi government sponsorship diverted funds to al
Qaeda.)‖165 Here the Commission is using the absence of evidence to make a fine distinction:
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while there was likely money given by the Saudi government for charitable purposes that was
then given to al Qaeda, the Commission is asserting that neither the Saudi government, nor any
of its ―senior‖ officials, were aware of such financial distributions. Similarly, in refuting charges
that Princess Haifa either knowingly, or unwittingly, helped to fund terrorist activities, the
Commission asserts in an endnote, ―We have found no evidence that Saudi Princess Haifa al
Faisal provided any funds to the conspiracy, either directly or indirectly.‖166 In essence, the 9/11
Commission is using the absence of evidence to combat conspiracy claims that the Saudi
government and the Saudi royal family were involved in any terrorist funding.
Finally, the 9/11 Commission used the absence of evidence to refute claims that Bayoumi
helped to finance the terrorist attacks. ―Our investigation‖ wrote the Commission, ―has found no
credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial
assistance. Similarly, we have seen no evidence that any foreign government—or any foreign
government official—supplied any funding.‖167 These statements directly refute the claims that
Bayoumi wittingly helped to fund Hazmi and Mihdhar, and that Bayoumi was a Saudi spy. By
definition, spies are government agents. If Bayoumi was a Saudi spy, and if he was funding al
Qaeda operatives, then it left open the possibility that the Saudi government was funding
terrorists. The Commission, in arguing that Bayoumi was not a spy based on an absence of
evidence, was attempting to make Senator Graham‘s conspiracy charges suspect. They were
fighting conspiracy claims with a conspiracy tactic. It becomes the conspiracist‘s burden to prove
that Bayoumi did finance Hazmi and Mihdhar, and that Bayoumi was a Saudi spy. As a general
rule, it is almost impossible to prove that someone is a spy unless, of course, the government of
the suspected spy acknowledges the person‘s agent status.

146
There are a few implications that can be garnered from the Commission‘s use of
argument from absence. The Commission could simply be telling the unvarnished truth.
Everything said in the Commission‘s report could simply be stating the facts as they were found;
there was no evidence of anything untoward. The Commission could be obfuscating some of the
information, banking on the fact that proving Bayoumi not only funded al Qaeda members, but
that he was also a Saudi spy, would be impossible without complete access to the information.
The Commission could simply be intentionally concealing the truth for altruistic reasons. If the
assertions made by Senator Graham are true, then they are pretty damning evidence of the role
Saudi Arabia played in the terrorist attacks. Considering that Saudi Arabia is one of the United
States‘ most staunch allies in the Middle East, and considering the U.S. was already involved in
costly and politically polarizing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, then the Commission could have
simply been protecting American interests by not casting blame on yet another suspect. The
Commission could have been intentionally concealing information for a more malign purpose,
namely that the Bush administration was complicit in preventing a full investigation of the 9/11
terrorist attacks. Finally, the Commission simply may just not know.
The use of the absence of evidence by the Commission is used as evidence that neither
the Saudi government nor the Saudi royal family were involved in a conspiracy to finance
terrorism. Considering that the evidence the Commission used to back its claims was redacted
from public view, and considering that the co-chair of the Joint Inquiry is one of the key players
in making allegations implicating the Saudi government in financing terrorism, a game of ―We
say‖ ―They say‖ is being employed. Who ultimately will be believed will be dependent on who
has been able to successfully force the opponent into shouldering the burden of proof. As the
logic of conspiracy theories goes, the Commission‘s use of absence serves as ―proof‖ that there
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was no conspiracy, but conspiracists can then take the absence to make the claim that the
absence is actually evidence of a conspiracy. What is certain is that the use of argument of
absence by the Commission, instead of laying the facts bare for the audience to comprehend,
adds to the indeterminacy of what happened and why.
With the Commission‘s use of hyper-objectivity to combat ―irrational‖ claims of
conspiracy, and its use of argument from absence to combat the more ―rational‖ conspiracy
theories, the Commission then turned to casting sole blame onto Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda.
In so doing, the Commission employed some of the more signature elements of Hofstadter‘s
paranoid style.

Portraying the Perfect Enemy
Conspiracists posit that bin Laden and al Qaeda could only have been successful on 9/11 through
the complicity of the federal government. Citing evidence that the U.S. provided material and
financial backing of the mujahedeen in Afghanistan, in which bin Laden participated,
conspiracists argued that bin Laden was a product, and thus a puppet, of the U.S. government.
For instance, Matthias Broeckers, who published the book, Verschwörungen,
Verschwörungstheorin, und die Geheimnisse des 11.9, in Germany in 2002, posited that bin
Laden‘s ties to the CIA during the Afghani mujahedeen and the existing ties between the Bush
and bin Laden families are evidence of governmental complicity in the 9/11 attacks.168 While the
9/11 Commission freely admitted that the United States funneled money through Pakistan to
support the Afghani mujahedeen, it denied that bin Laden received any substantial U.S.-backed
training or financial support. The Commission stated, ―Bin Ladin and his comrades had their
own sources of support and training, and they received little or no assistance from the United
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States.‖169 While this statement serves as an express denial that the United States was somehow
responsible for the power and abilities of bin Laden, what is particularly interesting is the
Commission‘s subsequent portrayal of bin Laden as the perfect enemy described by Hofstadter,
which bolsters the Commission‘s assertion that bin Laden was not aided in any meaningful way
by the U.S., but also implies that bin Laden‘s overriding hatred of the United States made it
impossible for him to act in concert with his most hated enemy. In essence, the Commission
employed one of the most signature elements of the conspiracy narrative in order to combat
claims of a governmental conspiracy, the construction of the perfect enemy.
―The enemy,‖ according to Hofstadter, ―is clearly delineated: he is the perfect model of
malice, a kind of amoral superman: sinister, ubiquitous, powerful, cruel, sensual, luxuryloving.‖170 Hofstadter further notes that the enemy ―is a free, active, demonic agent.‖ The enemy
conspiracists paint, in essence, is the personification of evil. One of the ways the Commission
characterizes the demonic nature of bin Laden and al Qaeda is through the use of archetypal
metaphor to explain the motive force—evil—driving bin Laden and al Qaeda.171 For instance,
the Commission explained that bin Laden had a unique appeal in the Middle East because, while
other Islamic extremists focused their attention on destroying Israel, bin Laden believed that
―[t]hey had not taken on what he called ‗the head of the snake,‘‖ the United States.172 The
Commission reiterated bin Laden‘s use of the ―head of the snake‖ metaphor by noting that after
bin Laden was expelled from Sudan, ―He was ready to strike at ‗the head of the snake.‘‖173
Finally, the Commission drove home the point when it stated, ―Bin Ladin and Islamist terrorists
mean exactly what they say: to them America is the font of all evil, the ‗head of the snake,‘ and it
must be converted or destroyed.‖174
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The metaphoric use of the snake to depict evil is one of the most consistent and lasting
metaphors used throughout history. Symbolically, the snake represents the seduction of evil; Eve
was seduced by the snake to eat the forbidden apple in the Garden of Eden, which was the cause
of humanity‘s fall from God‘s grace. In quoting bin Laden using ―the head of the snake‖ as his
metaphoric representation of the United States, the Commission was accomplishing three goals.
First, the Commission is highlighting the evil motive driving bin Laden and al Qaeda. Bin
Laden‘s belief that the U.S. is evil incarnate drives his overarching desires to destroy the United
States and all Americans. Second, because the Commission was writing to a largely American
audience, bin Laden‘s depiction of the U.S. as the ―head of the snake‖ served to divide the
American people and its government from the evil machinations of bin Laden and his cohorts.
The Commission was dividing the ―innocent‖ United States from the ―evil‖ bin Laden. As
Darsey notes, ―[c]onspiracy argument sets a secretive and malign purpose against a noble and
true one, or at least an innocent one.‖175 While many Americans will agree that the American
government has many faults, most would not credit that the government, or its people, as the font
of all evil. Finally, in dividing the United States and its people from bin Laden and his belief in
America‘s inherent evil, the Commission was, rhetorically, turning the evil back onto bin Laden.
Bin Laden is driven by evil, thus he is evil.
To further promote bin Laden‘s evil and demonic nature, the Commission went on to
note that, bin Laden ―claim[ed] that America had declared war against God and his messenger,
they called for the murder of any American, anywhere on earth, as the ‗individual duty for every
Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it.‘‖176 Bin Laden, according to
the Commission, further stated, ―‗We believe that the worst thieves in the world today and the
worst terrorists are the Americans. Nothing could stop you except perhaps retaliation in kind. We
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do not have to differentiate between military or civilian. As far as we are concerned, they are all
targets.‘‖177 Similarly, ―Bin Ladin has stated flatly, ‗Our fight against these governments is not
separate from our fight against you.‘‖178 In an interview with ABC in May 1998, bin Ladin,
according to the Commission, claimed, ―It was more important for Muslims to kill Americans
than to kill other infidels.‖179 Bin Laden believes, quoted the Commission, that ‗―It is far better
for anyone to kill a single American soldier than to squander his efforts on other activities.‘‖180
The Commission‘s use of the above passages is telling; all Americans, be they
government agents, American soldiers, or civilians, are targets of bin Laden and al Qaeda. The
most important activity for bin Laden and his minions is to kill Americans, but not just kill them,
―murder‖ them. Using the word ―murder‖ brings up images of the cold-blooded killer, one who
does not kill in a rage, out of jealousy, or even in self-defense, but in a cold, calculating,
purposeful act, an act compelled by evil. The foreign enemy, who is so obviously driven by evil,
who so obviously hates America and all Americans, would not engage in a conspiracy with its
arch enemy, the United States government, to achieve its means.
The Commission did not just rest its case on painting bin Laden as evil; it further offered
that bin Laden possesses remarkable foresight and is particularly powerful and cunning.
Conspiracists frequently construct an enemy so cunning, powerful, and resourceful that major
historical events are attributed to the enemy‘s malice. The enemy, Hofstadter warns, ―wills,
indeed he manufactures, the mechanism of history himself, or deflects the normal course of
history in an evil way. He makes crises, starts runs on banks, causes depressions, manufactures
disasters, and then enjoys and profits from the misery he has produced.‖181 ―Very often,‖
according to Hofstadter, ―the enemy is held to possess some especially effective source of
power,‖ whether it be the ability to control the press, to manage news, to obtain unlimited
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money, or even by ―gaining a stranglehold on the educational system.‖182 The Commission‘s
depictions of bin Laden, true to Hofstadter‘s formula, portray bin Laden as a demonic agent who
is particularly powerful and cunning.
Possessing an uncanny ability to predict what was needed in the future for him to lay out
his odious plans, bin Laden was able to recruit and train volunteers for al Qaeda by capitalizing
on a system of resistance that was started in the midst of the Cold War and set in place to provide
support to the Afghani mujahedeen. The Commission explained that the success of the
mujahedeen in Afghanistan was dependent on an ―increasingly complex, almost worldwide
organization,‖ which ―included a financial support network that came to be known as the
‗Golden Chain.‘‖183 ―Bin Ladin,‖ according to the Commission, ―understood better than most of
the volunteers [participating in the mujahedeen] the extent to which the continuation and
eventual success of the jihad in Afghanistan depended‖ on this network.184 The ―Golden Chain‖
was ―put together mainly by financiers in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states. Donations
flowed through charities or other nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Bin Ladin and the
‗Afghan Arabs‘ drew largely on funds raised by this network, whose agents roamed world
markets to buy arms and supplies for the mujahedeen, or ‗holy warriors.‘‖185
But the importance of the ―Golden Chain‖ did not simply rely on financial support.
―Mosques, schools, and boardinghouses‖ according to the Commission, ―served as recruiting
stations in many parts of the world, including the United States. Some were set up by Islamic
extremists or their financial backers. Bin Ladin had an important part in this activity. He and the
cleric Azzam had joined in creating a ‗Bureau of Services‘ (Mektab al Khindmat, or MAK),
which channeled recruits into Afghanistan.‖186 The Commission notes that:
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Bin Ladin and Azzam agreed that the organization successfully created for Afghanistan
should not be allowed to dissolve. They established what they called a base or foundation
(al Qaeda) as a potential general headquarters for future jihad … This organization‘s
structure included as its operating arms an intelligence component, a military committee,
a political committee, and a committee in charge of media affairs and propaganda. It also
had an Advisory Council (Shura) made up of bin Ladin‘s inner circle.187
As the above passages indicate, bin Laden had a preternatural sagacity in recognizing the
importance of the ―Golden Chain,‖ not only for the success of the Afghani mujahedeen, but also
in foreseeing how this operational network could be used to fund bin Laden‘s jihad against the
United States. Moreover, because bin Laden was intimately involved in receiving funds from the
―Golden Chain,‖ and because bin Laden was able to recruit members for al Qaeda from the
mosques and boarding schools that were part of the operational system, including ones in the
United States, bin Laden is accorded an almost mythical power.
The Commission‘s explanation of bin Laden‘s use of the ―Golden Chain‖ and his
subsequent development of al Qaeda also served to promote the idea of bin Laden‘s remarkable
organizational skills. Bin Laden‘s development of an organization that had an ―intelligence
component, a military committee, a political committee, and a committee in charge of media
affairs and propaganda‖ mirrors the structure and function of a mini-government. Gathering
intelligence, exploring military options, determining political actions, and coordinating and
supplying the media with its propaganda all serve as evidence of bin Laden‘s extraordinary
power and speak to his ability to affect history ―in an evil way.‖ The Commission, however, did
not simply bolster bin Laden‘s demonic image by highlighting his evil drive, his foresight, and
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his power, it also highlighted the remarkable cunning of bin Laden and al Qaeda in being able to
defeat the systems of protection the United States government had in place.
The Commission noted that, in order to be successful on 9/11, al Qaeda‘s leaders likely
―reflected on what they needed to do in order to organize and conduct a complex international
terrorist operation to inflict catastrophic harm.‖188 One such requirement, and one where the
Commission‘s description bolstered the cunning of bin Laden and al Qaeda, was ―an intelligence
effort to gather required information and form assessments of enemy strengths and
weaknesses.‖189 For instance, the Commission noted that al Qaeda operatives used ―flight
simulator computer games … that featured hijackings,‖ read ―flight schedules to determine
which flights would be in the air at the same time in different parts of the world,‖ and used ―the
game software to increase their familiarity with aircraft models and functions, and to highlight
the gaps in cabin security.‖190 Similarly, operatives ―were told to watch the cabin doors at takeoff
and landing, to observe whether the captain went to the lavatory during the flight, and to note
whether the flight attendants brought food into the cockpit.‖191 In addition to casing security on
airplanes, an al Qaeda operative tested the ―security by carrying a box cutter in his toiletries kit
onto [a] flight.‖ Even though ―security officials searched his carry-on bag and even opened the
toiletries kit, … [they] just glanced at the contents and let him pass.‖192 Furthermore, the same
operative ―waited until most of the first-class passengers were dozing, then got up and removed
the kit from his carry-on. None of the flight attendants took notice.‖193
Al Qaeda‘s intelligence also included understanding the visa requirements for the
different countries where al Qaeda operatives were being sent. The Commission recounted that al
Qaeda operatives ―visited travel agents to learn visa requirements for Asian countries.‖194
Malaysia, in particular, was considered a safe place for al Qaeda operatives to pass through
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because ―its government did not require citizens of Saudi Arabia or other Gulf states to have
visas‖ and ―Malaysian security was reputed to be lax when it came to Islamist jihadists.‖195
Because it was recognized that ―individuals with Saudi passports could travel much more easily
… particularly to the United States‖ than individuals from other countries, al Qaeda operatives
used ―Saudi passports to conceal their prior travels to and from Pakistan‖ in order to travel from
Malaysia to the United States without raising undue concern.196
While not an exhaustive list of the means bin Laden and al Qaeda used to overcome the
security in place to protect, not only people in the United States, but those in other countries as
well, the above passages illustrate the sophistication, the cunning, the foresight, and the
dedication it took in order for bin Laden and al Qaeda to unleash the terror of 9/11 on the United
States, and, indeed, the rest of the world. In the Commission‘s own words, the enemy ―is
sophisticated, patient, disciplined, and lethal.‖197 In describing bin Laden as being possessed by
an evil agenda with an overriding desire to destroy America and Americans by demonic means
as well as having the capability and foresight of organizing al Qaeda to carry out these aims, the
Commission put bin Laden in the role of the perfect enemy. The Commission painted a picture
of ruthless al Qaeda operatives who were under the control of their master and served his every
wish and whim. Such a portrayal was an effort to not only heighten the danger the United States
faces from the enemy, but to also stress that such an enemy will try any and all means to destroy
America and Americans. If the singular plot behind the enemy is to destroy the United States,
then the likelihood that bin Laden would willingly enter into a conspiracy with governmental
leaders becomes a laughable enterprise.
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Conclusion
Conspiracy theories exhibited enormous control over the form and substance of the 9/11
Commission Report. Haunted by the failure of other commissions to keep themselves from being
drawn into the fray of conspiracy argument, and driven by the conspiracy theories already
circulating in the public sphere, the Commission cast itself as an objective observer laying the
facts of 9/11 bare for the audience to consider. In so doing, the Commission was allowed to
ignore troublesome information that failed to fall within its perceived realm of consideration.
Even when the Commission did address what it deemed to be more ―rational‖ conspiracy
theories, the Commission employed the use of argument from absence in order to prove there
was no conspiracy involving the U.S. or any foreign government. Instead, blame is cast upon a
single, foreign, perpetrator driven by an evil desire to destroy the United States. The enemy, bin
Laden, was so powerful, so cunning and resourceful, that he and his demonic agents were able to
overcome the security in place to protect the United States because of ―inadequate policies and
procedures‖ that failed to take into consideration the threat non-state-supported terrorists posed
to the United States. While the narrative the Commission employs to explain the motive force
surrounding the terrorists and their evil leader is compelling, the Commission‘s use of hyperobjectivity to explain the anomalies surrounding the terrorist attacks is far less so and sets the
Commission up to be drawn into conspiracy discourse for years to come.
The strategies the Commission employed inherently serve as a forming ground for ever
more conspiracy theories. Conspiracy theories, according to Clare Birchall, are an almost
―necessary‖ result of indeterminacy. Birchall asserted that ―conspiracy theories … are possible
precisely because the type of interpretation or reading privileged by the mainstream press and
traditional academic discourses will always leave a remainder, a remainder that returns to
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destabilize the assumptions upon which the reading implicitly relies.‖198 Evidence provided to
support claims in official discourses serves as a foundation for further speculation because
questions left unanswered and information that is either ignored or distorted raise doubt,
uncertainty, and speculation. As counter-narratives about an event such as 9/11 grow, Birchall
insisted that such narratives will ultimately ―affect the general structure and meanings of that
story and who is entitled to interpret it.‖199
In its use of hyper-objectivity in order to prevent itself from being drawn into the fray of
conspiracy theories, the Commission inherently set its discourse up to fail against the more
satisfying and closed narratives conspiracy theories offered. In providing the facts of the terrorist
attacks, the Commission failed to address the emotional needs of the audience and left the
audience to determine its own motives as to why the United States invaded Iraq. The audience
also was left to determine why FAA and NORAD officials provided inaccurate evidence during
their public testimony. Furthermore, the audience was left to wade through the Commission‘s
highly technical and dense explanations of the failures of the military to effectively coordinate a
defense on 9/11. Such descriptions have fueled further questions, further remainders, because the
audience was not properly initiated into the technical language necessary to engage the
discourse. The information thus becomes secret and mysterious and questions continue to circle
around what the discourse means.
The only place in the narrative where the Commission did interpret the information, did
provide the audience with an emotional appeal was in its assertions that bin Laden and al Qaeda
are not done committing acts of terrorism against the U.S. ―Drawing on a long tradition of
extreme intolerance within one stream of Islam,‖ stated the Commission, a ―stream that is
motivated by religion and does not distinguish politics from religion‖ provides for a distorted
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view of the world where the United States is seen as the font of all evil.200 ―It is not a position
with which Americans can bargain or negotiate. With it there is no common ground—not even
respect for life—on which to begin a dialogue. It can only be destroyed or utterly isolated.‖201 In
these passages the Commission provided the audience with a motive, a reason to take heed of its
advice. We are in an all-out apocalyptic battle and failure means our own destruction. In essence,
the Commission was fomenting the same kind of apocalyptic fear that conspiracists use in the
narratives of their texts, but it only did so in its chapter of recommendations. Other fears, fears
that the government is incapable of protecting its people, that the government is lying to its
people, were never addressed.
In essence, the Commission‘s desire to not engage conspiracy theories by adopting a
hyper-objective stance provided conspiracy theories with proof that the Commission was
engaging in a cover-up, and when it did engage conspiracy theories, the Commission‘s use of
absence of evidence was, to conspiracy theorists, evidence of a cover-up. All told, the
remarkable flexibility of conspiracy theories, and their power within indeterminate climates,
speaks to the remarkable power of conspiracy theories, in our current times, to influence the
form and substance of official discourse. Official discourse, in other words, is put into an
untenable position, one where it cannot hope to prevail over the more closed, fixed, and
ultimately satisfying narrative that conspiracy theories offer because government agents can
never completely satisfy the argumentative burdens that conspiracy theories demand.
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CHAPTER 4

SUBSTANCE AND FORM:
CONSPIRATORIAL MANIFESTATIONS IN OFFICIAL DISCOURSE

The world has become one big grassy knoll,
crawling with lone gunmen
who think they’re the Warren Commission.
—Ken MacLeod

Conspiracy theories are becoming an increasingly significant mode of interpretation for
understanding the causes behind historical events. Scholars have pointed to the eruption of
conspiracy beliefs that continue to grow and expand in our contemporary world as proof that the
U.S. is becoming more paranoid and more besieged by conspiracy beliefs.1 The expansion of
conspiracy beliefs among the American people is a result, posit scholars, of the loss of central
authority and the rise of the indeterminacy of information.2 In the wake of revelations of actual
conspiracies enacted by the government against its people, in the wake of revelations of
government and corporate malfeasance, belief in conspiracy is no longer a purely paranoid
assumption. Labeling a belief as a conspiracy theory serves as a dismissal of its premises. But the
persistence and prominence of conspiracy theories is indicative that conspiracy theories are not
so easily marginalized and dispelled by simply dismissing their messages and their appeal.
At the heart of this study is the determination of how conspiracy theories shape and
influence official discourse. It has been widely acknowledged that conspiracy theories enter into
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a dialogue with official discourse; what has not been examined is the degree to which conspiracy
theories influence the substance of official discourse. Conspiracy theories come into being
almost immediately after a significant historical event occurs. From Sarah Palin‘s
pronouncement that President Obama wanted to impose ―death panels‖ as part of the health care
bill, to the leaking of thousands of classified military documents on the War in Afghanistan
which indicate that ―the Taliban are stronger than at any time since 2001,‖ to beliefs that
President Obama is a closet Muslim and that he, along with his administration, is attempting to
impose Sharia law in the United States, conspiracy theories are the wellspring of doubt,
uncertainty, and anxiety within the American public.3 When conspiracy claims become strong
enough, when they elicit enough doubt to effectively prohibit the government from enacting
legislation, diminish public support of overseas war efforts, or even provoke people to violently
target places of worship because of their fears that an alien religion is trying to usurp the
American way of life, it becomes incumbent upon officials to address the issues.4 The ways in
which officials respond to fears, to anxieties, to claims of conspiracy within the public sphere are
instrumental in perfecting the maturity of conspiracy theories.
The examination of two blue ribbon commissions and their reports from two deeply
moments in our contemporary era has uncovered a wealth of information about the power of
conspiracy theories in our time. The Warren Commission Report and the 9/11 Commission
Report, though released to the public roughly forty years apart from one another, show
remarkable differences and remarkable similarities.
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The Cultural Force and Power of Conspiracy Theories
The cultural force and power of conspiracy theories lies, in a large degree, with the loss of
central authority and the indeterminacy of information.5 Since 1960, and even before, a litany of
scandals and abuses of power have discredited the normally presumptive position authority
holds. Peter Knight observed that in the face of revealed scandals and conspiracies committed by
the government against its own people, conspiracy theories implicating the government of
wrongdoing are now a default assumption on the part of large contingents of the American
public.6 That loss of central authority thus gives rise to the indeterminacy of information. In our
time, when a globally significant historical event occurs, a deluge of information is immediately
available within the public through the media, especially through the Internet.
Competing sources, ones vying for the authority to narrate the happenings of such events,
quickly forward their own interpretations of what happened, who did it, and why it occurred.
While the more fantastic, the more conspiratorial beliefs may not be immediately creditable to
segments of the public, as more information is released, and as more conflicting evidence and
testimony is uncovered, the public has to make a series of choices as to whom or what to believe,
a task that, at least since the early 1960s, has been made more and more untenable.7 As Knight
indicates:
Whether we like it or not, all of us now live in a world in which there is a vast amount of
information but none of it is ever complete: there is always one more theory to consider,
one more expert opinion to consult, not helped by the possibility that the ultimate
consequences of any event threaten to mushroom outwards into a chain reaction of cause
and effect. And with so many different, and often incommensurable, sources of
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information, there seems to be no higher authority to which we can appeal in order to get
to the ultimate truth.8
The inability to appeal to a higher authority, the inability to find a higher truth, makes any
information that is provided suspect. Instead, the public has to sift through all of the competing
sources in order to determine its own truth. But the continual revelation of information never
provides the public with a stable meaning. Instead, information is constantly being changed,
challenged, and compounded. It is not possible to have anything but indeterminacy with such
unstable meaning, and it is almost certain that conspiracy theories will continue to grow, and to
be believed. The continued growth of conspiracy theories, and their ability to force officials to
attack their premises, is revelatory of the power conspiracy theories have over the form of
official discourse.

The Hierarchical Function of Official Discourse in the Conspiracy Genre
Official discourse plays an integral role in the development of the conspiracy argument. The
battle lines are drawn between the conspiratorial and the official as soon as conspiracy claims
gain enough cultural force within the public sphere to prompt a response. In confronting
conspiracy claims, official discourse takes on a double burden of proof- providing the American
public with an argument about what happened, who did it, and why, while simultaneously having
to argue that the government was not involved in a conspiracy plot. It is during its attempt to
―prove‖ that there was no conspiracy that official discourse takes on some of the substantive and
stylistic characteristics of conspiracy theories because it is in those areas of conflict that exist
between the conspiratorial and the authoritative arguments where officials have to strive to make
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their cases. Official discourse, in confronting claims of conspiracy, provides a necessary step in
the conspiracy genre.
The Warren Commission, overtly concerned with the problems that popular conspiracy
theories could impose on the social and political stability in the country, attempted to root out
conspiracy theories by directly confronting them. Conspiracists on the political left, prior to the
release of the Commission‘s report, raised a series of questions they believed the Commission
should answer to dispel the uncertainty surrounding the assassination President Kennedy,
especially concerns about ―establishment‖ connections to Oswald. Conspiracists on the political
right, however, believed that the assassination of President Kennedy was a result of a vast
Communist conspiracy that had been in the works for years. What is shared by the conspiracy
theories on both the left and right is the belief that the government was being usurped by dark
and powerful forces, forces that would keep the Warren Commission from being able to tell the
truth of the assassination.9 In confronting claims of conspiracy, the Warren Commission
mirrored some of the substantive and stylistic hallmarks of conspiracy arguments, namely the
strategies of argument from absence, the paradox of substance, overwhelming the audience with
massive evidence, and internal consistency.
Like the Warren Commission, the 9/11 Commission, too, was concerned with the cultural
force and power conspiracy theories wielded within the public realm. Within days of the Sept.
11, 2001, terrorist attacks, conspiracists on the right argued that a vast Jewish conspiracy was the
cause behind 9/11. It took a bit longer for the political left‘s conspiracy theories to flourish, but,
when they did, such theories posed that the terrorist attacks were, at the very least, allowed to
happen in order to provide an excuse to invade the Middle East and gain control over the oil-rich
region. Unlike the Warren Commission, the 9/11 Commission largely attacked conspiracy claims

163
indirectly by adopting a hyper-objective stance that disallowed anything but unanimity in its
conclusions. Furthermore, the Commission used massively documented technical information
that prohibited the audience from fully engaging in the information. When the Commission did
directly confront conspiracy theories, it used argument from absence in order to contradict
conspiracy claims. Finally, however, the 9/11 Commission, instead of addressing the American
public‘s fears, cast blame onto a supremely powerful foreign enemy imbued with evil. In
essence, the 9/11 Commission was using a conspiracy argument to combat conspiracy claims.
If we look at the salient characteristics used by both commissions in their attempts to
combat the conspiracy tide, we see a remarkable consistency with the forms they used. Both
asserted they were addressing the evidence from a materialist standpoint; they were simply
laying bare the facts of the assassination and the terrorist attacks. Both resorted to the use of
technical information that was left largely up to the audience to decipher meaning from its dense
prose. Both forwarded massively documented arguments to the American public. And both used
argument from absence in an attempt to disprove conspiracy claims. When compared to the
substantive, stylistic, and situational characteristics of conspiracy arguments, there is a
remarkable consonance between conspiracy arguments and the two commission reports.
However, just because official discourse and conspiracy arguments have similar forms does not
mean that both commissions participated within the conspiracy genre. Even though there is ―a
constellation of forms,‖ to borrow from Campbell and Jamieson, what is missing from official
discourse that exists in that of official discourse is the signature element of the conspiracy
argument; its ―self-sealing‖ nature.
Conspiracy theories become self-sealing because of their interaction with official
discourse. Initial conspiracy theories, such as those from Bertrand Russell and David Ray
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Griffin, propose a series of questions, of queries, of concerns that they feel must be answered by
official discourse. Yet, when confronting the evidence put forth in the commissions‘ reports,
conspiracists are able to look to the ―authoritative texts,‖ the government‘s ―truth‖ about the
event, and are then able to interrogate the evidence for its contradictions. Any questions that go
unanswered, any perceived distortions of the evidence, any bit of information that does not ―ring
true‖ with conspiracists‘ understanding of an event becomes further proof that there was a
conspiracy. In essence, official discourse provides the hierarchical function necessary for
conspiracy theories to gain their signature self-sealing nature. Official discourse confronts the
conspiratorial and then the conspiratorial confronts the official. In this way, both official and
conspiratorial are reactionary modes of discourse; both are attempting to uncover the ―truth,‖ but
the conspiratorial is dependent upon the official to arrive at its next level of meaning.
Official discourse plays into the hands of the conspiratorial. Any time a conspiracy theory
is confronted by officials, conspiracists can take the result of the clash of ideas and use it as
evidence that a conspiracy exists. Conspiracy theories, unlike their official counterparts, are not
constrained by the conventions of their offices, the rules of evidence, and the restrictions
imposed on them by the powers that be in telling their stories. Furthermore, because of their
mutability, conspiracy theories are able to easily adapt to the emotional needs of their audiences.
Official discourse does not have the luxury of mutability; it is supposed to serve as the definitive
and final narrative of an event. Once it is completed, it is forever consigned to the annals of
history unless a new investigation is opened. Even still, conspiracy theories are able to
continually renew their claims because new information inevitably comes to light. As more
documents become declassified, as more information about the secret dealings of the government
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comes to light, conspiracy theories have the opportunity to continually assert or reassert their
arguments while official discourse remains largely fixed and stagnant.
Conspiracy theories‘ cultural force now allows for conspiratorial understandings of
significant historical events to gain presumptive power in the face of tragedy. Authority is no
longer able to set the permissive terms of argument, choosing what to argue and how to argue it.
Instead, authority finds itself vying for authority over other modes of discourse, including the
conspiratorial. The burden of proof falls onto the shoulders of authority to not only make its case,
but to simultaneously prove that there was no conspiracy on the part of the government.10 In
essence, authority has to come out of its fortified position and attempt to make an argument
against conspiracy claims, what Whately said can be viewed as a feeble attack. In confronting
conspiracy beliefs, the official discourse becomes integral in the development of the
conspiratorial and functions within the genre of the conspiracy argument, and, in this sense, is
doomed to fail in containing conspiracy claims. If official discourse participates within the
conspiratorial genre, and if official discourse is incapable of prevailing over conspiracy theories
as a result, then it is revelatory of significant implications within political life.

Harnessing and Combating the Power of Conspiracy
With more people believing in conspiracy, and being seduced by conspiracy arguments, the
ability to have reasonable public debate is seriously diminished. Instead of entering a
marketplace of ideas where thoughts can be reasonably argued, the public is entering a growing
era of suspiciousness, unreasonableness, and disparity. With so many disparate voices
resounding within the public sphere, and with conspiracy beliefs becoming more prominent, the
ability of conspiracy beliefs to infect public and political life is at an all-time high. Everything
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done in the name of governing, in the name of the public good, is now suspect. While labeling
something done for the good of the public has always been suspect in the minds of some, such as
the fluoridation of water, the regularity of the belief that works being done in the name of the
public good is a part of a greater conspiracy to dupe the masses is now at a critical force. If
conspiracy theories are so easily believed, and if politicians, eager to maintain, and gain, power
in their respective parties continually attempt to harness the power of conspiracy beliefs in order
to mobilize support, then the public may fall victim to an endless, cyclical battle where the fury
of the fringe in political life is able to dictate the agenda of government.
Governance, instead of being about the greatest good for the greatest number of people,
may be doomed to the endless array of conspiracy beliefs fueled by special interests, what Jürgen
Habermas termed ―opinion management.‖11 Habermas argues that ―systematically creating news
events or exploiting events that attract attention‖ by focusing on ―human interest topics,‖ and by
then dramatically presenting ―facts and calculated stereotypes,‖ allows for ―a ‗reorientation‘ of
public opinion by the formation of new authorities or symbols which will have acceptance.‖12
Politicians as well as others who actively promote conspiratorial understandings of the current
social, economic, and political situations, are able to tap into the very real fears of many
Americans in these troubled times. By grabbing onto some of the most outrageous fears, such as
U.S. Representative Michele Bachmann‘s beliefs that we are moving to a single world currency
where China would be able to exert significant influence, or that expanding Americorps
programs is an attempt by the government to brainwash the nation‘s youths, conspiracy
advocates are able to exploit the very real fears that the government is going bankrupt and will
become subject to the wishes and whims of China, or that the government is increasingly trying
to control the lives of the American people.13
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Take the conspiracy theory that President Obama is not a U.S. citizen. The Obama
campaign provided a digital copy of his birth certificate in June 2008 to quell fears about his
authenticity as a naturally born U.S. citizen. Conspiracists were then able to respond to the
digital copy as a fake, offering that the failure to release the original document was evidence that
candidate Obama was not a citizen.14 In essence, the fears prompted a response, the response
fueled further fears and provided conspiracists the ability to make their theories self-sealing, and
attacks against such claims has prompted beliefs about the foreign birth of the president to rise to
an alarming 18 percent in public opinion polling.15 Part of the reason for the rise in conspiracy
beliefs about the president‘s birth certificate stemmed, at least in part, from the actions of
politicians in their attempts to cull support for their candidacies in the 2010 midterm elections by
tapping into the fears of the electorate. Instead of attacking vitriolic conspiracy beliefs about
President Obama, some Republican candidates fueled further beliefs because they never
expressly asserted their denial. Instead, candidates according to Jonathan Alter, provided ―coded
message[s]‖ that gave people ―permission to consider‖ conspiratorial understandings about the
president.16 In essence, Republican candidates tapped into the fears of those with marginal
beliefs in order to garner support for their candidacies.
Members of the media, politicians, and others who came out and attacked the conspiracy
claims frequently did so in a counterproductive way. In countering conspiracists‘ charges, it is
not enough for officials to simply provide the audience with ―facts and figures‖ and hope that
they ―will inevitably lead … to the right conclusions.‖17 Officials, in responding to conspiracies,
frequently relay the facts and denigrate what is being said and who is saying it. In doing so,
however, officials are not only failing to respond to the emotional fears of the people, fears that
are not completely unfounded, but they are also engaging in the ad hominem fallacy and thus

168
appear condescending, arrogant, and out of touch with the people.18 Such responses put
conspiracists in a defensive mode. In attacking the fears and beliefs of conspiracists, officials are
actually adding to the prominence of conspiracy theories, largely because they are failing to
connect on an emotional level with the audience. Forwarding an argument requires all three of
Aristotle‘s artistic proofs: ethos, pathos, and logos. Far too frequently, officials have relied
entirely too much on their credibility and their reasoning to set forth their positions; however,
credibility and reasoning are no longer enough to ensure a docile public because of the loss of
central authority.
Capitalizing on conspiracy fears in order to promote an agenda makes contemporary
political life fraught with problems. Every belief, every fear, every conspiracy, every mistruth
becomes fair game if it resonates with a public and can be exploited to forward an interest. Using
conspiracy beliefs to garner support a frightening trend. In a society where a battle is being
fought between the conspiratorial and the official, particularly in a society where the official is
steadily losing ground to alternative explanations for events and occurrences, what gets
determined as true and what gets labeled as conspiratorial may largely be determined by who is
able to mobilize the most support for their version of reality. This polyphony of authority is
dangerous because, as Hannah Arendt argued, ―The rule by nobody is not necessarily no-rule; it
may indeed, under certain circumstances, even turn out to be one of its cruelest and most
tyrannical versions.‖19 When officials use conspiracy beliefs to promote their own agendas, their
opponents are then put into the unenviable position of having to defend themselves against such
attacks, a quest that becomes almost impossible. Instead, the current political climate threatens to
become one where the side who can mobilize the support of those with the most conspiratorial
understanding of what is occurring in the political, social, and economic realms will gain power,
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thus begetting a continuous back-and-forth struggle among segments of the disenfranchised
looking for a way to have some modicum of control over their lives.

Taking Back the Political from the Conspiratorial
Scholars have posited that the only way to stem the belief in conspiracy is by enforcing greater
transparency of government.20 While greater transparency would certainly help, it is far more
complicated than simply laying bare the vaults of government information. The government
would also have to abstain from conspiring against its people. The manufactured evidence to
promote the War in Iraq; the disclosures on Wikileaks that not all is going as well as thought in
Afghanistan and the conviction of politicians such as Representative Charlie Rangel for ethics
abuses and former House Majority Leader Tom Delay for conspiracy to commit fraud, provide
the public with ample reason to believe that what is transpiring within the country is a series of
conspiracies against the people. Numerous reasons exist as to why conspiracy theories flourish,
and not least of which are the actual conspiracies that have been enacted. The umbrella of
secrecy under which several government agents and agencies operate only provides further fuel
for the problem, but the root of the problem stems from the loss of central authority precipitated
by the scandals and abuses of the government.
Parrying the influence of conspiracy theories also requires that officials, whether
political, academic, or other, tap into the emotions that underlie conspiracy beliefs. It is all too
common for politicians, for academics, and for that the median to diagnose the problems of
conspiracy thinking; yet, in doing so, these same officials hold themselves above the fray. That
attitude perpetuates beliefs that officials are elitist, and out of touch with the real fears of
Americans. Conspiracy theories typically start with factual information and marshal evidence
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forward to an inevitable conclusion. All too frequently, officials miss the very real fears—the
pathos—of the situation. Officials have to be able to connect in a more emotional way. Even
though conspiracy fears may not be rational, they remain deeply real to the people who are
experiencing them, and officials need to be able to understand the fears and rebut them in a way
that resonates with the people. Leaders have to be able to rebut conspiracy claims with a
combination of solid argumentation based on logic and reasoning, along with patience, kindness,
and compassion. In essence, we need to be able to find common ground between the official and
the conspiratorial.
Unless we can find common ground, unless we are willing to unveil the secrecy of the
government, and unless we can restore public trust, we are doomed, at least as it stands now, to
engage in a cyclical battle of wills between the disenfranchised and the establishment, a battle in
which members of the establishment knowingly participate.
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